Turkistan Islamic Party emir thought killed in 2010 reemerged to lead group in 2014

BY BILL ROGGIO | June 11, 2015

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/06/turkistan-islamic-party-emir-thought-killed-in-2010-reemerged-to-lead-group-in-2014.php

The emir of the Turkistan Islamic Party, who served on al Qaeda’s executive leadership council and who was thought to have been killed in a US drone strike in 2010, is believed to have re-emerged to lead the group after recovering from his injuries. If confirmed, Abdul Haq al Turkistani has been leading the group since the spring of 2014 without the knowledge of US intelligence services.

Abdul Haq appeared in a video that was released on June 5 by Islam Awazi, the official propaganda arm of the Turkistan Islamic Party. The video praised an attack “in Zawa township of Hotan prefecture in China’s Xinjiang region,” according to the SITE Intelligence group. The video was translated from Uighir to Turkish by the Turkistan Islamic Bulletin News Agency, which claimed that the jihadist speaking in the video is indeed Abdul Haq al Turkistani.

The Turkistan Islamic Bulletin News Agency said that Abdul Haq was “heavily injured in 2010” and was “unable to serve [as leader] until 2014,” according to SITE.

The relationship between the Turkistan Islamic Party and the Turkistan Islamic Bulletin News Agency is unclear, Adam Raisman from the SITE Intelligence Group told The Long War Journal. The Turkistan Islamic Bulletin News Agency publishes “a lot of material from TIP and reports on news as it relates to Muslims and jihad in Xinjiang and Syria and elsewhere in the Islamic world,” Raisman said.

The Long War Journal cannot independently confirm that Abdul Haq is alive and now leading the Turkistan Islamic Party. However, based on the timing of the succession, deaths of the group’s leaders, and propaganda released by the Turkistan Islamic Party, the claim from the Turkistan Islamic Bulletin News Agency that Abdul Haq was wounded in 2010 and re-emerged in 2014 does appear to be credible.

US intelligence officials said in September 2010 that they believed Abdul Haq was killed in a US drone strike in Mir Ali in Pakistan’s tribal agency of North Waziristan on Feb. 14, 2010. Pakistani officials also said that they believed that the TIP emir was killed in the drone strike. [See LWJ reports, Chinese terrorist leader Abdul Haq al Turkistani is dead: Pakistani interior minister, and ETIP leader killed in February Predator strike.]

The Turkistan Islamic Party never released an official martyrdom statement for Abdul Haq. In 2010, the jihadist group did name Abdul Shakoor al Turkistani as Abdul Haq’s replacement. Abdul Shakoor was also named by al Qaeda to command its forces in Pakistan’s tribal areas, an indication of just how much the global jihadist group trusted and relied on the TIP. He was subsequently thought to have been killed in a US drone strike in August 2012.

The reemergent Abdul Haq appears to have issued at least one public statement since the spring of 2014 without intelligence services picking up on it. In May 2014, Islam Awazi released a video that “claimed credit for the April 30, 2014, suicide bombings at a railway station in Urumqi in China’s Xinjiang region, and showed in a video the construction of a briefcase bomb used in the attack,” according to SITE. A person speaking in the May 2014 video (he is not identified) is the same person identified as Abdul Haq by the Turkistan Islamic Bulletin News Agency.

Another video, released in March 2014, identifies the leader of the Turkistan Islamic Party as “Abdul Haq Mansour” and uses an image of him, however his face is blurred.

If Abdul Haq is indeed alive and leading the Turkistan Islamic Party, he has been doing so for more than a year without the knowledge of US intelligence officials. Additionally, the fact that he is alive and not dead, as thought by US and other foreign intelligence services, demonstrates just how difficult it is to confirm the deaths of senior leaders and operatives who are targeted by air in areas under enemy control.

A member of al Qaeda’s shura

Abdul Haq, who is also known as Maimaitiming Maimaiti, became the leader of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party in late 2003 after Hassan Mahsum, the group’s previous leader, was killed during clashes with Pakistani troops at an al Qaeda training camp in South Waziristan on Oct. 2, 2003.

Al Qaeda appointed Abdul Haq to its Shura Majlis, or executive leadership council, in 2005, according to the US Treasury Department, which designated him as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in April 2009. The United Nations also designated him as a terrorist leader.

Abdul Haq was considered influential enough in al Qaeda’s leadership circles that he was dispatched to mediate between rival Taliban groups as well as to represent the Shura Majlis in important military matters. In June 2009, he was spotted in Pakistan’s tribal areas attending an important meeting with Baitullah Mehsud, then Pakistan’s overall Taliban commander. Abdul Haq and a senior delegation of Taliban and al Qaeda leaders traveled to Pakistan’s tribal areas to discuss the Pakistani military’s operation in South Waziristan. Among those in attendance were Sirajuddin Haqqani, the operational commander of the Haqqani Network; and Abu Yahya al Libi, who at the time was a senior al Qaeda ideologue and propagandist and later became al Qaeda’s general manager before he was killed by the US in a drone strike.

The Treasury Department said Abdul Haq has sent operatives abroad to raise funds for attacks against Chinese interests both at home and abroad. He also was involved with recruiting, propaganda efforts, and the planning and execution of terror attacks. In early 2008, Haq openly threatened to conduct attacks at the Olympic Games in Beijing.

In August 2009, he threatened to attack Chinese embassies worldwide as well as targets within the country.

Prior to the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, Abul Haq ran a training camp for his recruits at al Qaeda’s camp in Tora Bora in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province. [See LWJ report, “The Uighurs in their own words”.]

He later reestablished camps for the Turkistan Islamic Party in Pakistan’s lawless, Taliban-controlled tribal areas. The Chinese government has pressured Pakistan to dismantle the camps.

The Turkistan Islamic Party remains loyal to al Qaeda and has expanded its reach beyond China and Central and South Asia, and into Syria. The Turkistan Islamic Party’s branch in Syria claims to have more than 1,000 fighters, and the group played a major role in the jihadist coalition, which included al Qaeda’s official branch in Syria, that took control of Jisr al Shughur in Idlib province this spring. [seeLWJ report, Turkistan Islamic Party had significant role in recent Idlib offensive.]

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of The Long War Journal.

Report: More Than 100 Chinese Muslims Have Joined the Islamic State

BY BETHANY ALLEN-EBRAHIMIANJULY 20, 2016
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/20/report-100-chinese-muslims-have-joined-isis-islamic-state-china-terrorism-uighur/


Chinese state-backed media has claimed that 300 Chinese Muslims are fighting with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and authorities have blamed the violence emanating from its restive northwest on radical Islamist ideology and residents’ ties to foreign terrorist networks. U.S.-based experts and human rights groups have disputed both claims, arguing that China’s repressive political and religious policies have caused the tensions and that, at any rate, the number of Uighur Islamic State fighters is negligible. But new documents, leaked by an Islamic State defector in early 2016, suggest that Beijing is likely correct about the scale of Uighur involvement with the militant movement — if not about the underlying cause.

A July 20 report from New America, a think tank in Washington, DC, examined more than 4,000 registration records of fighters who joined the Islamic State between mid-2013 and mid-2014. These rudimentary questionnaires asked basic questions of each fighter, including origin, travel history, level of education, former employment, and previous jihad experience. Analysis of the records revealed that at least 114 Chinese Uighurs, a predominantly Muslim Turkic-speaking ethnic group concentrated in the northwestern Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang, entered Islamic State territory during that time period. Nate Rosenblatt, the author of the report and an independent Middle East/North Africa researcher, obtained the data from contacts made during his previous research in Syria.

The report indicates that Uighur Islamic State fighters were poor, unskilled, and uneducated — precisely none reported having attended college. On average, the Uighurs had the skill level of construction workers. Seventy-three percent of Uighur fighters in the sample joined the Islamic State after its conquest of the key Iraqi city of Mosul in June 2014, an event which greatly strengthened the military organization and its image as a viable state. And Uighurs in the sample had the widest age range among all the groups represented, with the youngest registered fighter aged 10 and the oldest aged 80. This likely indicates that Uighurs were more likely than other groups to have brought their families along with them. “These people are extremely poor,” said Rosenblatt in a phone interview with Foreign Policy. “They don’t have jobs. They don’t have good education. They hardly travel. Because the cost of traveling — financially and psychologically — are likely very high, it appears they are moving to the Islamic State on a more permanent basis.”

The Uighurs in the sample were entirely new to jihad.The Uighurs in the sample were entirely new to jihad. When asked if they had any previous experience with jihad, 110 of the Uighurs replied that they had not; the other four left the question blank. Seventy percent of respondents indicated they had never left China before embarking for the Islamic State. Rosenblatt said this suggests the fighters are not part of “traditional Islamic separatist movements that have existed in China for some time,” such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a Uighur separatist organization that China and the United States have labeled a terrorist organization. Beijing often blames Xinjiang unrest on the ETIM, while maintaining that Uighurs enjoy “unprecedented religious freedom” in China.

The lack of previous experience with jihad and the implied lack of contact with ETIM suggests that “it may not be that these fighters are as religiously motivated” as some fighters with origins elsewhere, said Rosenblatt, but rather that the they are looking “perhaps for a sense of belonging that they don’t get in China.” The Islamic State has targeted Uighurs with slick propaganda videos showcasing orderly classrooms full of children studying the Quran. “That is exactly what a lot of these fighters are looking for,” said Rosenblatt.

Chinese control hasn’t always sat well with the Uighurs, who have resided in Xinjiang for more than 1,000 years; after the collapse of two short-lived Soviet-backed republics in the 1930s and 1940s, small uprisings against Chinese rule have occasionally broken out in the region. Since the 1990s, pockets of Uighur society have increasingly turned to Islam as way to strengthen their resolve against state administrative controlSince the 1990s, pockets of Uighur society have increasingly turned to Islam as way to strengthen their resolve against state administrative control and Chinese cultural encroachment.

The security situation swiftly deteriorated after 2009, when ethnic riots in Xinjiang’s regional capital of Urumqi broke out between Uighurs and Han, China’s majority ethnic group. Almost 200 perished. Regional authorities shut off internet access for months after the riots and have heavily restricted foreign journalists’ access to much of the region. Chinese authorities have vocally blamed religious extremism for the unrest, while outside human rights groups have decried repressive religious and political policies and preferential economic practices that have benefited Han Chinese while marginalizing Uighurs in their own homeland. Authorities have implemented policies in Xinjiang which curtail common religious practices such as fasting, praying, wearing veils, and holding informal religious study groups.

The rise of the Islamic State has roughly coincided with increased violence that has spread from Xinjiang to the rest of China. In October 2013, five died when a car crashed into a group of pedestrians near Tiananmen Square in Beijing. The al Qaeda-affiliated Turkistan Islamic Party claimed responsibility for the attack in a video, with the group’s leader proclaiming on camera, “O Chinese unbelievers, know that you have been fooling East Turkistan for the last sixty years, but now they have awakened,” using a Uighur separatist term for Xinjiang. In February 2014, a band of knife-wielding masked attackers, later identified as Uighurs, attacked civilians at a train station in the southwestern Chinese city of Kunming, killing around 30. The terrorist attack shook the nation. In October 2015, foreign-based news agencies reported that 50 people had been killed in an attack on a coal mine, apparently perpetrated by knife-wielding Uighurs against the primarily Han facility.

But despite Chinese claims of radical Islamist and ETIM involvement, it’s been difficult to verify what is truly transpiring on the ground, due mostly to strict information control and online censorship. Unconfirmed rumors of police massacres of civilians have swirled among Uighur expat groups.

It’s also been extremely difficult to verify how many Uighurs have left China to join the Islamic State.It’s also been extremely difficult to verify how many Uighurs have left China to join the Islamic State. In December 2014, citing unnamed sources, state-run Global Times reported in that 300 Chinese Uighurs were fighting alongside the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. U.S.-based experts have previously disputed that number as “implausibly high.”

Uighurs within China are subject to travel restrictions, with local authorities confiscating passports and refusing to issue new passports. Even so, Uighurs seem to have left China in large numbers over the past two years as Chinese authorities have cracked down in Xinjiang. Since 2014, thousands of Uighurs have arrived in Turkey, many through human smuggling networks in Southeast Asia. In a 2015 interview in Istanbul with FP, Seyit Tumturk, the vice president of World Uighur Congress, a foreign-based Uighur organization that opposes Chinese rule in Xinjiang, said that some Uighurs in Xinjiang are desperate to flee, and that sometimes the only help they can find comes from extremist organizations.

“They don’t allow us to live as Muslims,” one Uighur refugee in Turkey told Reuters in 2015, referring to Chinese authorities. “You can’t pray. You can’t keep more than one Koran at home. You can’t teach Islam to your children. You can’t fast and you can’t go to Hajj. When you’re deprived of your whole identity, what’s the point?”

毒品走私出现新的严峻势头 呈显"西进东出"态势

來源：http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/1063/2689089.html
時間：2004年08月05日17:17

新华社昆明８月５日电（记者 秦晴）记者从８月５日在昆明召开的"全国海关查缉走私毒品工作会议"上获悉，尽管全国海关系统一直致力于全面提升缉毒能力，但仍然面临境外毒品渗透加剧和国内毒品来源增多的双重压力，毒品走私出现了新的严峻势头。

海关总署副署长盛光祖介绍，近年来"金三角"、"金新月"等境外毒源地对我国逐渐形成"多头入境、全线渗透"的复杂态势，欧美国家生产的新型毒品不断向东南沿海渗透，我国处于周边毒源的包围中。从海关查获的毒品案来看，旅检、邮递、货运渠道成为毒品走私的主要渠道。近５年来海关查获毒品数量不断攀升，查获万克以上毒品走私大案达４１起，其中仅今年上半年就查获千克以上毒品走私案件２０起，缴获各类毒品２１０千克。

据统计，５年来经昆明、南宁、成都、拉萨、乌鲁木齐、重庆、西宁等关区进境的毒品走私案件数量占查获案件总数的６７%，经上海、深圳、拱北等关区走私出境的案件数量占查获走私出境案件总数的７９%，毒品走私呈明显的"西进东出"态势。５年来海关共破获来自境外的毒品走私案件３０６起，查获海洛因、大麻等毒品１６７７千克；冰毒、摇头丸等新型毒品的走私犯罪也日益突出。

盛光祖分析说，除原有的缅甸--云南传统贩毒路线外，新的贩毒路线已被开辟，主要路线有缅甸--印度--西藏，再经内地省份到沿海地区出境；"金新月"地区的毒品经尼泊尔--西藏--四川--广东再到香港。拉萨、成都海关相继破获６起经尼泊尔、印度向我国走私毒品的案件；今年又首次发现台湾人从缅甸贩运毒品经泰国到福建厦门，再走私到台湾的最新贩毒路线。
来源：你好台湾网

新疆缴毒品8吨 一年查获吸毒人员1.6万人次

来源：山西信息港 http://cul.china.com.cn/cswh/2016-04/14/content_8704960.htm
時間：2016-04-14


新疆一年破获毒品案件2240起，缴获各类毒品8.19吨，查获吸毒人员1.6万人次，这是记者从4月13日召开的全区禁毒工作电视电话会议上获得的消息。

去年全年，全区共破获毒品案件2240起，同比上升1.86%，抓获犯罪嫌疑人2582名，同比上升7.85%，缴获各类毒品8.19吨，同比上升1.89倍。此外，全年查处吸毒人员1.6万人次，强制隔离戒毒4467人次，社区戒毒1805人次，社区康复216人次。

自治区党委常委、政法委书记、禁毒办主任熊选国指出，我区紧邻全球最大毒源地——“金新月”，“金新月”毒品通过我区陆路、航空口岸，向我区渗透的趋势明显，“金新月”毒品贩运手法不断更新变化，堵截“金新月”毒品走私渗透难度不断增大。

同时，新疆吸食毒品人群不断扩大，而且向年轻化蔓延。吸毒诱发违法犯罪活动突出，吸毒感染艾滋病仍然严重，合成毒品犯罪快速上升。去年缴获合成毒品超过前三年缴获的总和。

熊选国强调，我区禁毒工作要坚持预防为主，不断提高全民禁毒意识;坚持主动进攻，严厉打击毒品违法犯罪活动;坚持以人为本，加强吸毒人员服务管理。

暴力胁迫加毒品控制 新疆少年沦为犯罪工具

时间：2009年03月18日
来源：中国青年报 http://unn.people.com.cn/GB/14748/8980778.html

清晨6点多，天蒙蒙亮，一群10岁至20岁的新疆籍青少年离开廉价的旅馆和澡堂，来到内蒙古自治区呼和浩特市火车站，趁过往的旅客不注意，他们便偷偷跟上去，离开时，大多数人手里已拿着手机或钱包。

　　不久前，呼和浩特铁路公安局民警经过调查取证，一举抓获犯罪嫌疑人33名，这个盘踞在呼和浩特市火车站的特大扒窃团伙被彻底摧毁。

　　偷窃521元，“孩子”仅得1元

　　据了解，该团伙是一个有组织、有分工的犯罪集团，团伙成员大部分是被为首者以来呼和浩特市卖羊肉串、打工的名义招来的，到呼市后，他们才知道是进行盗抢活动。

　　团伙为首者图鲁洪自称为“爸爸”，其妻子称为“妈妈”，每名团伙成员除自己的真实姓名外，还有“爸爸”、“妈妈”重新起的名字。

　　“爸爸”手下有一批称之为“看孩子的”成员，系团伙骨干。骨干负责每日带领“孩子”实施违法犯罪活动。

　　“爸爸”每日给“看孩子的”成员下达盗抢指标，一般每人每天偷10部手机、1000元钱。“孩子”窃取财物后，全部上交“看孩子的”成员，由“看孩子的”成员再交给“爸爸”。

　　以某日行窃为例，“孩子”偷窃521元，交“爸爸”500元、“看孩子的”成员20元，“孩子”仅得1元。图鲁洪每日给每名成员10元钱饭费，承诺回家时每人给1万元。

　　图鲁洪的“收入”颇丰，仅近10日内从其中一伙“看孩子的”成员手中就获得手机27部、现金2400元。2008年12月1日，图鲁洪被抓获时，警方缴获马自达牌轿车1部、现金7000余元和价值数万元的玉石等物。

　　未成年人沦为单纯的犯罪工具

　　呼和浩特铁路公安局集宁公安处宣传科科长贾文成介绍，该团伙分成多个小组，2－3名成年人控制一名未成年人，利用被害人疏于报案和未成年人作案后难以被发现或被公安机关抓获后难以追究其刑事责任的便利，逃避侦查，多次躲过呼和浩特铁路公安局的打击。

　　在记者采访中，很多在车站开店和摆摊的生意人都知道这一团伙的存在，也看见过“孩子”偷窃过往行人，但都不敢管，如果“多管闲事”，就会遭到报复，连生意都做不成。

　　记者从警方的监控录像看到，有一个热心男子发现该团伙的“孩子”偷窃一个行人，上去提醒行人，却遭到“看孩子的”成员的围攻和恐吓。

　　据记者了解，犯罪团伙“看孩子的”成员除了在“孩子”偷窃过程中，用语言和动作向他们教授盗窃的技巧和反侦查技能，平时还时常教“孩子”被警察抓住时脱身的办法，如装作不懂汉语、自残等。

　　“一些不法分子往往瞄准未成年人的年幼无知，胁迫和引诱其实施犯罪，使他们沦为一个个单纯的犯罪工具。”贾文成说。

　　暴力加毒品控制青少年犯罪

　　“跟上去，手要快。”几个成人正对几个“孩子”进行日常“业务培训”。10多个年龄在10至20岁的青少年，围坐在出租房里，其中一个挎着包来回走动，另一个悄悄跟上，瞅准机会，探手拉开挎包的拉链，取出包内的手机、钱包。“孩子”中有“笨手笨脚”的，其后果是皮带抽、烟头烫等惩罚，直到“技能”娴熟，就被派出行窃。

　　“团伙中的未成年成员如果完不成‘爸爸’定下的任务或空手而回，就会被‘爸爸’用皮带抽、烟头烫、打火机烧等体罚，3名未成年人遍体鳞伤，惨不忍睹。”贾文成说。

　　记者在警方的取证录像中看到，10岁的阿乐（化名）两个手臂上有20多个烟头烫痕，后背和腿上遍布着被皮带抽出的瘀血痕迹。

　　据办案民警介绍，图鲁洪除了暴力胁迫青少年偷窃以外，还用毒品——大麻控制该团伙底层的青少年。

　　“我们最怕的就是图鲁洪断了供给我们的大麻，就按照他的要求偷窃，谁也不敢逃跑。”犯罪嫌疑人图尔深说。（记者李玉波 通讯员赵海东）

聚焦西部毒品死亡游戏 毒贩买卖猖獗不避警察

時間：2004年09月15日17:18
來源：《瞭望东方周刊》 http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/1060/2786484.html

　　“要是弄不好，我们就都得死。”线人老臧(化名)对记者说。

　　2004年7月9日，从兰州出发，经过20个小时长达700余公里车程的颠簸，记者跟随老臧来到了位于甘南高原的一处山区村落。

　　事先，经老臧再三要求，记者答应不披露其真实姓名和毒品具体种植地点--这是一条规则。

　　"这里，只要有山林的地方就有罂粟。具体地点并不重要，但说出去了，对我的人身安全却很要紧。"到达要去的村落后，老臧指着绵延不断的群山说。

　　一个多月前，国家社会科学基金项目课题《西部地区毒品犯罪对全国禁毒工作的影响研究》报告经数年努力，终告完成。报告披露了西部贩毒的种种"游戏规则"。《瞭望东方周刊》遂决定前往毒害重灾区甘肃采访。

　　"落了单就会被灭口"

　　7月10日清晨6时，老臧和另一位向导背着一天的干粮和水带领记者上山。

　　山路逼仄，下方即是沟深水急的白龙江峡谷，让人望而生畏。经过8个小时在山林中的艰难攀爬，下午2时许，终于在接近山顶的地方找到了种毒者用枯枝铺成的休息地，这表明，罂粟地就在附近。

　　此地海拔高度超过4000米，记者因为高原反应而大口喘气，双臂也被森林荆棘划破。老臧说："兰州或者县上来查毒的官员有多少人能冒着危险吃这份苦呢?何况他们根本不知道路，在山里几天几夜也找不着。"

　　"有一次缉毒队曾试图上山，种毒的人从山上扔几块石头就把他们吓回去了。从此，就在下面村子里开个会，吃顿饭，传达精神就完事了。"越过种毒者用伐倒的树干设置的藩篱，一块近一亩的罂粟地便一览无余地展现在眼前。除了一片地刚刚出苗以外，其余长满了半米多高的罂粟。向导说，这些罂粟还要过半个月才能开花，一个月后就能收割生浆，用来制鸦片。

　　向导说："像这样的地，在整个甘南的山区少说也有1000亩。这都算小的。"

　　记者取出相机正要拍照，罂粟地的另一头忽然有一个人影蹿动。老臧赶紧让记者趴下，他和向导用当地话向对方大声呼喊，直到动静消失。

　　"刚才好险，本来以为这个时候种罂粟的人应该不在。真是一场虚惊。他可能把你的相机套误认为枪套了，我们大声叫嚷才把他吓跑了。"

　　老臧说，"今天如果你落了单，就会被他灭口。深山里死一个人，没人会知道的。"老臧说，这些种毒者都有枪，来源就在本县的地下非法枪支加工厂。

　　在接下来的半小时里，《瞭望东方周刊》记者又接连发现了两块半亩大小的罂粟地。怕再生变故，记者决定在天黑前下山。

　　一天时间里所能调查的，不过是冰山一角。难以尽数的山巅在视野中环峙，如果不是身临其境，很难想像，当年红军长征经过的地方，如今已成为罂粟种植的渊薮。

　　"离我们这10多公里的邻村，那时候才厉害，生产队长带着全村人种植，光队长一家就种了6亩地，整个村子有上百亩，这样大规模地连续种植了4年，而且就种在离公路仅几百米的山沟里。"

　　"前年有个队长带着他卖鸦片挣下的几百万元逃跑了，公安来抓人的时候，整个村的男丁几乎都被抓走了。"一位村民对记者说。

　　《西部地区毒品犯罪对全国禁毒工作的影响研究》报告称，甘肃、内蒙古、新疆、云南、四川等省区非法种植罂粟、大麻等毒品原植物的情况非常严重。据统计，甘肃省在1988年发现有6个县市非法种植罂粟，到1996年发现有14个县市非法种植罂粟，而内蒙古非法种植的罂粟面积在高峰期间竟然高达5000亩。

　　报告称，据统计，1999年全国共铲除非法种植的罂粟1547．6万株，比1998年增加了1．64倍。2002年甘肃全省查处非法种植毒品原植物案件37起，铲除毒品原植物89387株。

　　"千万不能照相，否则我们一个都出不去"

　　2004年7月20日，甘肃省省会兰州市。

　　5年前，当《瞭望东方周刊》记者认识"大黄"的时候，他还只是兰州市城关区一个不太人流的毒贩。"大黄"大专毕业没几年，找不到称心工作，开始贩毒。

　　5年后，"大黄"身边已经有"小弟"了。圈内人说，"这几年大黄做毒品发了。现在查得这么紧，他手上居然还有'货'。"

　　然而，这个时候有"货"不一定是件好事，特别是一旦让别人知道了。也许是因为这个原因，"大黄"一反常态，开始"教育"记者："我也知道你想从我这儿了解一些情况。但毒品害人害己害社会啊!我早就不干了，这几年从来不沾。"

　　"你不知道吧，政府打得再厉害，就算从现在1克毒品都不进来，兰州的存量依然能维持这个市场3年。"不经意间，大黄仍然透露出他对兰州毒品市场的熟稔，他提醒道，"毒品的事，比你想像的要复杂得多，深得多，你最好别碰!我是出于你的安全考虑。"

　　临走时，"大黄"扔下一句狠话，"要是你还不识时务，你就继续调查吧，会有人把你做得冰冰的(兰州话：把你弄死)!"

　　《瞭望东方周刊》记者将"大黄"关于兰州毒品储量的说法向多位专家求证，专家说："兰州的贩毒网，网络广，根基深，为害久。有一点可以肯定，缴获的毒品只占市场流通毒品的少数。"

　　随后，记者通过关系，被领到一个黑社会毒枭的家中。记者装成是到兰州来旅游的，想搞点毒品玩玩。此人负责向兰州好几个场子提供毒品。但他回答说："最近不能出货，得过几天。"

　　兰州市和省内其他几个城市的一些公共娱乐场所，特别是一些"酒吧"、"迪吧"和"夜总会"，均发现了摇头丸、K粉等新型毒品。它们大有取代海洛因等传统毒品的趋势。

　　7月20日晚，兰州公安系统的3位干警带着《瞭望东方周刊》记者来到城关区一家有名的夜总会。进门前，他们特地关照记者把相机放人包中，"这家夜总会很有背景，我们去年专项整治时，都不能端掉它。你千万不能照相，否则我们4个一个都出不去!"

　　尽管记者对兰州市诸多夜总会贩卖毒品大胆猖獗早有耳闻，但是此话由公安人员说出，仍让人吃惊。

　　坐定后，就发现有可疑人员跟着坐在我们后面的桌子。"他是这个夜总会看场子的，在监视我们。可能发现你不像普通客人，他们产生了怀疑。"公安耳语指点。

　　12点，大厅表演的节目结束后，全场开始劲歌热舞。"这个时候，就是摇头丸等毒品吸食的高发时段。吸食完的客人可以这样high(兴奋)一晚上。"公安说。

　　记者并没有观察到毒品买卖的异常情况。借假装酒醉上厕所由服务生搀扶之机，记者试探询问。服务生在接过小费后告诉记者："现在风声紧，我们这里不是熟客是不卖的。先生不如开个包房，里头的服务就多了。"

　　由于担心已经暴露，公安带着记者转移到兰州市工人文化宫附近的另一家夜总会。一位自称是经理的女子表示，"一般我们是不卖的，但是如果你们消费到2000元，我们可以提供(毒品)。"

　　《西部地区毒品犯罪对全国禁毒工作的影响研究》报告称，西部5个省(区)、9个县(区)被国家禁毒委员会和公安部确定为毒品犯罪重点整治地区，一个重要的原因就是这些地方存在非常突出的吸、制、贩毒品问题，并且严重妨碍了全国的禁毒工作。

　　三甲集：中国最大毒品集散地之一

　　2004年7月6日，甘肃省临夏回族自治州广河县三甲集镇。

　　三甲集距离兰州86公里，是兰州通往四川、青海的交通要道，号称"西北第一集"，是西北重要的茶叶、皮毛和牲畜交易之地。

　　临夏回族自治州的东乡县和广河县都已被国家禁毒委员会和公安部列为全国毒品问题重点整治地区。三甲集镇曾被美国《时代》周刊称为中国最大的毒品集散地之一。三甲集的毒品吞吐量一度是非常惊人的，以车皮而非人次计算。

　　"上世纪90年代去三甲集卧底抓毒贩，看样品时，毒贩随便就从口袋里拿出一大包。"张立峰回忆道，"现在大有改观，但毒情还是很复杂。"张立峰是临夏州康乐县缉毒大队大队长，刚被授予"五一"劳动奖章。

　　广河县政法委的官员介绍说，今年5月三甲集抓了9个毒贩，这和以前比起来已经是"少得可怜了"。

　　如今，临夏的贩毒活动更为隐蔽，走私贩运大宗毒品的案件时有发生，而毒品消费市场则转以零包贩卖为主。

　　"如果是外人，在三甲集一眼就被认出了，根本打不进去。"曾经和当地毒贩交锋过的张立峰说。他告诉《瞭望东方周刊》，由于受经费和机制限制，临夏的缉毒工作至今未形成有效情报获取渠道。

　　值得注意的是，毒品地下销售网络仍然没有被摧毁，大的毒枭和贩毒团伙没有得到伤筋动骨的打击。最近，在北京、上海、江苏、新疆等地破获的多起贩卖"公斤级"海洛因的案件，都与临夏籍毒贩有关。

　　"外省破获的贩毒特大案件，凡是那些姓马的大毒枭，十有八九是我们临夏人。"临夏州禁毒委官员马小龙说。今年6月25日，制造新中国成立以来北京市最大贩毒案的年轻女毒枭马秀琴被执行死刑。马即是临夏东乡人。

　　甘肃政法学院公安分院副院长李波阳教授是《西部地区毒品犯罪对全国禁毒工作的影响研究》报告的执笔者。他说，近年来，为了逃避公安机关的缉查，毒品犯罪分子通过亲情、乡情和内部帮规组成了更为严密的贩毒组织，"枪毒同流"，"毒黑交织"，对抗侦查打击的能力不断提高；毒贩充分利用航空、铁路、公路等进行立体式贩毒；在贩毒方法上，采用伪装身份、人货分离、雇人携带、遥控指挥，藏毒方式非常隐秘，伎俩不断翻新。

　　"杀了老子儿子干，杀了丈夫妻子干"

　　无论临夏的三甲集、甘南毒品种植地或者兰州，都只是甘肃和中国西部毒品犯罪的一个缩影。

　　甘肃与新疆、宁夏、内蒙三个自治区及陕西、四川、青海三省接界，并与蒙古共和国接壤。从阿拉伯"金新月"毒品产地往中国东部地区的毒品贸易路线，从印度经过西藏的部分毒品，从云南及"金三角"经欧亚大陆桥的毒品都经过甘肃。

　　"其实，甘肃在解放前就是国际国内贩毒的重要通道，河西走廊当时已从丝绸之路沦为鸦片之路，我太爷爷那时就是玉门首屈一指的毒枭。有些毒贩家族几代就是干这个的。"一位当地人对《瞭望东方周刊》说。

　　甘肃地区地处北纬30度至5O度之间，属于干旱半干旱地区，非常适合罂粟和麻黄草等毒品原植物的生长。由于历史渊源，种植、吸食毒品在甘肃及其周边青海、四川、宁夏、内蒙等地的许多山区代代相承。

　　初步估算，在甘南和临夏，一亩地能够种近1万株罂粟，这里的收购价为l亩地2万一3万元。甘南得益于得天独厚的气候和地理因素，罂粟一年能产3季。也就是说，只要村民一年种上一亩三分地的罂粟，就能进账10万元，这对于年人均收入只有1000元的当地村民来说无疑是一种难以抗拒的诱惑。

　　知情人向《瞭望东方周刊》透露，甘南的罂粟主要由临夏人到甘南山区当地收购，然后和临夏产的罂粟一起卖到甘谷县和岷县再加工成粗制海洛因，俗称"黄皮"，然后销往全省各地，部分贩卖到其他省份。据说，陕西铜川一带和内蒙一些地方的隐君子一直爱抽甘肃产的"黄皮"，戏称为"绿色食品"。

　　一些毒贩发财之后，"荣归故里"、"大宴宾客"，成了当地农村的"英雄"、"榜样"，使无数贫困农民蹈其覆辙。而吸毒则又导致贫困。临夏当地流传"下云南上前线(东部)，一来一去几十万，杀了脑袋也情愿"的说法，甚至出现了"杀了老子儿子干，杀了丈夫妻子干"的家族性贩毒现象。（见习记者 穆撒）

　　死亡游戏

　　毒品是一场死亡游戏。涉毒的任何一方，无论是吸毒者、贩毒者还是缉毒者，都是在跟死神捉迷藏。

　　"我国法律规定，贩毒数量超过50克，即可枪毙。由于毒贩太多，临夏的一些地方已经出现了寡妇村。西部一些省区执行枪决的标准一般都酌情控制在100克一200克左右。"

　　一位甘肃禁毒人员说。

　　近年来，全国因吸食毒品过量导致死亡者累计已达2.5万余人。媒体最近报道，青海省已有272人因吸毒而死。

　　《瞭望东方周刊》采访所到的禁毒机关，从省级部门到地方禁毒委，从缉毒大队到基层的派出所，其办公室中几乎毫无例外地都设有简易床铺，充满枕戈待旦、蓄势待发的气氛。

　　谈起最危险的一次缉毒经历，缉毒队长张立峰说，"那是2002年到云南当卧底，扮做买毒品人和毒贩交易，狡猾的毒贩将交易地点定在居民楼里，我只能一个人去，对方3人有枪，云南警方都劝我太危险不能去，但我想，不去的话，几个月的追踪就化为乌有了，最终还是冒险单刀赴会，最终缴获毒品5200克。"

　　有的人就没有那么幸运了。2004年8月30日晚，毗邻"金三角"的云南临沧地区凤庆县3名缉毒警察在堵卡缉毒时，禁毒大队副大队长吴光林发出口令要求对方接受盘查，对方忽然开枪，吴光林头部中弹，当场牺牲，另有一人受伤。

　　据不完全统计，1990年至2001年，云南因缉毒而牺牲的公安民警达32人。

　　一位兰州军区驻云南边防部队的退伍战士曾作为狙击手多次参加对境内外武装毒贩的战斗，他透露，"边防部队的一项重要任务就是缉毒，对手是境内外勾结的荷枪实弹的贩毒集团，战斗中我们常有人员伤亡，我熟悉的战友就牺牲了1 O多个。"（见习记者穆撒）
来源：瞭望东方周刊