（由于移民新疆首府乌鲁木齐面临水资源短缺危机）
来源： http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/crisis-01082014181334.html
The capital city of northwestern China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is quickly depleting its available sources of water and faces a looming crisis made worse by a rapidly growing population and mismanaged environment, experts say.
The migration into Urumqi of large numbers of Han Chinese from China’s inner provinces has especially strained the city’s resources, Dr. Peyzulla Zeydin, a former associate professor of geography and natural resources at Xinjiang University, told RFA’s Uyghur Service.
“Following the rapid development of Urumqi, the large green zone along the Urumqi River has been destroyed, and numerous high buildings have been constructed one after another,” he said.
“No one is paying attention to the city’s damaged environment and shortage of water,” Zeydin said.
The Urumqi River, which is fed by a glacier, is among the key sources of water supply to the capital’s main reservoir. Another is Say’opa Lake, lying to the city’s east. The section of the Urumqi River that formerly ran to the city has now dried up, sources say.
An internal government report published in Chinese in 2012 and in the Uyghur language last year estimates a future jump in Urumqi’s population from 4 million in 2015 to 5 million in 2020, with the Xinjiang region’s current total population standing at just over 20 million.
And by 2020, the needs of the city’s increased population will far exceed existing resources, according to the report, published in Xinjiang Wenshi (History and Culture of Xinjiang) by Zhang Guowen of the Office of Consultants of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regional Government.
Resources threatened
Urumqi’s existing water resources are estimated at 1.12 billion cubic meters (39.6 billion cubic feet), according to the report. Already, Urumqi’s total annual consumption of “pure” water—1.10 billion cubic meters (38.8 billion cubic feet) in 2011—has surpassed the amount of the larger total considered fit to drink.
Additionally, natural sources of water to the Urumqi region are receding, with a glacier to the north of Urumqi losing mass each year and the freshwater Say’opa lake to the city’s east steadily shrinking in volume, according to the report.
Melting from bottom to top, the glacier has shrunk about 140 meters (460 feet) over the last 40 years, with the glacier’s total area reduced to about 40 square kilometers (15 square miles), the report said.
And the Say’opa Lake has dropped 2 meters (6.5 feet) in depth and shrunk by 10 square kilometers (4 square miles), according to the report.
Glacier No. 1, located in the Tianshan Mountains to the city’s north, “is the most important water resource for the Urumqi region,” Peyzulla Zeydin said, speaking to RFA.
“The ice cover is gradually melting due to global warming and damage to the area’s ecology, and the face of the Say’opa Lake is receding year by year,” he said.
Urumqi was formerly a “green city in which inhabitants carefully guarded water sources and planted trees and flowers in their yards,” Zeydin said.
“[Now], if the government does not invest in the protection of the ecology and water resources, Urumqi will become a cement skyscraper-covered city without flowers or trees.”
星期四, 1月 09, 2014
星期六, 7月 20, 2013
Violence in northwest China and Beijing's growth plans
COMMENT
In China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region differing cultural values between Uighurs and Han Chinese highlight the need for Beijing to review its ethnic policy to coincide with its development plans.
Recent violence at the end of last month which killed 35 people underlines the country’s ongoing struggle with its ethnically diverse border regions and the skewed living standards between people living near the coast and those deeper inland.
On the surface, what is happening in Xinjiang may not be as media-friendly as Egypt or Turkey, but unrest is just as geopolitically significant.
An historic heavy-handed control has already scarred relationships with ethnic minorities and a softer way of dealing with people inland could be evolving. Beijing is looking at new pragmatic approach for its border regions.
Xinjiang is located far inland near the Central Asian borderlands. The recent riots in the majority-Muslim northwestern region erupted just four days before the fourth anniversary of the 2009 clashes which killed almost 200.
It is unclear which ethnic minority the rioters represented, but state media has suggested a possible connection with Uighur exiles operating outside China that Beijing calls “terrorists”.
The exiles are angry at what they call cultural dilution as Beijing implements a massive migration of ethnic Han into the region to modernise core agricultural regions.
Fighting between the two groups is increasing and exacerbated by the vast energy reserves there which Beijing wants to develop. China has huge plans for the Xinjiang region, especially as it pushes westward into Central Asian trade routes and energy pipelines.
The stuttering march of development
Beijing is under pressure by such violence to find a way to reconcile its ethnic policy with its long-term goal of developing the interior regions into a wealthy and modern society.
Beijing is under pressure by such violence to find a way to reconcile its ethnic policy with its long-term goal of developing the interior regions into a wealthy and modern society.
China has struggled with Tibet in similar ways as Xinjiang because of the enormous distances to a diverse and ethnically divided interior feeling increasingly subjugated by Beijing.
Much of the legitimacy of the Communist Party in the eyes of the Han Chinese population comes from an expectation of continued stability and territorial integrity.
Unrest in Xinjiang has arisen from a policy of encouraging the movement of the Han to marginalise minority influences and integrate them into mainstream society.
But do these minorities want to be associated with Han lifestyle?
The fact that riots are erupting more often since 2008 as Uighurs push back against Beijing’s social engineering will worry Chinese officials trained in the ideology of sinic cultural superiority.
Clearly, the unique cultural traditions of the ethnic minorities are still closely respected, and adoption of Han Chinese culture – essentially a foreign one – is unattractive for many.
Calling Beijing’s ethnic policy in the border regions a total failure at this point may be premature. But building a “harmonious society” was always going be difficult for central planners.
Forcing two or more starkly different ethnic groups together under an artificial edifice has clearly not been successful, but there are some signs Beijing is considering more conciliatory policies.
China is must deal with its historic ghosts by keeping the interior docile and developing. In the past, revolutionary unrest has regularly been triggered in the under-privileged agricultural sector.
But Beijing’s go-to panacea for unrest – resolute advancing development – might have reached a violent ceiling in the northwestern provinces.
Ethnic unrest in China is not homogenous and differs from one restive region to another. Taken together, however, such clashes and public disobedience suggest China will continue to struggle with the complicated nature of stability in these areas.
China cannot very well adopt the Soviet strategy of forcibly removing whole populations. Instead, Beijing will continue diluting the populations and tighten security while adopting a softer approach to grievances to limit the unrest.
Nathan Smith has a Bachelor of Communications in Journalism from Massey University and has studied international relations and conflict. He blogs at LikeBulb
星期三, 7月 17, 2013
Xinjiang violence raises alarm bells in Beijing that the Uighur minority will push for independence
Thousands of kilometres from China's booming east coast, the Xinjiang region has become Beijing's gateway to Central Asia. But as the former backwater's economy grows, rising social tensions have erupted repeatedly into deadly violence, most recently in June. Should the situation in this ethnically divided region worsen, it could have negative consequences both political and economic for Central Asia.
Sharing borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is the point of entry for China's trade with the resource-rich region. Back in the early 1990s, this was mainly small-scale trade in consumer goods; Xinjiang's capital Urumqi and the former silk road city of Kashgar are both within a 1,200km radius of Almaty and Bishkek, where two of Central Asia's main wholesale bazaars are located.
Two decades later, not only has trade grown 100 times, increasing from $460m in 1992 to almost $46bn in 2012, it also flows in the opposite direction with oil, gas and minerals entering China via Xinjiang. China is now the largest trading partner for both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and among the top three partners of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, China's Deputy Commerce Minister Jiang Yaoping announced on May 28, Kazinform reported. As of 2010, while Central Asia accounted for just 1% of Chinese exports, the region absorbed no less than 83% of the Xinjiang region's exports, with 52% going to Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan's trade with China saw a steady increase during Karim Massimov's term as prime minister from 2007 to 2012. An ethnic Uighur educated in China, Massimov is widely credited with further opening up trade with China.
With China's growing demand for raw materials, there have been heavy investments into infrastructure to export Central Asian oil, gas and minerals. The Central Asia-China gas pipeline exports gas from the Turkmen Caspian basin to Xinjiang, via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, with Uzbekistan starting exports through the pipeline in mid-2012. Kazakhstan also has a direct oil pipeline link to China, and exports are expected to increase after the launch of production at the offshore Kashagan oilfield, where China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) will soon become a shareholder. There are also plans to build new road and rail infrastructure connecting Central Asia and Xinjiang.
Minority report
However, Xinjiang has become increasingly restive in the last two decades as millions of Han Chinese settled in the region, turning the Uighurs, who now make up just 48% of the population, into a minority. Growing social inequality is another factor. This has raised concerns in the Chinese government both about internal security and the possible consequences for trade with Central Asia.
The most serious outbreak of violence was in 2009, when at least 200 people were killed in days of rioting in Urumqi. The trigger was a demonstration over the "Shaoguan incident", the deaths of two Uighurs in a fight in China's Guangdong province, but it escalated into attacks on local Han Chinese and large-scale inter-ethnic fighting.
The violence also had an impact on Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries, which temporarily banned travel to Xinjiang. The move was intended to protect their own citizens and seal the borders against any potential spillover effects, but caused a temporary slump in trade.
Violence broke out again in June, leaving at least 35 people dead, with unofficial sources saying the death toll was considerably higher. The first incident was in the Turpan region, where a group armed with knives launched an early morning attack on a police station and local government offices, torching police cars and killing nine police officers and eight civilians before security forces opened fire. Just days later, there was a second outbreak of violence in Hotan, in the south of the region.
The Chinese press quotes foreign ministry spokesman, Hua Chunying, describing the Turpan riot as a "violent terrorist attack", the usual line taken on incidents in the region. However, there appears to be some acknowledgement of the social and economic pressures behind the attacks.
"The economic modernisation programme in Xinjiang has had less benefit for the ethnic minorities, especially the Uighurs, resulting in economic stratification between rural and urban areas, and different ethnic groups," says Dr Michael Clarke, research fellow at Griffith University and author of "Xinjiang and China's Rise in Central Asia". "Both Turpan and Hotan have experienced rapid urbanisation in the last 10 to 15 years, so there is a direct correlation between the central government's modernisation programme in Xinjiang and growing ethnic resentment."
Heading off trouble
Ironically, since the breakup of the Soviet Union the Chinese government had been pushing to develop Xinjiang, and promote trade with Central Asia, in an attempt to ensure the region's future stability. This includes safeguarding China against any spillover of instability from Central Asia or Afghanistan, says a report from the International Crisis Group.
"China's strategy seems to be the creation of close ties with Central Asia to reinforce economic development and stability, which it believes will insulate itself, including its Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, as well as its neighbours from any negative consequences of NATO's 2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan," writes the Crisis Group's Central Asia project director, Deirdre Tynan.
Despite being divided by the Chinese and Russian spheres of influence, Central Asia and Xinjiang share a common history and religion, and the Uighur language is similar to the Turkic Central Asian languages. There is a substantial Uighur minority in Kazakhstan of up to 200,000 people, while Kazakhs are the second-largest national minority in Xinjiang.
During the Soviet era, Uighurs in the Soviet Union were allowed a higher degree of cultural expression, probably in an attempt to unnerve the Chinese authorities. This continued immediately after independence, with a conference on the creation of an independent "Uighuristan" held in the former Kazakhstani capital Almaty in 1992.
This raised alarms in Beijing that the newly independent Central Asian states especially Kazakhstan could inspire the Uighur minority to push for independence. However, with the two revolutions in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan's own 2011 Zhanaozen tragedy, internal security has been made a higher priority in Central Asia.
While there has not yet been any political fallout in Central Asia from the 2009 and 2013 violence in Xinjiang, there are concerns on both sides of the border about the spread of unrest in either direction. "The potential for spillover is always there, given Kazakhstan's large Uighur population and the number of Uighur political organisations active in Kazakhstan. However, in terms of the recent violence, spillover to Kazakhstan in particular seems unlikely, give the security cooperation developed between the Kazakh and Chinese authorities," says Clarke, citing the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as an example.
本文摘自：http://www.balkans.com/open-news.php?uniquenumber=178684
Sharing borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is the point of entry for China's trade with the resource-rich region. Back in the early 1990s, this was mainly small-scale trade in consumer goods; Xinjiang's capital Urumqi and the former silk road city of Kashgar are both within a 1,200km radius of Almaty and Bishkek, where two of Central Asia's main wholesale bazaars are located.
Two decades later, not only has trade grown 100 times, increasing from $460m in 1992 to almost $46bn in 2012, it also flows in the opposite direction with oil, gas and minerals entering China via Xinjiang. China is now the largest trading partner for both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and among the top three partners of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, China's Deputy Commerce Minister Jiang Yaoping announced on May 28, Kazinform reported. As of 2010, while Central Asia accounted for just 1% of Chinese exports, the region absorbed no less than 83% of the Xinjiang region's exports, with 52% going to Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan's trade with China saw a steady increase during Karim Massimov's term as prime minister from 2007 to 2012. An ethnic Uighur educated in China, Massimov is widely credited with further opening up trade with China.
With China's growing demand for raw materials, there have been heavy investments into infrastructure to export Central Asian oil, gas and minerals. The Central Asia-China gas pipeline exports gas from the Turkmen Caspian basin to Xinjiang, via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, with Uzbekistan starting exports through the pipeline in mid-2012. Kazakhstan also has a direct oil pipeline link to China, and exports are expected to increase after the launch of production at the offshore Kashagan oilfield, where China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) will soon become a shareholder. There are also plans to build new road and rail infrastructure connecting Central Asia and Xinjiang.
Minority report
However, Xinjiang has become increasingly restive in the last two decades as millions of Han Chinese settled in the region, turning the Uighurs, who now make up just 48% of the population, into a minority. Growing social inequality is another factor. This has raised concerns in the Chinese government both about internal security and the possible consequences for trade with Central Asia.
The most serious outbreak of violence was in 2009, when at least 200 people were killed in days of rioting in Urumqi. The trigger was a demonstration over the "Shaoguan incident", the deaths of two Uighurs in a fight in China's Guangdong province, but it escalated into attacks on local Han Chinese and large-scale inter-ethnic fighting.
The violence also had an impact on Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries, which temporarily banned travel to Xinjiang. The move was intended to protect their own citizens and seal the borders against any potential spillover effects, but caused a temporary slump in trade.
Violence broke out again in June, leaving at least 35 people dead, with unofficial sources saying the death toll was considerably higher. The first incident was in the Turpan region, where a group armed with knives launched an early morning attack on a police station and local government offices, torching police cars and killing nine police officers and eight civilians before security forces opened fire. Just days later, there was a second outbreak of violence in Hotan, in the south of the region.
The Chinese press quotes foreign ministry spokesman, Hua Chunying, describing the Turpan riot as a "violent terrorist attack", the usual line taken on incidents in the region. However, there appears to be some acknowledgement of the social and economic pressures behind the attacks.
"The economic modernisation programme in Xinjiang has had less benefit for the ethnic minorities, especially the Uighurs, resulting in economic stratification between rural and urban areas, and different ethnic groups," says Dr Michael Clarke, research fellow at Griffith University and author of "Xinjiang and China's Rise in Central Asia". "Both Turpan and Hotan have experienced rapid urbanisation in the last 10 to 15 years, so there is a direct correlation between the central government's modernisation programme in Xinjiang and growing ethnic resentment."
Heading off trouble
Ironically, since the breakup of the Soviet Union the Chinese government had been pushing to develop Xinjiang, and promote trade with Central Asia, in an attempt to ensure the region's future stability. This includes safeguarding China against any spillover of instability from Central Asia or Afghanistan, says a report from the International Crisis Group.
"China's strategy seems to be the creation of close ties with Central Asia to reinforce economic development and stability, which it believes will insulate itself, including its Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, as well as its neighbours from any negative consequences of NATO's 2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan," writes the Crisis Group's Central Asia project director, Deirdre Tynan.
Despite being divided by the Chinese and Russian spheres of influence, Central Asia and Xinjiang share a common history and religion, and the Uighur language is similar to the Turkic Central Asian languages. There is a substantial Uighur minority in Kazakhstan of up to 200,000 people, while Kazakhs are the second-largest national minority in Xinjiang.
During the Soviet era, Uighurs in the Soviet Union were allowed a higher degree of cultural expression, probably in an attempt to unnerve the Chinese authorities. This continued immediately after independence, with a conference on the creation of an independent "Uighuristan" held in the former Kazakhstani capital Almaty in 1992.
This raised alarms in Beijing that the newly independent Central Asian states especially Kazakhstan could inspire the Uighur minority to push for independence. However, with the two revolutions in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan's own 2011 Zhanaozen tragedy, internal security has been made a higher priority in Central Asia.
While there has not yet been any political fallout in Central Asia from the 2009 and 2013 violence in Xinjiang, there are concerns on both sides of the border about the spread of unrest in either direction. "The potential for spillover is always there, given Kazakhstan's large Uighur population and the number of Uighur political organisations active in Kazakhstan. However, in terms of the recent violence, spillover to Kazakhstan in particular seems unlikely, give the security cooperation developed between the Kazakh and Chinese authorities," says Clarke, citing the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as an example.
本文摘自：http://www.balkans.com/open-news.php?uniquenumber=178684
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