作者：Peter Lee（Peter Lee writes on East and South Asian affairs and their intersection
with US foreign policy. This article was originally published on the
China Matters blog. Republished with permission.）
来源：http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/CHIN-02-150814.html
It's been reported on the always-reliable Twitter by a Pakistan journalist, Ali Kamran Chishti, that Abdul Maulana Aziz has declared his support for the "Caliphate of Abu Bakar Baghdadi", ie ISIS, or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, now the Islamic State. "Video to be uploaded soon". If confirmed, this is potentially big and bad news for the People's Republic of China.
Abdul Maulana Aziz was the radical spiritual leader of Lal Masjid, the Red Mosque, in downtown Islamabad. In 2007, after a prolonged and desultory siege, Pakistan armed forces stormed the mosque, signaling a partial fracture of the de facto alliance
between the Pakistan deep state and radical Islam.
The confrontation was little noted in the West, but it was big news in the People's Republic of China.
Followers of the Red Mosque had targeted Chinese sex workers as part of a purification campaign; Uyghur students - "terrorists" according to the PRC - were reportedly ensconced at the mosque, and, as the as the siege muddled slowly on its initial stages, radical Islamists retaliated against Chinese in other parts of the country.
In response, the PRC, which at that time relied largely upon the good offices of its local allies and assets to keep a lid on Uyghur extremism, demanded action. The then president, General Pervez Musharraf, torn between his military/intelligence and Chinese constituencies, obliged the PRC by sending troops personally loyal to him to storm the mosque in a bloody, catastrophic attack that probably claimed hundreds of lives.
Aziz had previously attempted to escape the siege by disguising himself in a burka, but was captured and paraded before the cameras in a humiliating fashion. His brother died in the assault.
Maulana Aziz was released on bail in 2009 and spoke to an adoring throng. The Guardian described the scene:
The 2007 siege had been a necessary sacrifice, he told them. "Hundreds were killed, many were injured. But today the whole country is resounding with cries to implement Islamic law. We will continue with the struggle.
"Now Islam will not remain confined to Swat. It will spread all over Pakistan, then all over the world."
Standing beside him was a senior leader from Sipa-e-Sahaba, a banned sectarian group that kills Shias, and which has close ties to the Red mosque.
In 2013, in another murky episode of Pakistan jurisprudence, the over two dozen legal cases against Maulana Aziz all evaporated without any serious government challenge.
Judging by Maulana Aziz's subsequent re-emergence as member of the Pakistani Taliban's negotiation team, one can assume his ties to the ISI intelligence services remain strong, and that he was cut loose with the hope that he would smooth the way in peace talks between the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Pakistani government.
The TTP is reportedly a willing host to Uzbek and Uyghur fighters, and does not adhere to the basically hands-off strategy toward the PRC followed by many Islamic militants in the region (China's links to militants run long and deep, thanks to its central role in funneling hundreds of millions of dollars of materiel to the mujahideen on the CIA's behalf during the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan). The TTP talks don't seem to be going anywhere, which is bad news for the PRC.
Maulana Aziz is apparently residing in Islamabad, so it remains to be seen what caveats or qualifications he places upon his ISIS allegiance in order to dodge legal jeopardy - and if he and the ISI (Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence) will encourage forbearance in the matter of enabling the training and infiltration of Uyghur radicals back into Xinjiang.
Best case for PRC, the bond holds despite Maulana Aziz's presumably deep resentment against the PRC for its role in the siege and the death of his brother, and his apparent sympathy for the extreme Sunni/sharia stance of ISIS.
Worst case, the ISI exploits radical forces and exacts a terrorist price tag in Xinjiang for PRC attempts to balance its support for Pakistan with its desire to strengthen ties with India, in a recapitulation of the bloody anti-diplomacy inflicted on Mumbai by Pakistan terror assets in 2008.
But in any case, the awareness that the dots are slowly but surely getting connected from ISIS to the TTP and onward to Xinjiang will shadow Beijing's thoughts, its Uyghur security policy, and its diplomacy with Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban, and its interlocutors among Islamic radicals in Pakistan's borderlands.
What follows to the end of this article is an excerpt from "In the Shadow of Lal Masjid", a piece I wrote in 2007 on the siege, and the important role that the PRC played:
The provocative kidnapping of 7 PRC nationals compelled Musharraf - reportedly under heavy Chinese pressure - to abandon a policy of appeasement and compromise with Islamic militants at the Lal Masjid mosque in Islamabad and, in July of this year [2007], launch a bloody assault that revealed the extent of the security crisis at the heart of the Pakistani military regime and displayed to the US Musharraf's - and Pakistan's - wholehearted reliance on China.
In the speech announcing the state of emergency, Musharraf broke into English to tell us what he hoped we wanted to hear, evoking Lincoln as he tried to justify his move to the United States, the EU, and the Commonwealth as a response to judicial activism.
On the other hand, in his remarks in Urdu directed to the local audience as translated by Barnett Rubin, Musharraf cited the Lal Masjid mosque crisis - not the pursuit of al-Qaeda and its allies in the border regions - as the primary instance of terrorism and extremism afflicting Pakistan.
And when he commiserated with the victims of terrorism, he took the opportunity to give a heartfelt shout-out to the Chinese, not to the United States:
Now. We saw the event of Lal Masjid in Islamabad where extremists took [the] law into their own hands. In the heart of Pakistan - capital city - and to the great embarrassment of the nation around the world... These people - what didn't they do? - these extremists. They martyred police. They took police hostage. They burned shops. The Chinese, who are such great friends of ours - they took the Chinese hostage and tortured them. Because of this, I was personally embarrassed. I had to go apologize to the Chinese leaders, "I am ashamed that you are such great friends and this happened to you".
Now, about the standoff at the mosque.
One could describe it as Pakistan's Waco - if Waco had taken place in the heart of Washington, DC.
It didn't get the attention it deserved. As the Times of India dryly observed of the attack that claimed at least 100 and perhaps 1000 lives:
... the week-long stand-off that ended in a massacre on Tuesday attracted little attention in the US, where focus is more on the debate over a pullout from Iraq. In fact, a news channel on Tuesday cut into a story on Lal Masjid to bring breaking news of a small airplane crash in Florida.
Lal Masjid was controlled by militant clerics who not only proclaimed their interpretation of sharia law - they enforced it.
An otherwise sympathetic observer declared:
One cannot have any objection to the Lal Masjid just preaching implementation of Sharia in Pakistan. So many organizations are doing so, one more cannot be objected to. The right of any Muslim to preach adoption of Sharia is one thing but to take the powers of implementing his own version of Sharia is another, and the latter is a function of the State. ...
Lal Masjid stands in revolt when it establishes its own Sharia courts, it passes judgments, and imprisons Pakistanis and foreigners.
Musharraf's administration had its hands full with the militant, confrontational, and well-connected (to the intelligence services) cleric who ran the mosque, Maulana Abdul Aziz.
The difficulties involved can be seen from this excerpt from a timeline of the mosque crisis compiled by B Raman, an Indian China-watcher who is assiduous in washing Pakistan's dirty linen on the site Intellibriefs:
January 22, 2007: Female students of the Jamia Hafsa madrasa attached to the Lal Masjid in Islamabad occupied a Children's Library adjacent to their madrasa to protest against the demolition of seven unauthorised mosques constructed on roads
in Islamabad by which President Pervez Musharraf often travels. The mosques were demolished on the advice of his personal security staff.
February 13, 2007: The authorities agreed to rebuild one of the demolished mosques to end the library standoff, but the students refused to vacate the library.
March 27, 2007: The female students, along with their male colleagues from the Jamia Faridia, another madrasa attached to the mosque, raided a house near the mosque and kidnapped a woman, her daughter-in-law and her six-month-old granddaughter for allegedly running a brothel. They were released after they "repented".
March 28, 2007: Some students of the two madrasas took three policemen hostage in retaliation for the arrest of some students by the police. The hostages were released on March 29.
March 30, 2007: Some madrasa students visited CD and video shops in the capital and warned the shop owners that they should either switch to another business or face the "consequences".
April 6, 2007: The Lal Masjid set up its own Sharia court. The mosque's chief cleric, Abdul Aziz, warned of "thousands of suicide attacks" if the Government tried to shut it down.
April 9, 2007: The Sharia court issued a fatwa condemning the then Tourism Minister Nilofar Bakhtiar after newspapers pictured her hugging her parachuting instructor in France.
You get the picture. Escalating confrontation, with the government conciliating, accommodating, and backing down.
After exposing the skydiving outrage, the students of Lal Masjid turned their attention to another font of impurity - a Chinese-run massage parlor in Islamabad.
The epic was reported in great detail in Pakistan Today. First, the abduction:
Male and female students of Jamia Faridia, Jamia Hafsa and Beaconhouse School System, in a joint operation, kidnapped the Chinese women and Pakistani men shortly after midnight Friday from a Chinese massage centre, working at House No 17, Street 4, F-8/3, alleging that they were running a brothel. ...
Riding in three vehicles, the students ... raided the massage centre located in the posh Islamabad sector. They overpowered three Pakistani males and guards posted there after thrashing them.
They, later, entered the building and ordered those present there to accompany them. On refusal, the students thrashed them and forcibly took them to the Jamia Hafsa compound. They accused the abducted people of rendering un-Islamic and unlawful services. ...
Ghazi [of Lal Masjid] said the China massage centre was involved in sex trade and complaints were being received about it since long. "Even housewives used to tell us by phone that the centre charges Rs 1,000 for massage while by paying Rs 500, something else was also available," he said.
Then the anxious confab with the Chinese:
President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz were earlier given minute-by-minute reports of the negotiations regarding the release of the hostages. ... The prime minister was in contact with the Islamabad administration and the Interior Ministry and getting minute-by-minute reports from State Minister for Interior Zafar Warriach. ...
The Chinese ambassador contacted President Hu Jintao two times during the 15-hour hostage drama, sources said. The ambassador called his president while holding talks with Pakistan Muslim League chief Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain at his residence. ...
Sources quoted President Hu Jintao, expressing shock over the kidnapping of the Chinese nationals, has called for security for them. The ambassador informed his president about his talks with Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain. The PML leader also got telephonic contact established between the hostages and the ambassador.
The ignominious conclusion:
The release came only after Deputy Commissioner Chaudhry Muhammad Ali and Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) Zafar Iqbal, who held talks with the Lal Masjid administration, beseeched it for five hours and even touched the knees of some leading clerics while begging for the freedom of the abductees.
Finally, the tellingly sleazy detail:
The administration quietly let two "big shots", Pakistani customers, go and released their vehicles, seized from outside the massage centre... The identity of these clients is not being disclosed.
Beyond President Hu Jintao's tender regard for the security and livelihood of Chinese masseuses, there was obviously a larger issue at stake. China did not want to see its citizens and interests to become pawns in Pakistan's internal strife.
It's a non-trivial point for China, which lacks the military reach to effectively protect its overseas citizens itself, but does not want to see them turned into the bargaining chip of first resort for dissidents in dangerous lands like Pakistan, Sudan, Nigeria, etc. who are looking to get some leverage on the local government - or Beijing.
It looks like China demanded that Pakistan draw a red line at the abduction, extortion, and murder of its citizens.
A week after the kidnapping incident, Pakistan's Federal Interior Minister was in Beijing. Once more from the Intellibriefs timeline:
June 29, 2007: The "Daily Times" of Lahore wrote in an editorial as follows: "During his visit to Beijing, [Interior Minister Aftab Ahmad Khan] Sherpao got an earful from the Chinese Minister of Public Security, Zhou Yongkang, who asked Pakistan for the umpteenth time to protect Chinese nationals working in Pakistan. The reference was to the assault and kidnapping of Chinese citizens in Islamabad by the Lal Masjid vigilantes. The Chinese Minister called the Lal Masjid mob "terrorists" who targeted the Chinese, and asked Pakistan to punish the "criminals".
One factor that would have intensified Chinese alarm and exasperation was a report that the attack on the massage parlor revealed a tie-up between Pakistan's Islamic militants and Uyghur separatists:
Mr.Sherpao also reported that the Chinese suspected that the raid on the massage parlour was conducted by some Uyghur students studying in the Lal Masjid madrasa and that the Chinese apprehended that Uyghur "terrorists" based in Pakistan might pose a threat to the security of next year's Olympics in Beijing.
In early July Musharraf apparently was able to invoke China's anger to overcome resistance within his armed forces, and move against Lal Masjid.
Even so, he was forced to employ troops personally loyal to him, as the Weekly Standard reported:
China applied enormous pressure to Musharraf. His previous attempts to order military strikes against the Lal Masjid had met with rebuffs. In late January, after the Pakistani army refused to raid the mosque, Musharraf ordered his air force to do so - only to see this order refused as well. Musharraf's eventual solution was to send in 111 Brigade, which is personally loyal to him.
The mosque was encircled by 15,000 troops and the siege proceeded in a dilatory fashion ... until three Chinese were murdered in remote Peshawar, apparently in retaliation for the siege.
China Daily reported:
Police officer Abdul Karim said that it was a robbery attempt.
But one witness said that attackers with face covered were shouting religious slogans when they opened fire on four Chinese nationals in a three-wheel auto-rickshaw factory at Khazana, a town some eight kilometers from Peshawar, the capital city of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province.
The Chinese outlets splashed the story all over the media, including their embassy websites, complete with atrocity photos - a treatment that the unfortunate demise of rickshaw factory employees doesn't usually attract.
Tarique Niazi describes the denouement:
On July 2, barely a week after the abduction, the government ordered 15,000 troops around the mosque compound to flush out the militants. On July 4, it arrested the leader of the militants, Maulana Abdul Aziz ... After apprehending the leader, government troops moved to choking off the militants' supplies of food, water, and power. But as soon as word of the revenge killing of three Chinese on July 8 reached Islamabad, it created a "perfect storm" for Gen Musharraf. Embarrassed and enraged, he reversed the troops' strategy and ordered them, on July 10, to mount an all-out assault at the mosque, in which Aziz's brother and his deputy, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, together with as many as 1,000 people, was killed.
(Copyright 2014 Peter Lee)
星期四, 9月 04, 2014
Iraq claims to have caught Chinese ISIS jihadist; releases photos of battered man
http://www.straitstimes.com/news/world/middle-east/story/iraq-claims-have-caught-chinese-isis-jihadist-releases-photos-battered-
Published on Sep 4, 2014 1:01 PM
Iraqi Ministry of Defence/Iraq says it has captured an Islamic State militant from China, which would, if proven, make the man the first confirmed Chinese national to be found fighting for the extremist Sunni militant group. -- PHOTO: IRAQI MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Iraqi Ministry of Defence/Iraq says it has captured an Islamic State militant from China, which would, if proven, make the man the first confirmed Chinese national to be found fighting for the extremist Sunni militant group. -- PHOTO: IRAQI MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
IRAQ'S Ministry of Defence has claimed to have captured a Chinese national fighting for the extremist Sunni militant group, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and posted two photos of an East Asian-looking man with a battered face on its Facebook page.
A short message accompanying the photos that were put up on Monday called the man a "Chinese daash" - daash being an acronym for ISIS.
If the indentity of the man and the authenticity of the images are validated, this could be the first confirmed case of a Chinese ISIS fighter, the South China Morning Post reported.
Mr Wu Sike, China's special envoy to the Middle East, has previously said that an estimated 100 Chinese citizens - mostly Muslim Uighurs from China's remote western region of Xinjiang - may be fighting for ISIS.
The Chinese embassy in Iraq declined to comment on the photos, while the Iraqi government and Chinese foreign ministry have not responded to interview requests from the Post.
Earlier, the US State Department said some 12,000 foreign jihadists from 50 countries have gone to fight in Syria since the conflict began more than three years ago.
In Austria, the authorities said they suspect about 130 residents - most of them foreign nationals - have allied themselves with Islamist militants fighting abroad.
In Asia, Singapore said in July it is aware of two Singaporeans fighting in Syria with their families.
Malaysia has held 19 ISIS-inspired militants who allegedly planned to bomb pubs, discos and a Malaysian brewery of beer producer Carlsberg. They wanted to establish a hardline Islamic caliphate spanning Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore, said police.
Three Malaysian women had also reportedly travelled to the Middle East in a so-called "sexual jihad" to act as "comfort women" for ISIS fighters.
Indonesia, the world's biggest Muslim-majority nation, estimates that 60 of its citizens have joined the fighting.
As many as 150 Australians are also said to be fighting alongside ISIS overseas, including at least one Sydney man and his young son who have posed for photos with a severed head.
ISIS has carried out beheadings, crucifixions and public stonings in areas under its control in Iraq and neighbouring north-eastern Syria, where it has declared an Islamic "caliphate".
Videos that have emerged since August 19 showing the militants beheading American journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff have enraged world leaders, with US President Barack Obama vowing to "degrade and destroy" the group.
Published on Sep 4, 2014 1:01 PM
Iraqi Ministry of Defence/Iraq says it has captured an Islamic State militant from China, which would, if proven, make the man the first confirmed Chinese national to be found fighting for the extremist Sunni militant group. -- PHOTO: IRAQI MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Iraqi Ministry of Defence/Iraq says it has captured an Islamic State militant from China, which would, if proven, make the man the first confirmed Chinese national to be found fighting for the extremist Sunni militant group. -- PHOTO: IRAQI MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
IRAQ'S Ministry of Defence has claimed to have captured a Chinese national fighting for the extremist Sunni militant group, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and posted two photos of an East Asian-looking man with a battered face on its Facebook page.
A short message accompanying the photos that were put up on Monday called the man a "Chinese daash" - daash being an acronym for ISIS.
If the indentity of the man and the authenticity of the images are validated, this could be the first confirmed case of a Chinese ISIS fighter, the South China Morning Post reported.
Mr Wu Sike, China's special envoy to the Middle East, has previously said that an estimated 100 Chinese citizens - mostly Muslim Uighurs from China's remote western region of Xinjiang - may be fighting for ISIS.
The Chinese embassy in Iraq declined to comment on the photos, while the Iraqi government and Chinese foreign ministry have not responded to interview requests from the Post.
Earlier, the US State Department said some 12,000 foreign jihadists from 50 countries have gone to fight in Syria since the conflict began more than three years ago.
In Austria, the authorities said they suspect about 130 residents - most of them foreign nationals - have allied themselves with Islamist militants fighting abroad.
In Asia, Singapore said in July it is aware of two Singaporeans fighting in Syria with their families.
Malaysia has held 19 ISIS-inspired militants who allegedly planned to bomb pubs, discos and a Malaysian brewery of beer producer Carlsberg. They wanted to establish a hardline Islamic caliphate spanning Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore, said police.
Three Malaysian women had also reportedly travelled to the Middle East in a so-called "sexual jihad" to act as "comfort women" for ISIS fighters.
Indonesia, the world's biggest Muslim-majority nation, estimates that 60 of its citizens have joined the fighting.
As many as 150 Australians are also said to be fighting alongside ISIS overseas, including at least one Sydney man and his young son who have posed for photos with a severed head.
ISIS has carried out beheadings, crucifixions and public stonings in areas under its control in Iraq and neighbouring north-eastern Syria, where it has declared an Islamic "caliphate".
Videos that have emerged since August 19 showing the militants beheading American journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff have enraged world leaders, with US President Barack Obama vowing to "degrade and destroy" the group.
Uighur girls get calls to be ISIS sex slaves
来源：http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/Uighur-girls-get-calls-to-be-ISIS-sex-slaves/articleshow/40231161.cms
时间：Aug 14, 2014, 06.40AM IST
Chinese police is probing claims that teenage Uighur girls based outside the Xinjiang province were being telephoned and asked to serve as "sex slaves" for ISIS jihadists in the Middle East.
BEIJING: Chinese police is probing claims that teenage Uighur girls based outside the Xinjiang province were being telephoned and asked to serve as " sex slaves" for ISIS jihadists in the Middle East.
State-run Global Times, quoting online posts alleging a number of phone calls made to Uighur girls, reported that they were being telephoned and asked to serve as "sex slaves" by ISIS jihadists.
Xinjiang, which is on boil over the native Muslim Uighur protests opposing Han settlements, as well as several parts of China has witnessed terror attacks carried out by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) comprising of Uighur youth who have also been found to be fighting in Syria along with ISIS.
A post on Sina Weibo, akin to Twitter, claimed some high school Uighur students from Xinjiang, have received these calls. These appear to be soliciting them to give up studying and travel to Iraq to become "sex slaves".
The post immediately caught wide attention and was reposted at least 2,000 times before it was deleted on Monday. A person identified as Zheng who claimed knowledge about such calls was quoted by the Chinese daily as saying that he was told by several Uighur school girls about similar phone calls."They told me that they received anonymous calls, asking them to go to Syria through Indonesia for battlefield service. They were asked to dedicate themselves to jihadists. But the girls did not report this to the police. They were hesitant, because (they thought) all Muslims are brothers and sisters," Zheng noted.
He said the solicitation may expand from individuals to larger groups.
"Many teenagers (studying outside Xinjiang) are from rural areas in southern Xinjiang. They are easily affected due to their family backgrounds," Zheng said.
Police in Altay prefecture in Xinjiang said they are following up on the issue. "It is possible that such calls do exist,One of our investigation focuses at present is how the students' numbers were leaked," an officer from the Altay bureau said. pti The officer added that before local students leave to attend schools outside the region, they all have to go through a training session.
"Such training is more about warning against participation in illegal religious activities, instead of being designed to guard against such calls, but I believe students will be highly alert if they receive such calls," the officer said.
Meanwhile, an anti-terrorism official in Xinjiang said they have taken note of similar online revelations, and authorities are looking into the issue.
However, this is yet to be confirmed. Li Wei, an expert on anti-terrorism with the Chinese Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, said it would be very difficult to actually send those students out of the country, even if the alleged instigators are able to contact the students.
Sun Lizhou, a Xinjiang-born scholar from Chongqing University, said the authenticity of such calls still needs to be verified, "but since some Uygurs are reportedly fighting alongside IS in Syria, it would be possible to speak to the students on the phone."
"Junior or senior high school students are an easy target of such incitement since they are psychologically immature and many are rebellious in their teenage years. A lack of objective judgment also makes them vulnerable to these audio or video files," Li said.
An anonymous anti-terrorism official in Xinjiang said separatist groups tend to link themselves with overseas terrorist organizations, such as the IS, so as to boost their international standing, and win recognition from those groups in exchange for financial and personnel support.
The IS is also reportedly planning on expanding its "holy war" to Xinjiang.
According to a report from Phoenix Weekly, in a video released early July, IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi claimed he will take revenge on those who took away the rights of Muslims in 20 countries, with China allegedly placed at the top.
"This is the habitual practice of terrorist groups for propaganda efforts. It won't have any substantial influence," Li said.
时间：Aug 14, 2014, 06.40AM IST
Chinese police is probing claims that teenage Uighur girls based outside the Xinjiang province were being telephoned and asked to serve as "sex slaves" for ISIS jihadists in the Middle East.
BEIJING: Chinese police is probing claims that teenage Uighur girls based outside the Xinjiang province were being telephoned and asked to serve as " sex slaves" for ISIS jihadists in the Middle East.
State-run Global Times, quoting online posts alleging a number of phone calls made to Uighur girls, reported that they were being telephoned and asked to serve as "sex slaves" by ISIS jihadists.
Xinjiang, which is on boil over the native Muslim Uighur protests opposing Han settlements, as well as several parts of China has witnessed terror attacks carried out by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) comprising of Uighur youth who have also been found to be fighting in Syria along with ISIS.
A post on Sina Weibo, akin to Twitter, claimed some high school Uighur students from Xinjiang, have received these calls. These appear to be soliciting them to give up studying and travel to Iraq to become "sex slaves".
The post immediately caught wide attention and was reposted at least 2,000 times before it was deleted on Monday. A person identified as Zheng who claimed knowledge about such calls was quoted by the Chinese daily as saying that he was told by several Uighur school girls about similar phone calls."They told me that they received anonymous calls, asking them to go to Syria through Indonesia for battlefield service. They were asked to dedicate themselves to jihadists. But the girls did not report this to the police. They were hesitant, because (they thought) all Muslims are brothers and sisters," Zheng noted.
He said the solicitation may expand from individuals to larger groups.
"Many teenagers (studying outside Xinjiang) are from rural areas in southern Xinjiang. They are easily affected due to their family backgrounds," Zheng said.
Police in Altay prefecture in Xinjiang said they are following up on the issue. "It is possible that such calls do exist,One of our investigation focuses at present is how the students' numbers were leaked," an officer from the Altay bureau said. pti The officer added that before local students leave to attend schools outside the region, they all have to go through a training session.
"Such training is more about warning against participation in illegal religious activities, instead of being designed to guard against such calls, but I believe students will be highly alert if they receive such calls," the officer said.
Meanwhile, an anti-terrorism official in Xinjiang said they have taken note of similar online revelations, and authorities are looking into the issue.
However, this is yet to be confirmed. Li Wei, an expert on anti-terrorism with the Chinese Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, said it would be very difficult to actually send those students out of the country, even if the alleged instigators are able to contact the students.
Sun Lizhou, a Xinjiang-born scholar from Chongqing University, said the authenticity of such calls still needs to be verified, "but since some Uygurs are reportedly fighting alongside IS in Syria, it would be possible to speak to the students on the phone."
"Junior or senior high school students are an easy target of such incitement since they are psychologically immature and many are rebellious in their teenage years. A lack of objective judgment also makes them vulnerable to these audio or video files," Li said.
An anonymous anti-terrorism official in Xinjiang said separatist groups tend to link themselves with overseas terrorist organizations, such as the IS, so as to boost their international standing, and win recognition from those groups in exchange for financial and personnel support.
The IS is also reportedly planning on expanding its "holy war" to Xinjiang.
According to a report from Phoenix Weekly, in a video released early July, IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi claimed he will take revenge on those who took away the rights of Muslims in 20 countries, with China allegedly placed at the top.
"This is the habitual practice of terrorist groups for propaganda efforts. It won't have any substantial influence," Li said.
伊斯兰圣战组织通过暴力和教规建立秩序
作者：an employee of THE NEW YORK TIMES, BEN HUBBARD
来源：纽约时报 http://cn.nytimes.com/world/20140725/c25raqqa/
时间：2014年07月25日
叙利亚拉卡——叙利亚北部城市阿勒颇的一名商人，在自己的工厂被炸毁之后，对两个前景凄凉的选择进行了权衡：一是留在家中，可能会在以后的空袭中丧命，二是和数以万计的其他人一样，逃往土耳其的一个难民营。
结果，他带着剩下的钱财，搬到了阿勒颇以东不远的城市拉卡，世界上发展最迅猛的圣战组织实质上的首府。他发现那里存在某种程度的秩序和安全，是叙利亚其他地区所没有的。
“在叙利亚，战斗还将继续，而我们必须活下去，”这名商人一边看着十几个工人在他新开的拉卡童装厂里工作，一边说。他只透露自己的名字叫卡德里(Qadri)。
这里的极端组织名为伊拉克与叙利亚伊斯兰国（Islamic State in Iraq and Syria，简称ISIS），在他们进军伊拉克，并攻下了那里一大片领土的很久之前，ISIS就在人口约100万的拉卡省占据了大部分地区，并在其首府设立了总部。通过战略管理和诉诸蛮力，这个自称为伊斯兰国家的组织已经开始贯彻其建国治国的愿景，该愿景是伊斯兰教原教旨主义和治国实务的一个融合。
令人惊讶的是，随着时间推移，它已经赢得了一些厌战民众的敬意。卡德里就是一个例子，只要一个组织能够恢复正常生活的表象，他就可以接受其权威。相比之下，叛军控制的阿勒颇地区却仍然粮食短缺，犯罪猖獗。但是，伊斯兰统治也有更加阴暗的一面，比如公开处决犯人，社会规范严苛，这些已经让很多拉卡人对未来感到忧心忡忡，以前这里是一个宽容度较高的地方。
在拉卡城内，交警保持着交叉路口的畅通，犯罪现象十分罕见，收税人员会开收据。但是，一些被认为亵渎神灵的东西遭到了破坏，比如拉希德公园(Al Rasheed Park)标志性的狮子塑像。一些公共场所，比如青年男女在晚间出游谈情的阿玛西广场(Amasy Square)，已经用沉重的金属围栏隔开，插上了ISIS的黑色旗帜。实施偷盗行为的人，则被砍手示众。
“我在拉卡看到的情况显示，ISIS拥有清晰的愿景，即建立一个名副其实的伊斯兰式国家，”拉卡城的一名退休教师说。“这可不是在开玩笑。”
当ISIS巩固其在叙利亚和伊拉克边境占据的领土上的控制权时，你可以从它统治拉卡的方式中，了解它意欲何为。《纽约时报》的一名员工最近在拉卡待了六天，并采访了那里的十几名居民。本文不会提及该员工和受访者的姓名，以保护他们免遭报复，因为极端分子追杀过一些他们认为反对自己计划的人。
对于ISIS来说，位于幼发拉底河流域的拉卡是一个试点城市，今年年初，ISIS确立了自己在该市的终极权威地位。在击溃叙利亚其他民兵组织及伊拉克军队的战斗中，ISIS已经证明了它的军事实力。但是在位于农业枢纽地区的拉卡，它才拥有了大量时间，来把自己的意识形态变成现实。因为这里没有可以取代ISIS的其他军事力量，这个项目可能不会很快终止。
一个从其他地方来到拉卡的援助人员说，ISIS的队伍中充斥着情绪无常的年轻人，其中很多都是对暴力比对治理国家更感兴趣的外国人。为了让城市运转起来，ISIS通过威逼利诱，让技术人员留在自己的岗位上，并派出忠于ISIS的管理者来监督他们，以确保事情符合伊斯兰教规。
“他们不能解雇所有员工，把医院的全部岗位都换成新人，所以他们就换上了那些会执行他们的规则和条例的管理者”，这名援助人员说，他不愿透露姓名，以免危害到自己的工作。
拉卡有三座教堂，曾经是活跃的基督教少数派的聚集场所，现在已经全部关闭了。ISIS占领了最大的亚美尼亚天主教殉教者教堂(Armenian Catholic Martyrs Church)后，摘下了十字架，挂上了黑旗，将它改成了一个伊斯兰教场所，用来播放战斗和自杀行动的视频，以招募新战士。
剩下的寥寥几名基督徒每个月要交几美元的少数派团体税。在穆斯林祈祷的时候，虔诚的ISIS警官会四处巡逻，确保所有商铺关门，基督徒也必须遵守。
比较务实的是，ISIS做到了在市场里有食物，面包店和加油站也都在正常运转。但在饮用水和电力方面遇到了较大问题，一天里有长达20个小时是不予供应的。
大概是意识到手下这些年轻的极端分子主要是冲着教派暴力冲突而来，没有什么职业技能，ISIS领导人阿布·巴克尔·巴格达迪(Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi)在最近发布的一段讲话录音中召唤医生和工程师前往拉卡这样的地方，协助建设他新成立的伊斯兰国。“他们的迁居是一种义务，这样才可以响应穆斯林的急切召唤，”巴格达迪说。
在拉卡已经能看到国际动员的迹象，检查站的枪手中时常有来自沙特、埃及、突尼斯或利比亚的人员。掌管拉卡电力供应的是一个苏丹人，一个约旦人在管理一家医院，据他的叙利亚下属说，此人的顶头上司是个埃及人。
上月ISIS向伊拉克进军后，那个约旦人去了摩苏尔，参与筹建了一座医院，而后回到拉卡。
“他说话的时候带着热切的眼神，说在拉卡开始的哈里发伊斯兰统治将会传播到整个地区，”他手下的一名雇员说。
《纽约时报》一名雇员自拉卡、Ben Hubbard自黎巴嫩贝鲁特报道。Hwaida Saad和Mohammad Ghannam自贝鲁特对本文有报道贡献。
翻译：经雷、土土
来源：纽约时报 http://cn.nytimes.com/world/20140725/c25raqqa/
时间：2014年07月25日
叙利亚拉卡——叙利亚北部城市阿勒颇的一名商人，在自己的工厂被炸毁之后，对两个前景凄凉的选择进行了权衡：一是留在家中，可能会在以后的空袭中丧命，二是和数以万计的其他人一样，逃往土耳其的一个难民营。
结果，他带着剩下的钱财，搬到了阿勒颇以东不远的城市拉卡，世界上发展最迅猛的圣战组织实质上的首府。他发现那里存在某种程度的秩序和安全，是叙利亚其他地区所没有的。
“在叙利亚，战斗还将继续，而我们必须活下去，”这名商人一边看着十几个工人在他新开的拉卡童装厂里工作，一边说。他只透露自己的名字叫卡德里(Qadri)。
这里的极端组织名为伊拉克与叙利亚伊斯兰国（Islamic State in Iraq and Syria，简称ISIS），在他们进军伊拉克，并攻下了那里一大片领土的很久之前，ISIS就在人口约100万的拉卡省占据了大部分地区，并在其首府设立了总部。通过战略管理和诉诸蛮力，这个自称为伊斯兰国家的组织已经开始贯彻其建国治国的愿景，该愿景是伊斯兰教原教旨主义和治国实务的一个融合。
令人惊讶的是，随着时间推移，它已经赢得了一些厌战民众的敬意。卡德里就是一个例子，只要一个组织能够恢复正常生活的表象，他就可以接受其权威。相比之下，叛军控制的阿勒颇地区却仍然粮食短缺，犯罪猖獗。但是，伊斯兰统治也有更加阴暗的一面，比如公开处决犯人，社会规范严苛，这些已经让很多拉卡人对未来感到忧心忡忡，以前这里是一个宽容度较高的地方。
在拉卡城内，交警保持着交叉路口的畅通，犯罪现象十分罕见，收税人员会开收据。但是，一些被认为亵渎神灵的东西遭到了破坏，比如拉希德公园(Al Rasheed Park)标志性的狮子塑像。一些公共场所，比如青年男女在晚间出游谈情的阿玛西广场(Amasy Square)，已经用沉重的金属围栏隔开，插上了ISIS的黑色旗帜。实施偷盗行为的人，则被砍手示众。
“我在拉卡看到的情况显示，ISIS拥有清晰的愿景，即建立一个名副其实的伊斯兰式国家，”拉卡城的一名退休教师说。“这可不是在开玩笑。”
当ISIS巩固其在叙利亚和伊拉克边境占据的领土上的控制权时，你可以从它统治拉卡的方式中，了解它意欲何为。《纽约时报》的一名员工最近在拉卡待了六天，并采访了那里的十几名居民。本文不会提及该员工和受访者的姓名，以保护他们免遭报复，因为极端分子追杀过一些他们认为反对自己计划的人。
对于ISIS来说，位于幼发拉底河流域的拉卡是一个试点城市，今年年初，ISIS确立了自己在该市的终极权威地位。在击溃叙利亚其他民兵组织及伊拉克军队的战斗中，ISIS已经证明了它的军事实力。但是在位于农业枢纽地区的拉卡，它才拥有了大量时间，来把自己的意识形态变成现实。因为这里没有可以取代ISIS的其他军事力量，这个项目可能不会很快终止。
一个从其他地方来到拉卡的援助人员说，ISIS的队伍中充斥着情绪无常的年轻人，其中很多都是对暴力比对治理国家更感兴趣的外国人。为了让城市运转起来，ISIS通过威逼利诱，让技术人员留在自己的岗位上，并派出忠于ISIS的管理者来监督他们，以确保事情符合伊斯兰教规。
“他们不能解雇所有员工，把医院的全部岗位都换成新人，所以他们就换上了那些会执行他们的规则和条例的管理者”，这名援助人员说，他不愿透露姓名，以免危害到自己的工作。
拉卡有三座教堂，曾经是活跃的基督教少数派的聚集场所，现在已经全部关闭了。ISIS占领了最大的亚美尼亚天主教殉教者教堂(Armenian Catholic Martyrs Church)后，摘下了十字架，挂上了黑旗，将它改成了一个伊斯兰教场所，用来播放战斗和自杀行动的视频，以招募新战士。
剩下的寥寥几名基督徒每个月要交几美元的少数派团体税。在穆斯林祈祷的时候，虔诚的ISIS警官会四处巡逻，确保所有商铺关门，基督徒也必须遵守。
比较务实的是，ISIS做到了在市场里有食物，面包店和加油站也都在正常运转。但在饮用水和电力方面遇到了较大问题，一天里有长达20个小时是不予供应的。
大概是意识到手下这些年轻的极端分子主要是冲着教派暴力冲突而来，没有什么职业技能，ISIS领导人阿布·巴克尔·巴格达迪(Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi)在最近发布的一段讲话录音中召唤医生和工程师前往拉卡这样的地方，协助建设他新成立的伊斯兰国。“他们的迁居是一种义务，这样才可以响应穆斯林的急切召唤，”巴格达迪说。
在拉卡已经能看到国际动员的迹象，检查站的枪手中时常有来自沙特、埃及、突尼斯或利比亚的人员。掌管拉卡电力供应的是一个苏丹人，一个约旦人在管理一家医院，据他的叙利亚下属说，此人的顶头上司是个埃及人。
上月ISIS向伊拉克进军后，那个约旦人去了摩苏尔，参与筹建了一座医院，而后回到拉卡。
“他说话的时候带着热切的眼神，说在拉卡开始的哈里发伊斯兰统治将会传播到整个地区，”他手下的一名雇员说。
《纽约时报》一名雇员自拉卡、Ben Hubbard自黎巴嫩贝鲁特报道。Hwaida Saad和Mohammad Ghannam自贝鲁特对本文有报道贡献。
翻译：经雷、土土
沙特必须停止输出伊斯兰极端主义
作者：埃德·侯赛因
来源：纽约时报 http://cn.nytimes.com/opinion/20140825/c25husain/
时间：2014年08月25日
埃德·侯赛因(Ed Husain)是对外关系委员会(Council on Foreign Relations)的兼职高级研究员，也是托尼·布莱尔信仰基金会(Tony Blair Faith Foundation)的高级顾问。
每天，我会和全球10亿穆斯林一起，朝着沙特阿拉伯的麦加方向祷告。但在我去圣城麦加和先知穆罕默德的安息地麦地那时，我却满怀痛苦地被迫离开。让我痛苦的，是在伊斯兰教发源地肆虐的极端主义势力。非穆斯林被禁止进入沙特王国的这片地区，因此，影响着每年前往朝拜的1300万穆斯林的观点和作法，不可能得到国际社会的审视。
上周，沙特阿拉伯向联合国捐款1亿美元（约合6亿元人民币），资助一个反恐机构。这是一笔受欢迎的捐赠，但去年，沙特阿拉伯拒绝了联合国安全理事会(United Nations Security Council)轮值理事国席位。沙特王国这种半参与、半拒绝的姿态，反映了该国在应对逊尼派伊斯兰激进主义问题上处于一种内在的瘫痪状态：希望结束暴力，却又不去面对激进者引以为据的萨拉菲主义。
我们得明确一点，基地组织(Al Qaeda) 、伊拉克与叙利亚伊斯兰国（Islamic State in Iraq and Syria，简称ISIS）、博科圣地(Boko Haram)、青年党(Shabab)等都是暴力的逊尼派萨拉菲组织。50年来，沙特阿拉伯一直是全球逊尼派萨拉菲主义的官方赞助者。
全世界穆斯林人口约有90%属于逊尼派，他们大部分不是萨拉菲派。萨拉菲主义被认为过于严格、拘泥于字面意思、偏离主流伊斯兰教。什叶派和其他宗派只占全球穆斯林总人数的10%，而萨拉菲信徒和其他原教旨主义者则占了全世界穆斯林的3%。
不同于大部分逊尼派，萨拉菲派是伊斯兰教的“福音派”，希望穆斯林和其他人改信他们那种“更纯正”的宗教。他们认为，自己信奉的伊斯兰教没有受到现代性的污染。在这样做的过程中，他们得到了沙特政府的大力支持。沙特政府任命使者前往其驻穆斯林国家的大使馆任职，这些使者会劝说他人改信萨拉菲主义。沙特王国还允许顺从的伊玛目以要人的身份参与一年一度的麦加朝圣，并为穆斯林世界联盟(Muslim World League)和世界穆斯林青年大会(World Assembly of Muslim Youth)等极端保守的组织提供资金。
9·11后，在美国的压力下，这种全球性的资金扶持来源有相当一部分已经枯竭，但在沙特王国，萨拉菲主义的堡垒依然很牢固，强硬地实行着过时的伊斯兰教法惩罚措施，而这些惩罚措施早已被大部分穆斯林摒弃。仅自8月4日以来，沙特阿拉伯就有19人被斩首，近一半人是因为非暴力的罪行。
我们理应对伊斯兰激进分子斩首詹姆斯·福利(James Foley )，以及ISIS的其他罪行感到义愤填膺，但我们忽略了沙特阿拉伯允许的公开斩首处决。一旦这样的暴行得到沙特王国的授权，其他地方也将它当成了常态，并形成了间接的激励。当这么做的国家是伊斯兰教的发源地时，它释放的信号是很强烈的。
2005年我住在沙特阿拉伯最开明的城市吉达。那一年，为了让封闭的沙特萨拉菲派思想开放起来，阿卜杜拉国王支持同信奉其他宗教的人进行对话。在我去的那间清真寺，神职人员利用周五的祷告布道活动，以这种对话将伊斯兰教与“假宗教”相提并论为由，禁止进行这种对话。他说，这是滑向自由、民主和性别平等的斜坡，是西方异教徒的堕落作法。
国王与萨拉菲派神职人员的矛盾是沙特阿拉伯无法进行改革的关键因素。国王推崇现代化，但他与他的顾问又不希望打破沙特王室与瓦哈比派（一种朴素的伊斯兰教形式，与萨拉菲派类似）创始人之间延续了270年的部落协议。这个1744年的沙漠条约现在必须被废止。
神职人员的影响力是无与伦比的。甚至连沙特人气最旺的Twitter账号都属于宗教人物：比如穆罕默德·阿里菲(Muhammad al-Arifi)这样的极端主义神职人员。去年，他因为宣扬殴打妻子和对犹太人的憎恨而被封号。他的关注者有940万。沙特王国还有一支宗教警察部队，他们的作用就是确保女性戴面纱、禁止年轻情侣见面，并保证商店不展示“下流的”杂志封面。在麦加和麦地那这两座圣城，如果女性不小心进入只允许男性进入的区域，或者她们的裙子不符合萨拉菲派的庄重标准，宗教警察就会用鞭子抽打她们。先知穆罕默德绝不会认可这种伊斯兰教。
萨拉菲派的不包容政策导致麦加和麦地那的伊斯兰传统遭到破坏。ISIS现在正在轰炸神殿，但那也是从1925年的先例中学来的——当时，在瓦哈比派的授意下，沙特王室摧毁了麦地那加纳特·巴奇(Jannat Al-Baqi)公墓一座拥有1400年历史的坟墓。过去两年，残暴的萨拉菲派也在实施同样的宗派破坏，他们炸毁了从利比亚到巴基斯坦、从马里到伊拉克的神殿。真主党(Hezbollah)武装人员甚至还会进入叙利亚保护圣地。
沙特的学校和大学里的教科书也会教授这个派别的伊斯兰教义。麦地那大学(University of Medina)从世界各地招生，然后用偏执的萨拉菲主义教导这些学生，随后再把他们送往巴尔干半岛、非洲、印尼、孟加拉国和埃及等地的穆斯林社区，于是这些曾在沙特受训的强硬派就会前去根除当地温和的伊斯兰教派。
除了把伊斯兰教法当做国家法律来奉行，宗教极端主义还有什么？这正是ISIS试图利用它的权力所做的事。我们必须挑战这种试图用一种对伊斯兰教法的生硬理解来进行管理的非伊斯兰的、不切实际的错误观念，否则无论联合国机构做什么努力，都无法对抗伊斯兰恐怖主义。
沙特阿拉伯创造了一个萨拉菲派恐怖主义的怪物。现在，它不能把杀死这头野兽的任务交给联合国。沙特必须面对国内极端主义的神学和意识形态根源，从麦加和麦地那开始。对伊斯兰教的发源地进行改革，那将是在这场全球性的观念战争中打败极端主义的关键一步。
翻译：陈亦亭、陈柳
来源：纽约时报 http://cn.nytimes.com/opinion/20140825/c25husain/
时间：2014年08月25日
埃德·侯赛因(Ed Husain)是对外关系委员会(Council on Foreign Relations)的兼职高级研究员，也是托尼·布莱尔信仰基金会(Tony Blair Faith Foundation)的高级顾问。
每天，我会和全球10亿穆斯林一起，朝着沙特阿拉伯的麦加方向祷告。但在我去圣城麦加和先知穆罕默德的安息地麦地那时，我却满怀痛苦地被迫离开。让我痛苦的，是在伊斯兰教发源地肆虐的极端主义势力。非穆斯林被禁止进入沙特王国的这片地区，因此，影响着每年前往朝拜的1300万穆斯林的观点和作法，不可能得到国际社会的审视。
上周，沙特阿拉伯向联合国捐款1亿美元（约合6亿元人民币），资助一个反恐机构。这是一笔受欢迎的捐赠，但去年，沙特阿拉伯拒绝了联合国安全理事会(United Nations Security Council)轮值理事国席位。沙特王国这种半参与、半拒绝的姿态，反映了该国在应对逊尼派伊斯兰激进主义问题上处于一种内在的瘫痪状态：希望结束暴力，却又不去面对激进者引以为据的萨拉菲主义。
我们得明确一点，基地组织(Al Qaeda) 、伊拉克与叙利亚伊斯兰国（Islamic State in Iraq and Syria，简称ISIS）、博科圣地(Boko Haram)、青年党(Shabab)等都是暴力的逊尼派萨拉菲组织。50年来，沙特阿拉伯一直是全球逊尼派萨拉菲主义的官方赞助者。
全世界穆斯林人口约有90%属于逊尼派，他们大部分不是萨拉菲派。萨拉菲主义被认为过于严格、拘泥于字面意思、偏离主流伊斯兰教。什叶派和其他宗派只占全球穆斯林总人数的10%，而萨拉菲信徒和其他原教旨主义者则占了全世界穆斯林的3%。
不同于大部分逊尼派，萨拉菲派是伊斯兰教的“福音派”，希望穆斯林和其他人改信他们那种“更纯正”的宗教。他们认为，自己信奉的伊斯兰教没有受到现代性的污染。在这样做的过程中，他们得到了沙特政府的大力支持。沙特政府任命使者前往其驻穆斯林国家的大使馆任职，这些使者会劝说他人改信萨拉菲主义。沙特王国还允许顺从的伊玛目以要人的身份参与一年一度的麦加朝圣，并为穆斯林世界联盟(Muslim World League)和世界穆斯林青年大会(World Assembly of Muslim Youth)等极端保守的组织提供资金。
9·11后，在美国的压力下，这种全球性的资金扶持来源有相当一部分已经枯竭，但在沙特王国，萨拉菲主义的堡垒依然很牢固，强硬地实行着过时的伊斯兰教法惩罚措施，而这些惩罚措施早已被大部分穆斯林摒弃。仅自8月4日以来，沙特阿拉伯就有19人被斩首，近一半人是因为非暴力的罪行。
我们理应对伊斯兰激进分子斩首詹姆斯·福利(James Foley )，以及ISIS的其他罪行感到义愤填膺，但我们忽略了沙特阿拉伯允许的公开斩首处决。一旦这样的暴行得到沙特王国的授权，其他地方也将它当成了常态，并形成了间接的激励。当这么做的国家是伊斯兰教的发源地时，它释放的信号是很强烈的。
2005年我住在沙特阿拉伯最开明的城市吉达。那一年，为了让封闭的沙特萨拉菲派思想开放起来，阿卜杜拉国王支持同信奉其他宗教的人进行对话。在我去的那间清真寺，神职人员利用周五的祷告布道活动，以这种对话将伊斯兰教与“假宗教”相提并论为由，禁止进行这种对话。他说，这是滑向自由、民主和性别平等的斜坡，是西方异教徒的堕落作法。
国王与萨拉菲派神职人员的矛盾是沙特阿拉伯无法进行改革的关键因素。国王推崇现代化，但他与他的顾问又不希望打破沙特王室与瓦哈比派（一种朴素的伊斯兰教形式，与萨拉菲派类似）创始人之间延续了270年的部落协议。这个1744年的沙漠条约现在必须被废止。
神职人员的影响力是无与伦比的。甚至连沙特人气最旺的Twitter账号都属于宗教人物：比如穆罕默德·阿里菲(Muhammad al-Arifi)这样的极端主义神职人员。去年，他因为宣扬殴打妻子和对犹太人的憎恨而被封号。他的关注者有940万。沙特王国还有一支宗教警察部队，他们的作用就是确保女性戴面纱、禁止年轻情侣见面，并保证商店不展示“下流的”杂志封面。在麦加和麦地那这两座圣城，如果女性不小心进入只允许男性进入的区域，或者她们的裙子不符合萨拉菲派的庄重标准，宗教警察就会用鞭子抽打她们。先知穆罕默德绝不会认可这种伊斯兰教。
萨拉菲派的不包容政策导致麦加和麦地那的伊斯兰传统遭到破坏。ISIS现在正在轰炸神殿，但那也是从1925年的先例中学来的——当时，在瓦哈比派的授意下，沙特王室摧毁了麦地那加纳特·巴奇(Jannat Al-Baqi)公墓一座拥有1400年历史的坟墓。过去两年，残暴的萨拉菲派也在实施同样的宗派破坏，他们炸毁了从利比亚到巴基斯坦、从马里到伊拉克的神殿。真主党(Hezbollah)武装人员甚至还会进入叙利亚保护圣地。
沙特的学校和大学里的教科书也会教授这个派别的伊斯兰教义。麦地那大学(University of Medina)从世界各地招生，然后用偏执的萨拉菲主义教导这些学生，随后再把他们送往巴尔干半岛、非洲、印尼、孟加拉国和埃及等地的穆斯林社区，于是这些曾在沙特受训的强硬派就会前去根除当地温和的伊斯兰教派。
除了把伊斯兰教法当做国家法律来奉行，宗教极端主义还有什么？这正是ISIS试图利用它的权力所做的事。我们必须挑战这种试图用一种对伊斯兰教法的生硬理解来进行管理的非伊斯兰的、不切实际的错误观念，否则无论联合国机构做什么努力，都无法对抗伊斯兰恐怖主义。
沙特阿拉伯创造了一个萨拉菲派恐怖主义的怪物。现在，它不能把杀死这头野兽的任务交给联合国。沙特必须面对国内极端主义的神学和意识形态根源，从麦加和麦地那开始。对伊斯兰教的发源地进行改革，那将是在这场全球性的观念战争中打败极端主义的关键一步。
翻译：陈亦亭、陈柳
要了解ISIS，不能不知道瓦哈比
作者：阿拉斯塔尔·克鲁克(Alastair Crooke)，英国军情六处前探员，《抵抗：伊斯兰革命的实质》
来源： 【本文8月27日，原载于美国最大新闻网站《赫芬顿邮报》，原题“You Can’t Understand ISIS If You Don’t Know the History of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia”，观察者网杨晗轶译。】www.guancha.cn/Alastair-Crooke/2014_09_03_263454_s.shtml
伊拉克和大叙利亚伊斯兰国（译者注：Islamic State of Iraq and al Shams缩写为ISIS，亦称“伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国”，即ISIL，部分媒体取该组织阿拉伯语首字母缩写，蔑称其为Da’ish）在伊拉克粉墨登场，使西方为之震惊。让西方感到困惑而恐惧的，是该组织的暴力手段，及其对逊尼派青年磁石般的吸引力。更令他们不安又费解的，是沙特阿拉伯对此事模棱两可的态度——许多西方人都揣着这样的问题：“难道沙特人不明白，ISIS对他们也是个威胁吗？”
直到现在，从表面上看，沙特的统治精英们存在分歧。一部分支持属于逊尼派的ISIS与什叶派伊朗对掐，他们乐于见到逊尼派在所谓“先祖故土”上建立一个新的伊斯兰国家；他们也认同ISIS严格的萨拉菲主义（伊斯兰复古主义）意识形态。
另一部分沙特精英则对伊赫万（即“认主独一兄弟会”）心存疑惧，这个瓦哈比派宗教武装组织（作者注：伊赫万在阿拉伯语中意为兄弟会，此兄弟会与埃及穆兄会无关，下文均用伊赫万指代瓦哈比派认主独一兄弟会）曾在1920年代末叛变沙特开国国王阿卜杜勒·阿齐玆，当时几乎从内部瓦解了瓦哈比派和沙特家族。
ISIS的激进教义已使众多沙特人感到不安，甚至令他们对国家的总体方向和官方话语产生了质疑。
双面的沙特
要理解沙特阿拉伯内部关于ISIS的争议，就必须抓住问题的核心，即沙特王国宗教与历史根源所固有（且持续）的双面性。
沙特民族身份认同的主线之一，可直接追溯到瓦哈比派创始人穆罕默德·伊本·阿卜杜勒·瓦哈卜。伊本·沙特酋长（在灼热贫瘠的内志沙漠中，当时的沙特仅是彼此劫掠的贝都因众部落之一）接受并支持瓦哈卜激进的排他性教义。
上世纪20年代阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹国王走民族建国道路时，埋下了沙特民族双面性的另一条脉络：他为了争取英美两国对沙特外交地位的支持，打压了伊赫万的武装暴力；他将原本未固化的瓦哈比派教义通过制度确立起来，以非暴力的文化革命形式向穆斯林世界渗透。后来在70年代，沙特又利用激增的石油出口收入，把伊赫万这股不稳定因素输往别国。
但这场以瓦哈卜的教义为基础的“文化革命”却不是什么温和的改革——正因为瓦哈卜对一切他所认知腐朽和邪说怀有雅各宾式的仇恨，他才会呼吁将异端和偶像崇拜从伊斯兰教中清洗出去。
穆斯林中的欺世盗名者
根据美国作家记者斯蒂文·柯尔的描写，瓦哈卜生性简朴苛刻，其师承渊源来自14世纪宗教学者伊本·泰米叶，对“那些附庸风雅、沉迷于烟草和印度大麻，在朝圣路上前呼后拥的埃及与奥斯曼贵族”充满鄙夷。
在瓦哈卜的观念中，这些王孙贵胄根本算不上穆斯林，他们只是群欺世盗名的骗子；而阿拉伯半岛上的贝都因人也好不到哪里去——他们供奉圣徒、树立墓碑、崇尚“迷信”（例如对坟墓等“神力灌注”的场所充满敬畏），让瓦哈卜恼怒不已。
瓦哈卜谴责这些行为是真主禁止的“异端”（Bid’ah）。与泰米叶一样，瓦哈卜相信先知穆罕默德时期的麦地那代表着穆斯林的理想社会（“最好的时代”），也是所有穆斯林都应致力效仿的社会（这在本质上，便是萨拉菲主义）。
泰米叶曾向什叶派、苏非派和希腊哲学宣战。他也反对祭拜先知坟墓和庆祝其生日，宣称这些行为无异于基督教徒们把耶稣当作神来膜拜（即偶像崇拜）。瓦哈卜吸收了先人的教诲，宣布信徒如对他解读的伊斯兰教义有“任何怀疑或犹豫”，其“财产和生命的豁免权”便应被剥夺。
瓦哈卜的主要信条之一构成了“塔克费尔”（takfir，即叛教）的核心思想。在“塔克费尔”教义下，任何穆斯林只要做出了侵害绝对王权的行为，瓦哈卜和他的信徒们便有权宣告其为叛教者。所有敬奉死者、圣徒、天使的穆斯林统统被瓦哈卜革除了教籍。他坚信穆斯林应全心全意侍奉真主，其他神祗势必会减损这种信仰。所以，根据瓦哈比派教义，信众不得向圣徒祈祷或为逝去的亲人祷告；不得祭扫坟墓；不得前往装饰奢华的清真寺；不得纪念圣徒的宗教节日；不得庆祝先知穆罕默德诞辰；甚至不得为死者立墓碑。
瓦哈卜要求教徒身体力行，严格遵守教义。他宣称每一个穆斯林都必须单独向唯一的穆斯林领袖（如哈里发在世，则为哈里发）宣誓效忠。他写道：“那些异见者应被处决，他们的妻女应被强奸，他们的财产应被充公。”在瓦哈比派眼中，什叶派、苏非派和一些其他教派的信徒都是应处以极刑的叛教者，根本算不上穆斯林。
目前，瓦哈比派和ISIS之间没有分歧，而未来两者可能产生裂痕：沙特王国将瓦哈卜关于“唯一的统治者、唯一的权威、唯一的清真寺”的主张，已在沙特阿拉伯固化下来，形成三大制度支柱，分别对应着沙特国王的统治、国教瓦哈比派的绝对权威、以及教派对真言的解读（清真寺）。
ISIS虽严格遵循瓦哈比派教义，但否认这支撑整个逊尼派权威的三大支柱，这就使前者对沙特阿拉伯构成了深远的威胁。
沙特第一王国简史（1744-1818）
瓦哈卜鼓吹极端激进的观点，不可避免地导致了他被逐出故乡——在短暂的漂泊后，他于1744年得到了伊本·沙特的庇护。在瓦哈卜新奇的教义中，伊本·沙特看到了一条颠覆阿拉伯传统、夺取权力的道路。
伊本·沙特的部族紧握瓦哈卜这张宗教牌，终于可以名正言顺地干他们一贯的勾当——去邻近村落打家劫舍。唯一的区别是，他们可以高举圣战的旗帜，不再受到阿拉伯传统的约束。伊本·沙特和瓦哈卜以圣战为名，重新提出殉道这个概念，宣扬在圣战中殉道的烈士可以立即上天堂。
最初，他们征服并统治了一些邻近的部落。被征服的部众只有两种选择：要么改宗瓦哈比派，要么被处死。到1790年，政教合一的沙特部族控制了阿拉伯半岛大部，并反复入侵麦地那、叙利亚和伊拉克。
他们的战略——与今天的ISIS一样——都是让被征服民族产生恐惧，进而臣服于自己。1801年，沙特攻打今伊拉克境内的什叶派圣城卡巴拉，屠杀了包括妇孺在内的数千名什叶派穆斯林。许多什叶派圣祠毁于一旦，包括穆罕默德之孙伊玛目侯赛因的陵墓。
当年的见证者英军中尉弗朗西斯·沃登记述道：“他们把它（卡巴拉）抢掠一光，捣毁了侯赛因的陵墓……在光天化日之下，以古怪而残忍的手段，杀害了五千多名当地居民……”
第一沙特王国的历史学家奥斯曼·伊本·白舍尔·纳吉迪记录了伊本·沙特1801年在卡巴拉的大屠杀。他骄傲地宣称：“我们占领了卡巴拉城，屠宰并奴役了那里的人，然后向万世的真主安拉祷告，我们没有歉意，只有一句话：‘这就是异教徒的下场。’”
1803年，圣城麦加在阿卜杜勒·阿齐玆的恐吓下投降（麦地那也遭遇了同样的命运）。瓦哈比派教徒们拆毁了众多历史遗迹和所有的陵墓与圣祠。最后，大清真寺周围历经数百年的伊斯兰教古建筑悉数被毁。
但1803年11月，一名什叶派刺客为卡巴拉大屠杀复仇，杀死了阿卜杜勒·阿齐玆国王。王子沙特·本·阿卜杜拉·阿齐兹继位，继续展开对阿拉伯半岛的征服。奥斯曼帝国的统治者再无法容忍沙特对帝国的蚕食。1812年，由埃及人组成的奥斯曼帝国军队将沙特人赶出了麦地那、吉达和麦加。1814年，沙特·本·阿卜杜拉·阿齐兹死于热病，其子阿卜杜拉·本·沙特被押往奥斯曼帝国首都伊斯坦布尔并遭处以极刑（据当地一名旅客称，他先被游街示众，在三天中受尽凌辱，然后被处以绞刑、斩首，首级被填入炮膛再轰出，心脏被挖出来钉在身体上）。
1815年，代表奥斯曼苏丹出征的埃及人在关键一役中击垮了瓦哈比派武装力量。1818年，帝国军队攻陷并将瓦哈比派首都达尔伊耶夷为平地。沙特第一王国至此灭亡。瓦哈比派势力纠集残部撤入沙漠，并在19世纪后几十年里几乎销声匿迹。
历史的重演
如今，ISIS在伊拉克建立伊斯兰国，撩拨起不少人心头这根历史之弦。实际上，贫瘠的内志沙漠并未湮没18世纪的瓦哈比精神；当奥斯曼帝国在第一次世界大战的混乱中崩塌时，瓦哈比派呼啸着复苏了。
沙特家族在精明干练的阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹的领导下，在20世纪走向了复兴。阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹统一了四分五裂的贝都因部落，继承了瓦哈卜与伊本·沙特的衣钵，组织沙特“伊赫万”征讨变节者。
这个伊赫万实际就是现代版的瓦哈比派半独立武装卫道先锋队。19世纪初年瓦哈比派势力几乎一统阿拉伯半岛；一个世纪后，从1914年至1926年，伊赫万以同样的方式相继攻占了麦加、麦地那和吉达。然而此时，阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹开始意识到，伊赫万展现出的“雅各宾式”革命性质，损害了他更大的利益。后来，沙特爆发了一场持续至30年代的内战，最终沙特国王用机枪镇压了伊赫万叛乱。
关于阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹国王早年的事迹，真相已经模糊。在阿拉伯半岛发现了石油后，英美两国一方面讨好阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹，另一方面又倾向于支持沙里夫·胡赛因作为阿拉伯半岛的合法统治者。沙特人需要运用更微妙的外交手段。
作为交换，瓦哈比派被迫从一场圣战革命和宗教清洗，退为一场社会、政治、神学、宗教层面的保守主义宣教运动；成为维护沙特王室和国王绝对权力正当性的工具。
浮在石油上瓦哈比派
法国学者吉勒·凯贝尔写道，当石油成了沙特的摇钱树，该国的目标是“向穆斯林世界传播瓦哈比派学说……将伊斯兰教瓦哈比化，让伊斯兰教内部的多种声音归于同一信仰”——这是一场超越国界的运动。沙特阿拉伯为了打造宗教软实力，已投入了数十亿美元，未来还将在这方面投入更多财力。
1945年，刚参加完雅尔塔会议的罗斯福在美国战舰上接见了阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹，从那一场会面开始，沙特阿拉伯就长期依赖于西方的政策，至今仍未改变。一方面，是沙特为建设软实力，动用数十亿美元的大手笔；另一方面，沙特在教育、社会、文化等领域向其他伊斯兰国家输出瓦哈比派学说，控制逊尼派伊斯兰教，也是在帮助美国实现其利益。
沙特阿拉伯王国惊人的财富、现代化的外表、以及在伊斯兰世界中展现出的领导姿态，吸引了大部分西方人的注意力。他们以为控制好逊尼派就能让沙特服从于现代生活的驱使。
但伊赫万运动并没有在上世纪30年代被赶尽杀绝。它虽然从主流隐退，却仍保持着对伊斯兰意识形态的影响力——所以我们看到今天的沙特人对ISIS的态度甚是微妙。
ISIS虽深受瓦哈比派影响；然而在某些方面它走向另一个激进的极端。我们可以把ISIS看做一场针对当代瓦哈比派教义的修正运动。
ISIS代表着一场“后麦地那”运动：它将前两任哈里发——而非先知穆罕默德——的言行视为典范，并且极力否认沙特的统治权威。
沙特王国在石油时代暴富，导致制度臃肿，虽然费萨尔国王致力于现代化，但伊赫万运动仍然扩大了其影响力，获得了（并仍得到）许多社会名流和酋长们的支持。在某种意义上，奥萨马·本·拉登正是伊赫万运动得势的一个代表性人物。
今天，我们不难理解ISIS对沙特国王合法性的削弱，因为这才是重归沙特-瓦哈卜联盟的本源。
在许多西方战略项目上（反社会主义、反阿拉伯复兴主义、反纳赛尔主义、对抗苏联和伊朗），沙特与西方联手对阿拉伯地区实行联合管理，西方政治家对沙特阿拉伯做具有选择性的正面解读，突出其富裕、现代化、有影响力，忽略了瓦哈比派思潮的影响。
毕竟，西方情报机构认为更加激进的伊斯兰主义运动，既能有效地推翻苏联在阿富汗的存在；又能颠覆那些不再受西方青睐的中东国家和领导人。
沙特和西方授意班达尔亲王处理叙利亚反政府叛乱，最终引发了一场“新伊赫万式”暴力恐怖先锋运动——ISIS。其实，西方何必感到惊诧呢？稍微了解一点瓦哈比派的历史，你就应该知道，叙利亚叛军里的“温和派”比麒麟还罕见。西方为什么会幻想激进的瓦哈比派能濡染出温和派？为什么会幻想提出“唯一的统治者、唯一的权威、唯一的清真寺”的教派，能从“逆我者亡”走向温和与忍让？
或者，西方连幻想都不曾有过。
来源： 【本文8月27日，原载于美国最大新闻网站《赫芬顿邮报》，原题“You Can’t Understand ISIS If You Don’t Know the History of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia”，观察者网杨晗轶译。】www.guancha.cn/Alastair-Crooke/2014_09_03_263454_s.shtml
伊拉克和大叙利亚伊斯兰国（译者注：Islamic State of Iraq and al Shams缩写为ISIS，亦称“伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国”，即ISIL，部分媒体取该组织阿拉伯语首字母缩写，蔑称其为Da’ish）在伊拉克粉墨登场，使西方为之震惊。让西方感到困惑而恐惧的，是该组织的暴力手段，及其对逊尼派青年磁石般的吸引力。更令他们不安又费解的，是沙特阿拉伯对此事模棱两可的态度——许多西方人都揣着这样的问题：“难道沙特人不明白，ISIS对他们也是个威胁吗？”
直到现在，从表面上看，沙特的统治精英们存在分歧。一部分支持属于逊尼派的ISIS与什叶派伊朗对掐，他们乐于见到逊尼派在所谓“先祖故土”上建立一个新的伊斯兰国家；他们也认同ISIS严格的萨拉菲主义（伊斯兰复古主义）意识形态。
另一部分沙特精英则对伊赫万（即“认主独一兄弟会”）心存疑惧，这个瓦哈比派宗教武装组织（作者注：伊赫万在阿拉伯语中意为兄弟会，此兄弟会与埃及穆兄会无关，下文均用伊赫万指代瓦哈比派认主独一兄弟会）曾在1920年代末叛变沙特开国国王阿卜杜勒·阿齐玆，当时几乎从内部瓦解了瓦哈比派和沙特家族。
ISIS的激进教义已使众多沙特人感到不安，甚至令他们对国家的总体方向和官方话语产生了质疑。
双面的沙特
要理解沙特阿拉伯内部关于ISIS的争议，就必须抓住问题的核心，即沙特王国宗教与历史根源所固有（且持续）的双面性。
沙特民族身份认同的主线之一，可直接追溯到瓦哈比派创始人穆罕默德·伊本·阿卜杜勒·瓦哈卜。伊本·沙特酋长（在灼热贫瘠的内志沙漠中，当时的沙特仅是彼此劫掠的贝都因众部落之一）接受并支持瓦哈卜激进的排他性教义。
上世纪20年代阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹国王走民族建国道路时，埋下了沙特民族双面性的另一条脉络：他为了争取英美两国对沙特外交地位的支持，打压了伊赫万的武装暴力；他将原本未固化的瓦哈比派教义通过制度确立起来，以非暴力的文化革命形式向穆斯林世界渗透。后来在70年代，沙特又利用激增的石油出口收入，把伊赫万这股不稳定因素输往别国。
但这场以瓦哈卜的教义为基础的“文化革命”却不是什么温和的改革——正因为瓦哈卜对一切他所认知腐朽和邪说怀有雅各宾式的仇恨，他才会呼吁将异端和偶像崇拜从伊斯兰教中清洗出去。
穆斯林中的欺世盗名者
根据美国作家记者斯蒂文·柯尔的描写，瓦哈卜生性简朴苛刻，其师承渊源来自14世纪宗教学者伊本·泰米叶，对“那些附庸风雅、沉迷于烟草和印度大麻，在朝圣路上前呼后拥的埃及与奥斯曼贵族”充满鄙夷。
在瓦哈卜的观念中，这些王孙贵胄根本算不上穆斯林，他们只是群欺世盗名的骗子；而阿拉伯半岛上的贝都因人也好不到哪里去——他们供奉圣徒、树立墓碑、崇尚“迷信”（例如对坟墓等“神力灌注”的场所充满敬畏），让瓦哈卜恼怒不已。
瓦哈卜谴责这些行为是真主禁止的“异端”（Bid’ah）。与泰米叶一样，瓦哈卜相信先知穆罕默德时期的麦地那代表着穆斯林的理想社会（“最好的时代”），也是所有穆斯林都应致力效仿的社会（这在本质上，便是萨拉菲主义）。
泰米叶曾向什叶派、苏非派和希腊哲学宣战。他也反对祭拜先知坟墓和庆祝其生日，宣称这些行为无异于基督教徒们把耶稣当作神来膜拜（即偶像崇拜）。瓦哈卜吸收了先人的教诲，宣布信徒如对他解读的伊斯兰教义有“任何怀疑或犹豫”，其“财产和生命的豁免权”便应被剥夺。
瓦哈卜的主要信条之一构成了“塔克费尔”（takfir，即叛教）的核心思想。在“塔克费尔”教义下，任何穆斯林只要做出了侵害绝对王权的行为，瓦哈卜和他的信徒们便有权宣告其为叛教者。所有敬奉死者、圣徒、天使的穆斯林统统被瓦哈卜革除了教籍。他坚信穆斯林应全心全意侍奉真主，其他神祗势必会减损这种信仰。所以，根据瓦哈比派教义，信众不得向圣徒祈祷或为逝去的亲人祷告；不得祭扫坟墓；不得前往装饰奢华的清真寺；不得纪念圣徒的宗教节日；不得庆祝先知穆罕默德诞辰；甚至不得为死者立墓碑。
瓦哈卜要求教徒身体力行，严格遵守教义。他宣称每一个穆斯林都必须单独向唯一的穆斯林领袖（如哈里发在世，则为哈里发）宣誓效忠。他写道：“那些异见者应被处决，他们的妻女应被强奸，他们的财产应被充公。”在瓦哈比派眼中，什叶派、苏非派和一些其他教派的信徒都是应处以极刑的叛教者，根本算不上穆斯林。
目前，瓦哈比派和ISIS之间没有分歧，而未来两者可能产生裂痕：沙特王国将瓦哈卜关于“唯一的统治者、唯一的权威、唯一的清真寺”的主张，已在沙特阿拉伯固化下来，形成三大制度支柱，分别对应着沙特国王的统治、国教瓦哈比派的绝对权威、以及教派对真言的解读（清真寺）。
ISIS虽严格遵循瓦哈比派教义，但否认这支撑整个逊尼派权威的三大支柱，这就使前者对沙特阿拉伯构成了深远的威胁。
沙特第一王国简史（1744-1818）
瓦哈卜鼓吹极端激进的观点，不可避免地导致了他被逐出故乡——在短暂的漂泊后，他于1744年得到了伊本·沙特的庇护。在瓦哈卜新奇的教义中，伊本·沙特看到了一条颠覆阿拉伯传统、夺取权力的道路。
伊本·沙特的部族紧握瓦哈卜这张宗教牌，终于可以名正言顺地干他们一贯的勾当——去邻近村落打家劫舍。唯一的区别是，他们可以高举圣战的旗帜，不再受到阿拉伯传统的约束。伊本·沙特和瓦哈卜以圣战为名，重新提出殉道这个概念，宣扬在圣战中殉道的烈士可以立即上天堂。
最初，他们征服并统治了一些邻近的部落。被征服的部众只有两种选择：要么改宗瓦哈比派，要么被处死。到1790年，政教合一的沙特部族控制了阿拉伯半岛大部，并反复入侵麦地那、叙利亚和伊拉克。
他们的战略——与今天的ISIS一样——都是让被征服民族产生恐惧，进而臣服于自己。1801年，沙特攻打今伊拉克境内的什叶派圣城卡巴拉，屠杀了包括妇孺在内的数千名什叶派穆斯林。许多什叶派圣祠毁于一旦，包括穆罕默德之孙伊玛目侯赛因的陵墓。
当年的见证者英军中尉弗朗西斯·沃登记述道：“他们把它（卡巴拉）抢掠一光，捣毁了侯赛因的陵墓……在光天化日之下，以古怪而残忍的手段，杀害了五千多名当地居民……”
第一沙特王国的历史学家奥斯曼·伊本·白舍尔·纳吉迪记录了伊本·沙特1801年在卡巴拉的大屠杀。他骄傲地宣称：“我们占领了卡巴拉城，屠宰并奴役了那里的人，然后向万世的真主安拉祷告，我们没有歉意，只有一句话：‘这就是异教徒的下场。’”
1803年，圣城麦加在阿卜杜勒·阿齐玆的恐吓下投降（麦地那也遭遇了同样的命运）。瓦哈比派教徒们拆毁了众多历史遗迹和所有的陵墓与圣祠。最后，大清真寺周围历经数百年的伊斯兰教古建筑悉数被毁。
但1803年11月，一名什叶派刺客为卡巴拉大屠杀复仇，杀死了阿卜杜勒·阿齐玆国王。王子沙特·本·阿卜杜拉·阿齐兹继位，继续展开对阿拉伯半岛的征服。奥斯曼帝国的统治者再无法容忍沙特对帝国的蚕食。1812年，由埃及人组成的奥斯曼帝国军队将沙特人赶出了麦地那、吉达和麦加。1814年，沙特·本·阿卜杜拉·阿齐兹死于热病，其子阿卜杜拉·本·沙特被押往奥斯曼帝国首都伊斯坦布尔并遭处以极刑（据当地一名旅客称，他先被游街示众，在三天中受尽凌辱，然后被处以绞刑、斩首，首级被填入炮膛再轰出，心脏被挖出来钉在身体上）。
1815年，代表奥斯曼苏丹出征的埃及人在关键一役中击垮了瓦哈比派武装力量。1818年，帝国军队攻陷并将瓦哈比派首都达尔伊耶夷为平地。沙特第一王国至此灭亡。瓦哈比派势力纠集残部撤入沙漠，并在19世纪后几十年里几乎销声匿迹。
历史的重演
如今，ISIS在伊拉克建立伊斯兰国，撩拨起不少人心头这根历史之弦。实际上，贫瘠的内志沙漠并未湮没18世纪的瓦哈比精神；当奥斯曼帝国在第一次世界大战的混乱中崩塌时，瓦哈比派呼啸着复苏了。
沙特家族在精明干练的阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹的领导下，在20世纪走向了复兴。阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹统一了四分五裂的贝都因部落，继承了瓦哈卜与伊本·沙特的衣钵，组织沙特“伊赫万”征讨变节者。
这个伊赫万实际就是现代版的瓦哈比派半独立武装卫道先锋队。19世纪初年瓦哈比派势力几乎一统阿拉伯半岛；一个世纪后，从1914年至1926年，伊赫万以同样的方式相继攻占了麦加、麦地那和吉达。然而此时，阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹开始意识到，伊赫万展现出的“雅各宾式”革命性质，损害了他更大的利益。后来，沙特爆发了一场持续至30年代的内战，最终沙特国王用机枪镇压了伊赫万叛乱。
关于阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹国王早年的事迹，真相已经模糊。在阿拉伯半岛发现了石油后，英美两国一方面讨好阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹，另一方面又倾向于支持沙里夫·胡赛因作为阿拉伯半岛的合法统治者。沙特人需要运用更微妙的外交手段。
作为交换，瓦哈比派被迫从一场圣战革命和宗教清洗，退为一场社会、政治、神学、宗教层面的保守主义宣教运动；成为维护沙特王室和国王绝对权力正当性的工具。
浮在石油上瓦哈比派
法国学者吉勒·凯贝尔写道，当石油成了沙特的摇钱树，该国的目标是“向穆斯林世界传播瓦哈比派学说……将伊斯兰教瓦哈比化，让伊斯兰教内部的多种声音归于同一信仰”——这是一场超越国界的运动。沙特阿拉伯为了打造宗教软实力，已投入了数十亿美元，未来还将在这方面投入更多财力。
1945年，刚参加完雅尔塔会议的罗斯福在美国战舰上接见了阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹，从那一场会面开始，沙特阿拉伯就长期依赖于西方的政策，至今仍未改变。一方面，是沙特为建设软实力，动用数十亿美元的大手笔；另一方面，沙特在教育、社会、文化等领域向其他伊斯兰国家输出瓦哈比派学说，控制逊尼派伊斯兰教，也是在帮助美国实现其利益。
沙特阿拉伯王国惊人的财富、现代化的外表、以及在伊斯兰世界中展现出的领导姿态，吸引了大部分西方人的注意力。他们以为控制好逊尼派就能让沙特服从于现代生活的驱使。
但伊赫万运动并没有在上世纪30年代被赶尽杀绝。它虽然从主流隐退，却仍保持着对伊斯兰意识形态的影响力——所以我们看到今天的沙特人对ISIS的态度甚是微妙。
ISIS虽深受瓦哈比派影响；然而在某些方面它走向另一个激进的极端。我们可以把ISIS看做一场针对当代瓦哈比派教义的修正运动。
ISIS代表着一场“后麦地那”运动：它将前两任哈里发——而非先知穆罕默德——的言行视为典范，并且极力否认沙特的统治权威。
沙特王国在石油时代暴富，导致制度臃肿，虽然费萨尔国王致力于现代化，但伊赫万运动仍然扩大了其影响力，获得了（并仍得到）许多社会名流和酋长们的支持。在某种意义上，奥萨马·本·拉登正是伊赫万运动得势的一个代表性人物。
今天，我们不难理解ISIS对沙特国王合法性的削弱，因为这才是重归沙特-瓦哈卜联盟的本源。
在许多西方战略项目上（反社会主义、反阿拉伯复兴主义、反纳赛尔主义、对抗苏联和伊朗），沙特与西方联手对阿拉伯地区实行联合管理，西方政治家对沙特阿拉伯做具有选择性的正面解读，突出其富裕、现代化、有影响力，忽略了瓦哈比派思潮的影响。
毕竟，西方情报机构认为更加激进的伊斯兰主义运动，既能有效地推翻苏联在阿富汗的存在；又能颠覆那些不再受西方青睐的中东国家和领导人。
沙特和西方授意班达尔亲王处理叙利亚反政府叛乱，最终引发了一场“新伊赫万式”暴力恐怖先锋运动——ISIS。其实，西方何必感到惊诧呢？稍微了解一点瓦哈比派的历史，你就应该知道，叙利亚叛军里的“温和派”比麒麟还罕见。西方为什么会幻想激进的瓦哈比派能濡染出温和派？为什么会幻想提出“唯一的统治者、唯一的权威、唯一的清真寺”的教派，能从“逆我者亡”走向温和与忍让？
或者，西方连幻想都不曾有过。
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