藏人因何自焚？[1]
——以境内外三个不同角度看其综合原因
孙 雁[2]
自2009年二月自焚首次在藏区发生以来，自焚总数在四年后的2013年3月已达109起。倘若不是在敏感民族地区，中国任何其他地方发生了如此广泛和持续的群体人命事件，都必定会引起国内公众及知识精英的高度关注。然而，由于国内公共话语将自焚事件完全归咎于境外势力的操纵，影响了全面地去理解自焚发生的多层因素，也导致中国大众及知识界在此问题上的集体失语。
民间学者王力雄就此评论说，“解开这个难题，或至少知道该怎样面对，前提在于需要搞清这种广泛而持续的自焚，整体是在表达什么意愿，追求何种目标？对此存在不同解读，多数只是强调某个方面，甚至按需所取。”[3] 这番说法不失客观中肯。的确，境内境外对藏区自焚的解释，南撤北辕，争锋相对。前者一味强调外因， 而后者一律怪罪内因，各自都有其局限。
本文首先介绍和评析王力雄本人对自焚者动机的统计分析，其后将他的结论与一位境外藏人学者和一位境内藏人学者的观点相比较。这三个不同的视野各有独到之处，综合起来有助我们更全面地理解自焚的原因。
王力雄：自焚是无法空等下去的一种行动
2012年底，王力雄根据藏人作家唯色对每个自焚者情况的记录，将自焚者中留有的遗言做了分类统计分析。由于并非所有的自焚者都留有遗言，他的数据只反映了留有遗言这一小部分自焚者所想表达的心愿。必须肯定的是，尽管王力雄在民族问题上与官方立场不同，数据也来自其对政府同样持批评态度的夫人，他的治学态度和方法是认真严谨的，并没有回避不利于境外藏人和西方观点的结论。
首先，王力雄对自焚者遗言的分析证明了境内外有关自焚的三大流行说法并不成立。第一，境外藏人包括流亡政府政治领导人都曾宣称，自焚是境内藏人无法忍受目前处境的绝望选择。但这一点在王力雄分类的7项动机中所占比例相对较低，有19 % （共5人），不能令人信服地佐证自焚是藏人绝望的选择。
第二，境外藏人和国内官方都往往认为，自焚行为旨在引起国际社会对西藏问题的关注和干涉。然而在王力雄的数据中，仅有4 % （共1人）表达了此意，在他归纳的七项动机里远属最低。况且，这唯一的一人还是遗言者中算得上知识分子的一位网络作家，应该比大多数自焚者更了解西藏问题的国际化，因此他的呼吁不能说有代表性。此外，大多数自焚者不提国际关注，也并非出于境外人士的指点。正如王力雄指出的，至2012底流亡藏人中共有两名自焚者，只有他们在遗言里反复呼吁国际关注。王力雄认为，这反映出境内外藏人的关键区别：寻求国际社会的支持一直是境外藏人的主要目标，也是迄今流亡西藏领导机构的工作重心所在，而境内自焚者并不寄希望于国际社会。
第三，流亡藏人还往往认为，藏区自焚者意在谋求“西藏独立”这一政治目标。然而在王力雄的数据里，只有19% （共5人）直接或间接地表达了此意，在七项动机中也占很低的比重。王力雄及其夫人唯色，都是西方颇为信任的藏事评论人。根据唯色的纪录和王的分析而得出的此结论，一定令境外藏人颇为失望。
那么自焚者究竟想要表达什么？在王力雄的数据里比重占前三位的动机似乎都比较抽象：把自焚“当做一种行为”（占54% 共14人），“祈愿达赖喇嘛”（占38% 共10人），“表达勇气和承担”（占35% 共9人）。王力雄以自焚发生的时间背景推测，这些抽象表达的背后不乏具体愿望。如2012年的两个自焚高峰分别是有诸多藏人纪念日的3月和中共十八大召开的11月。王对前一高峰理解为对中国民族政策的抗议，对后一高峰则理解为促使中国新一代领导人改变西藏政策。选择这些特别的时候去行为，“体现了自焚者期望他们的牺牲有助于实现目标，而非仅仅只是表达抗议或绝望。”至于什么目标，遗言里并未具体表达，因此既不能证明流亡藏人所期望的是“独立”愿望，也不能证明中国官方所指控的是境外有组织的操纵。至于自焚是否真的有助于实现目标，王力雄认为自焚者自己也并不清楚，但下述遗言较有代表性 —－ “无法继续活下去空等。” 也就是说，可以把自焚理解为自焚者对现实的消极抵抗。
占比重第二位的动机，“祈愿达赖喇嘛，”似乎正是自焚者主要想表达的愿望。流亡藏人和中国官方都倾向把呼唤“达赖喇嘛回西藏”的口号等同于要求西藏独立。但王力雄则强调这一口号包含的是宗教情感，需要与政治主张分开：以自己的生命供养达赖喇嘛并超度众生是一种具有宗教性质的奉献，非宗教人士对此不易理解；它是一种不求功利，只求功德的境界。这一宗教精神为多数藏人所具有，也构成自焚的精神动力。同时，这一精神动力还需要与国内的官方政策联系起来理解。由于官方不断向寺庙和僧人施压，要他们谴责达赖喇嘛，反而更促使僧人以自焚这种过激的方式表达对其宗教领袖的尊重和奉献。这其中当然也包含对当局的要求和抗议。
王力雄数据里居第三位的动机是“表达勇气和承担。”其典型的具体阐述有“要为西藏民族的尊严而自焚，”“他们认为我们害怕武力镇压，他们想错了。”这也告诉我们，如果官方政策继续把宗教与政治诉求等同，则可能使僧人的反应更加激烈。
此外，王力雄数据里有一部分自焚者在遗言中表达了一些政治诉求（19% 共5人）。比如，“让达赖喇嘛返回西藏”、“西藏要自由”、 “释放十一世班禅喇嘛”、“语言要自由”等口号。但这些口号都可以与“分裂”的主张切割，而狭义地理解为抗议政府在宗教及文化方面的干涉（如不予达赖回归西藏，干涉十一世班禅的选择，推动汉语教育）。
比这些口号更重要的，是王力雄文章传达的这一信息：西藏问题的国际化正转为国内化。在他看来，西藏问题多年未有进展，从藏人自身的角度反省，原因在于一直把希望寄托于外界——境内藏人寄托于境外藏人，境外藏人又寄托于国际社会，进而期望利用国际社会的压力迫使中国政府让步。在中国经济崛起的当今世界，这一策略已走到尽头。在这一背景下，王力雄认为境内自焚成为“不知还又什么可做”的另类策略，同时也显示了境内藏人的觉醒。
王力雄的遗言分析对我们了解自焚者的动机有一定的意义。从自焚者的个人陈述中，我们可以看到他们的话语和诉求与流亡藏人的区别，即他们限于宗教的情感与流亡藏人的政治目标有很大的不同。这一区别不仅让流亡藏人失望，也使国内官方对“境外煽动”的谴责显得相对无力。同时，那些遗言又为境内僧人对本族宗教和文化的强烈认同感而加分。总之，王力雄的释析意在告诉我们，境内藏人的民族主义已经成熟，境内藏人终于可以自己掌握命运，找出解决所谓西藏问题的路径。
然而，王力雄的分析没有触及一个关键的问题，即自焚者是否代表广大藏民的意愿？下面的两位境外境内藏人学者，分别从不同的角度回答了这个问题。
次仁夏迦：教派积怨及对现代化的抗议
1959年出生于西藏，文革初期出走的次仁夏迦 (Tsering Shakya)，现为著名的历史学家和藏学专家。目前任加拿大英属哥伦比亚大学亚洲研究中心亚洲宗教与当代社会研究主席。他于2012年底在法国《西藏研究》杂志的自焚专刊里发表文章，分析藏区自焚原因。他认为，藏族民族主义，或是藏人与汉人之间的经济社会差距，都不足以解释自焚现象的猛势增长。[4] 自2009年首次自焚发生以来，大部分自焚事件都与川西的阿坝自治区有关。包括在阿坝自治区以外地区发生的事件，自焚者也往往来自阿坝地区。更有甚者，近年的自焚和抗议活动几乎都出自格鲁派的寺庙，而且可以具体到阿坝地区格鲁派的格尔登寺（次仁夏迦：33-34页）。也就是说，自焚并非是涉及所有藏区和教派的普遍现象，而是一个含特殊地域因素和特殊教派因素的局部现象。
就特殊的地域因素来说，次仁夏迦认为这恰恰是东藏地区（即川藏和青藏地区）比西藏享有更大的宗教自由而带来的相关后果。改革初期至90年代中期以前，许多当年逃往到印度的资深喇嘛都被允许回来访问或讲课，或参与及帮助修复寺庙的工作，其中也包括原格尔登寺的首席喇嘛——格尔登活佛。他后来于1997年至1999年期间曾任流亡政府的宗教事务部长。而格尔登寺也正是近年来自焚者的主要来源。东藏区的僧人也有相对的自由去印度访问，并在境外藏人寺庙里学经。其最好的证明就是在印度的藏传佛教寺庙里，国内出生的僧人不断增加。比如在达兰萨拉的流亡格尔登寺里，150位僧人中有127位来自阿坝，仅一人出身于印度（其余的来自国内其他藏区或喜马拉雅山周边地带）。而这些有国内背景的僧人自然与他们家乡的僧人和亲友保持密切的联系（次仁夏迦，第29，34，36页）。这也就是说，即使自焚有外来影响，它也来自印度的流亡藏区，而非西方。而且这种影响更多是宗教方面的。
此外，青海、甘肃、云南、四川这几省的藏区里相对宽松的政策也使藏文化创作的中心从西藏转移到西藏以外的藏区。各区藏人通过民间音乐，出版物及社交媒体等形式创造了新型的藏族共同文化，从而也增强了藏族的共同文化意识和认同感（次仁夏迦：27页）。
就特殊的教派因素来说，次仁夏迦把它归咎于格鲁派与中国政府之间的紧张关系。原因主要有两个。一是格鲁派在历史曾占统治地位，属于所谓的皇教，教派内部讲究等级和寺庙传统，因此它对当今政府对宗教的管制比其他教派有更强烈的不满。二是格鲁派系的所有寺庙至今仍拒绝接受中国政府选定的第十一世班禅喇嘛。由于班禅喇嘛属于格鲁派，这些格鲁派寺庙不能像非格鲁派寺庙那样，可以对政府要求它们承认新班禅喇嘛的压力视而不见。这两大原因使格鲁派寺庙对中国政府的宿怨和愤怒尤为激烈，因为其核心的权威地位受到挑战。比如涉及自焚事件最多的格尔登寺，它既是藏区最大的寺庙之一，又曾是阿坝地区重要的政治权利中心。第十世班禅圆寂后留下的宗教领袖真空，目前又因老一辈喇嘛的逐渐离世而加剧。经过文革的老一辈喇嘛，无意在政治上挑战中国政府，故而专注藏传佛教的复兴。随着这批资深而温和的喇嘛逐个谢世，同时政府又不断要求喇嘛和僧侣谴责达赖喇嘛，与境外寺庙保持距离，这些都给格鲁派寺庙造成了持续的紧张和焦虑（次仁夏迦： 28-29页）。
此外，次仁夏迦也如许多西方分析者一样，认为中国政府近年来的西部开发政策加剧了民族地区的矛盾。尽管国内官方政策总是以肯定的态度大力发展藏区的交通和援助项目，境外藏人和西方人士却往往把它们看作是同化和融合藏区的手段，认为它们威胁到当地民族的文化传统和生存方式。次仁夏迦称，以保护藏区草原环境为幌子的牧民定居工程，尽管在降低婴儿死亡率和延长成人寿命方面有所贡献，但同时也加剧了失业和社会分配不公，其长期效益不明。这些社会问题使当地藏人把牧民定居工程看成政府对他们传统权利的侵犯，对他们生存方式的不当干预。次仁夏迦引用荷兰学者安德鲁·费舍尔的研究为证。费舍尔在2012年4月的一篇文章里制作了一张藏区自焚路线图，图中显示了自焚发生地域与定居工程的吻合。[5] 尽管目前自焚者中还没有人直接来自牧民定居的社区，次仁夏迦认为上述路线的吻合毋庸置疑地反映了社会变迁给当地藏民带来的焦虑 （次仁夏迦：31-32页）。
有意义的是，次仁夏迦也承认，尽管藏人的不满是基于他们族权的诉求，但是“藏民族”这一概念的历史并不长。而且它正是由中国政府本身“识别”出来并人为地统一起来的。但是经过政府的创造和固定后，这一“民族”概念已成为当今藏人的民族主义和领土意识的基础（次仁夏迦： 24页）。
川藏籍学者：旧势力的回升与影响
与上述两个体制外的分析观点相比，国内体制内的藏族知识分子如何看待藏区自焚事件？几年来我也多次求问一位就职于中国藏学研究中心的甘孜籍藏族学者。由于他谈的是个人看法，不希望被误认为代表官方意见，故我在此不署其真名，简称他为“康巴学者。”[6]
首先，这位康巴学者并不否定王力雄的分析。他认为，虽然王的立意不同，但“并非出于绝望”、“呼喊达赖与西藏独立等同过于牵强”、“从众心理驱使” 等几个主要结论是客观的，定量分析的方法是可取的。同时，他也指出王力雄的分析中有一个关键的疏漏：既然是从自焚者的角度去分析原因，就不能忽略这个群体的个人及社会背景。这位康巴学者认为，自焚者大多是一些不明真相的青少年，家境贫穷且学习又最差，在寺中是地位最低的僧人，为了提升自己名望或功德，被一些僧人利用、鼓动、甚至直接帮助进行自焚。他把自焚的主要诱因总结为“死后见达赖”、“民族英雄”、“经济补偿”这三项。这一说法意味着自焚者实际上是一群易受伤害、易受操纵的弱势群体。
我就以上观点询问了王力雄的意见。王的答覆佐证了自焚者年龄偏小、学历偏低这两点。在他有纪录的92例自焚者中，31%为十九岁以下；45%为二十至三十岁之间；8%为三十至四十岁之间；8%为四十至五十岁之间；5%为五十岁以上。也就是说，三分之二多（76%）的自焚者在三十岁以下，这的确是一个很高的比重。王还确认，自焚者中的僧人只受过传统的寺庙教育，而世俗人中没有超过中学毕业的。但王否认经济补偿是自焚的动力之一。他举例说一个自焚者家庭，非常贫穷，但是把收到的十来万元捐款，又转捐给了当地学校（电子邮件，2012年12月19日）。
其次，这位康巴学者也同意次仁夏迦有关自焚事件限于特定地域和特定教派的观点。他具体指出，自焚者只来自于藏区3,600多座寺庙中的4座，属于极少数。而自焚多发的川、甘、青三省交界的三县七乡，在历史上就属于几不管的部落争斗地区，“无政府”思想历来突出，当年就因此受到马步芳的严厉镇压。现在因为地处偏远，在各省区里藏区所占的经济总量、区位不同。在藏区的经济发展思路、资金投入、宗教管理、社会管理的政策宽严不同的情况下，部分地方的旧势力、宗教旧思想回升，使少数人绑架多数人有了运作空间。相比之下，云南、西藏这些年来经济发展相对较好，大规模的旅游济经促进了民族交流和交融。云南藏区从未发生过自焚。
与次仁夏迦相同，这位康巴学者认为正是东藏地区相对宽松的政策，导致宗教势力回升。在物质生活改善、自由活动拓展、法制对干部手脚的约束，以及境内外信息连通的便利（地方上称为“政府政策软弱”）等情况下，老百姓思想受各种思潮、特别是境外达赖喇嘛影响增大。其中最担忧的，就是共产党允许达赖喇嘛回来（达赖要回来的传言很多），天会变，所以许多人想给自己留后路，许多持拥护达赖观点的僧人也借达赖回来的种种后果威逼、绑架民众，一些地方出现“不种地、不准买卖肉类食品”等响应达赖号召“不与共产党合作”运动的现象，搞得老百姓私下也不得安宁。
至于教派方面的原因，这位康巴学者强调了格鲁派指望恢复传统政教制度的阶级因素。除了自焚事件的受害者往往是贫穷年轻的底层僧人，格鲁派势力回升的其他受害者也是普通藏族百姓。为达其政治目的，在煽动自焚后，一些僧人还不准旁人进行救助，就是为了境外能够看到“刺激”的画面和民众惊恐……，这里面宗教精神已经被深深亵渎。该学者还称，据了解自焚甚至还有私下按旧部落方式抽签强制。
与王力雄和次仁夏迦的分析鲜明不同的是，这位康巴学者认为自焚因素虽然复杂，但主要还是受境外以“达赖喇嘛旗号”所做的煽动。在王力雄的统计里，高达38% 自焚者的动机是将身体“贡献”给达赖喇嘛（宗教供奉），因此明显看到达赖喇嘛这个宗教符号在这场摧残无知、盲目青少年生命活动中的作用。康巴学者问到，作为一个宗教领袖能接受这种“生命供奉”，而拒不公开谴责和反对自焚，能被视为“情有可原”吗？
解决问题的出路
王力雄认为，解决所谓的西藏问题需要突破困境，而关键又在于改变由境外藏人包办的一贯战略，由境内百万藏人成为主体，共同参与“自由与和解”之事业。从这个意义上说，王认为自焚代表了境内藏人的“觉醒”和“行动，”尽管目前除了自焚，他们还不知道到底要什么样去行动。一旦境内藏人知道了路在何方，他们就会活着挺进充满希望的未来，而不需要再投身自焚的烈火。
次仁夏迦则指出任何方法也解决不了西藏问题。他认为中国政府同其他所有面临分裂主义的政府一样，对藏区采取两大政策。一是加强监控，二是增加投资以诱导合作与服从。然而这两种政策都效果有限。加强经济发展并没有增加藏民对政府统治的接受，而加强监控反而更激起藏族百姓的受害感。次仁夏迦罗列了当局对藏区之间藏民出入的限制，如数百名四川及青海藏区的藏人被驱逐出拉萨。东藏区的藏人要进入西藏自治区面临越来越多的限制，而汉族移民进入西藏却不受限制。（其实次仁夏迦文章里也曾提到，西藏自治区境内发生的零星自焚事件都由川藏区或青藏区来的人员所为。这必然是政府限制藏区之间人口流动的原因）。2008年后藏族旅客面临更多的机场安检，在拉萨机场，他们甚至必须通过专门的安全检查。次仁夏迦认为，正是此类的歧视政策加剧了藏族被排斥的感受，导致他们以自焚的极端手段去表达他们的集体愤怒。但是王力雄的数据则显示，自焚者并非因表达绝望而献身。
相反，康巴学者认为自焚现象的解决方法还需境外的系铃人。鉴于他把自焚的主要诱因总结为“死后见达赖”、“民族英雄”、“经济补偿”这三项，因此他认为自焚行为甚至与伊斯兰极端势力“自杀式炸弹”没有本质的区别。由此，他呼吁西方各国政府要求达赖喇嘛站出来公开谴责自焚是反人类、反人权行为，是违背藏传佛教基本教义的、他不会为自焚人员祈祷超度。只要达赖喇嘛站出来公开拒绝为自焚人员加气鼓劲，相信自焚事件会大幅减少。
[1] 本文刊载于《领导者》2013年4月刊（总第51期），第172-176页。
[2] 作者为 美国纽约市立大学 政治学教授
[3] 王力雄，“燃烧的遗言——藏人因何自焚？”明镜新闻网，2012，12月15日：http://www.mingjingnews.com/2012/12/blog-post_8816.html
[4] Shakya, Tsering. 2012. “Self-Immolation, the Changing Language of Protest in Tibet.” Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines. 25 (Décembre): 19-39.
[5] Fischer, Martin Andrew. 2012. “The Geopolitics of Politico-Religious Protest in Eastern Tibet,” Hot Spot Forum, Cultural Anthropology Online, April 9: http://www.culanth.org/?q=node/530
[6] 2011 年8月访谈，9月电子邮件。2012年12月初北京访谈，12月电子邮件。
星期一, 7月 22, 2013
资深议员噶玛群培声明：将在议会阻击中间道路
来源：让赞联盟网站
背景：第十五届西藏人民议会第五次会议，2013年3月27日
视频：http://www.rangzen.net/2013/06/07/translation-of-karma-chophel-intervention-at-paliament/
原标题：Translation of Karma Chophel’s intervention at Parliament
Translated and edited by Tenzin Nyinjey, with permission from Karma Chophel.
In 1991, I was elected, for the first time, as a member of Tibetan parliament. On 29 May 1991, I took my oath and responsibility [as MP]. Since then until today, for almost twenty-two years, I have been consecutively elected as a member of Tibetan parliament and purported to have made some modest contribution to our common cause. During these years, I served as a speaker of parliament twice, and also once as pro tem speaker of the parliament.
As a matter of clarification, I would like to express to the parliament with special emphasis that from the perspective of Dharma (Chos) His Holiness the Dalai Lama is my undisputed, noble protector, my source of spiritual refuge both in this and the next life. I believe [from the depth] of my heart that not only for the Tibetan people in and outside Tibet, but also for the whole world, His Holiness the Dalai Lama is a noble leader, and I love, respect and admire him [accordingly]. This [my love, respect and admiration for His Holiness as a noble leader] will never ever change.
From the perspective of politics, in 2011, His Holiness the Dalai Lama issued many statements [to the effect that] his political and administrative leadership and responsibilities shall be handed over to a directly-elected leadership of the Tibetan people. Therefore the structure [provisions] of the charter of the Central Tibetan Administration was amended for the 25th time resulting in tremendous changes. Based on this [such changes], His Holiness the Dalai Lama doesn’t hold the political and executive power of the Central Tibetan Administration anymore; nor is he the nominal or titular head of our nation [Tibet].
Before the above changes occurred, to resolve the Tibetan issue truthfully, His Holiness the Dalai Lama — the undisputed spiritual and temporal head of the Tibetan people — implemented the Middle Way policy in the Tibetan parliament. Although I do not agree [with the Middle-Way], I supported it and the resolutions related [to the Middle-Way] were passed unanimously in the parliament. The main reason I supported [the Middle-Way] is because I respect His Holiness the Dalai Lama from the depth of my heart, and [also] because I took a series of oath to [sincerely] follow the words of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
Now under different circumstances, [exercising my] democratic duties and rights, and in accordance with my earlier [political] stand, from today onwards I am going to support the restoration of Tibet’s complete freedom and independence, and withdraw all the support that I have given in the parliament to the Middle-Way till date. I request the parliament to acknowledge this. I have three important reasons to make my [political] stand clear:
For the past 64 years, China’s policy on Tibet—let alone undergoing positive changes—has worsened [in terms of its] barbaric and oppressive actions. Now the Tibetan people have lost every faith in the Chinese government [to resolve the Tibetan issue through dialog].
Based on above reasons, our fellow Tibetans inside Tibet are engaging in diverse non-violent protests, including the act of self-immolation, and through [these protests], they are making clear that they don’t want to live under the Chinese communist government and aspire for Tibet’s complete freedom and independence. Therefore, I am going to show my support and solidarity [to them].
This year is the 100th anniversary of the Great 13th Dalai Lama Thubten Gyatso’s declaration of Tibetan independence in 1913. I commemorate and express my respect [to this great event]. I pray to the Buddha, Dharma and Sangha—the three sources of ultimate refuge—that this clarification will advance the unity and patriotism of the Tibetan people in and outside Tibet, resulting in the restoration of Tibet’s complete freedom and independence. I [hope] my prayers would be answered accordingly.
Honorable speaker let me express a few more words. I consider my clarification significant, which is why I presented it in writing. Since the 11th session of the Tibetan parliament, it is not that our members of parliament and observers from outside do not know what my [political] stand is. Therefore, while making this clarification, I have done it with full modesty considering it as my duty. I have made the clarification not out of pride, resentment or to impress others. I have never had such [desires]. Moreover, inside and outside parliament, and everywhere, although this [independence] is my fundamental political stand, I am a person who have always tried, if necessary, to avoid speaking and making clarifications about it.
I am not a person who always wave the [flag of independence] and [disrupt] our internal unity; our internal unity is strong generally, but it [raising the independence stance] might hurt some individuals, which is not nice. And in democracy, all of us, bearing our responsibility and using our intelligence, primarily taking responsibility for our nation, can have our own [political stand]—that each one of us has the right to free expression and free thought. Acknowledging and respecting this right to free expression and free thought, I have been a person who always made efforts not to raise the [independence] stance all the time. However, for the ultimate [struggle] of Tibet—be it Tibetan people’s polity, religion, culture, or any other matter that one considers—I have always felt that what we really need is freedom and independence.
This feeling and stance I have arrived at out of strong conviction and belief. Such is the case. For instance, in 1970, after graduating from Mussorie School I joined the university; it was as if I had now begun to stand on my own feet, to have my own self-sufficiency [autonomous existence]. In that year, in Dharamsala, I participated in a conference organized to found the Tibetan Youth Congress. It was an important milestone for this [independence] stand. In 1979, generally from 1959 to 1979, the policy implemented by both the Tibetan government and public was [restoration] of freedom and independence. Since 1979, the policy underwent changes—1979 is generally considered the turning point. Even at that time, my [political] stand didn’t undergo any changes. In 1979, I was a [member of] Central Executive Committee of the Tibetan Youth Congress. I was serving as a teacher in Bylakupee Tibetan school. Then in 1987, His Holiness the Dalai Lama presented the Five-Point Peace Plan in the United States. In 1988, His Holiness presented the Strasbourg proposal—the essence of which is how to conduct negotiations in stages with the Chinese government through the Middle-Way approach—thus making it all clear through this proposal.
While making all this clear, I was simultaneously serving as the principal of the Central Tibetan School in Mussorie and Vice-President of the Central Executive Committee of the Tibetan Youth Congress. Even then also, my stand did not undergo any changes. Since then keeping a firm stand, without undergoing any changes, in my heart I have felt that the short and long-term need, the ultimate need, of the Tibetan people is freedom and independence. As far as my knowledge is concerned, His Holiness the Dalai Lama, considering the urgent circumstances and implementing thousand strategies and hundred tactics, proposed the Middle-Way, but I think that what we needed was independence, that was in His Holiness’s mind, I felt. Therefore, from 1959 to 1979, the policy of Central Tibetan Administration was to [restore] Tibet’s freedom and independence. As such the prayers that I recite regularly, His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s composition of prayers for Tibet’s spiritual and temporal cause, these prayers I recite regularly, everyday, without any break. For us Kagyu followers, there’s a prayer-text called Chags Med De Mon (literally: prayers for welfare to be recited regularly) that we are advised to recite regularly, but we could not recite it regularly. However, the prayers composed by His Holiness the Dalai Lama during that time, for instance on 29 September 1962, His Holiness composed the prayers Dentsig Monlam (Words of Truth) that we today recite with lots of importance.
“May this heartfelt wish of total freedom for all Tibet,
Which has been awaited for a long time,
be spontaneously fulfilled;
Please grant soon the good fortune to enjoy
the happy celebration of spiritual with temporal rule.”
The above verse from the Words of Truth is the prayer that we offer to Avalokiteshvara Chenresig, the patron deity of the Land of Snows. Then on 5 February 1962, His Holiness composed, Deshek Riknga (five kinds of enlightened beings), a prayer meant to propitiate the Nechung deity. In this prayer, His Holiness propitiates the Nechung with the [following verse]:
“For the welfare of Dharma and sentient beings
Propagate the noble deeds of Tenzin Gyatso
Pacifying the harm that causes the degeneration of Tibet
Fulfill the joys of political and spiritual freedom.”
Then on 5 March 1973, His Holiness composed two very important prayers to propitiate deities. The one is the prayer to propitiate the female deity Palden Lhamo, in which he wrote:
“Defeated by the enemy hordes
The living beings of the Land of Snows
Despite having been subjected to unbearable suffering
With courage if they cling to the grand [struggle for] freedom
How could you abandon your noble blessings?”
Thus, His Holiness, with a bit of lamentation, propitiated Palden Lhamo with these words. Then on the same date, His Holiness composed the important prayer that we recite regularly, Ma med Sonam (Fortune not undermined). In this prayer, His Holiness wrote:
“Dispelling the darkness [caused by] the degeneration of times
The victory of the spiritual and political freedom of Tibet
Is sure to emerge, [so you] should not feel discouragement.”
Such propitiations were made to the deities of Tibet. Therefore, based on such awareness I stood firm with my stand, and will do so in future. Since it has significance for the parliament, I have tried to clarify and clear it up.
背景：第十五届西藏人民议会第五次会议，2013年3月27日
视频：http://www.rangzen.net/2013/06/07/translation-of-karma-chophel-intervention-at-paliament/
原标题：Translation of Karma Chophel’s intervention at Parliament
Translated and edited by Tenzin Nyinjey, with permission from Karma Chophel.
In 1991, I was elected, for the first time, as a member of Tibetan parliament. On 29 May 1991, I took my oath and responsibility [as MP]. Since then until today, for almost twenty-two years, I have been consecutively elected as a member of Tibetan parliament and purported to have made some modest contribution to our common cause. During these years, I served as a speaker of parliament twice, and also once as pro tem speaker of the parliament.
As a matter of clarification, I would like to express to the parliament with special emphasis that from the perspective of Dharma (Chos) His Holiness the Dalai Lama is my undisputed, noble protector, my source of spiritual refuge both in this and the next life. I believe [from the depth] of my heart that not only for the Tibetan people in and outside Tibet, but also for the whole world, His Holiness the Dalai Lama is a noble leader, and I love, respect and admire him [accordingly]. This [my love, respect and admiration for His Holiness as a noble leader] will never ever change.
From the perspective of politics, in 2011, His Holiness the Dalai Lama issued many statements [to the effect that] his political and administrative leadership and responsibilities shall be handed over to a directly-elected leadership of the Tibetan people. Therefore the structure [provisions] of the charter of the Central Tibetan Administration was amended for the 25th time resulting in tremendous changes. Based on this [such changes], His Holiness the Dalai Lama doesn’t hold the political and executive power of the Central Tibetan Administration anymore; nor is he the nominal or titular head of our nation [Tibet].
Before the above changes occurred, to resolve the Tibetan issue truthfully, His Holiness the Dalai Lama — the undisputed spiritual and temporal head of the Tibetan people — implemented the Middle Way policy in the Tibetan parliament. Although I do not agree [with the Middle-Way], I supported it and the resolutions related [to the Middle-Way] were passed unanimously in the parliament. The main reason I supported [the Middle-Way] is because I respect His Holiness the Dalai Lama from the depth of my heart, and [also] because I took a series of oath to [sincerely] follow the words of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
Now under different circumstances, [exercising my] democratic duties and rights, and in accordance with my earlier [political] stand, from today onwards I am going to support the restoration of Tibet’s complete freedom and independence, and withdraw all the support that I have given in the parliament to the Middle-Way till date. I request the parliament to acknowledge this. I have three important reasons to make my [political] stand clear:
For the past 64 years, China’s policy on Tibet—let alone undergoing positive changes—has worsened [in terms of its] barbaric and oppressive actions. Now the Tibetan people have lost every faith in the Chinese government [to resolve the Tibetan issue through dialog].
Based on above reasons, our fellow Tibetans inside Tibet are engaging in diverse non-violent protests, including the act of self-immolation, and through [these protests], they are making clear that they don’t want to live under the Chinese communist government and aspire for Tibet’s complete freedom and independence. Therefore, I am going to show my support and solidarity [to them].
This year is the 100th anniversary of the Great 13th Dalai Lama Thubten Gyatso’s declaration of Tibetan independence in 1913. I commemorate and express my respect [to this great event]. I pray to the Buddha, Dharma and Sangha—the three sources of ultimate refuge—that this clarification will advance the unity and patriotism of the Tibetan people in and outside Tibet, resulting in the restoration of Tibet’s complete freedom and independence. I [hope] my prayers would be answered accordingly.
Honorable speaker let me express a few more words. I consider my clarification significant, which is why I presented it in writing. Since the 11th session of the Tibetan parliament, it is not that our members of parliament and observers from outside do not know what my [political] stand is. Therefore, while making this clarification, I have done it with full modesty considering it as my duty. I have made the clarification not out of pride, resentment or to impress others. I have never had such [desires]. Moreover, inside and outside parliament, and everywhere, although this [independence] is my fundamental political stand, I am a person who have always tried, if necessary, to avoid speaking and making clarifications about it.
I am not a person who always wave the [flag of independence] and [disrupt] our internal unity; our internal unity is strong generally, but it [raising the independence stance] might hurt some individuals, which is not nice. And in democracy, all of us, bearing our responsibility and using our intelligence, primarily taking responsibility for our nation, can have our own [political stand]—that each one of us has the right to free expression and free thought. Acknowledging and respecting this right to free expression and free thought, I have been a person who always made efforts not to raise the [independence] stance all the time. However, for the ultimate [struggle] of Tibet—be it Tibetan people’s polity, religion, culture, or any other matter that one considers—I have always felt that what we really need is freedom and independence.
This feeling and stance I have arrived at out of strong conviction and belief. Such is the case. For instance, in 1970, after graduating from Mussorie School I joined the university; it was as if I had now begun to stand on my own feet, to have my own self-sufficiency [autonomous existence]. In that year, in Dharamsala, I participated in a conference organized to found the Tibetan Youth Congress. It was an important milestone for this [independence] stand. In 1979, generally from 1959 to 1979, the policy implemented by both the Tibetan government and public was [restoration] of freedom and independence. Since 1979, the policy underwent changes—1979 is generally considered the turning point. Even at that time, my [political] stand didn’t undergo any changes. In 1979, I was a [member of] Central Executive Committee of the Tibetan Youth Congress. I was serving as a teacher in Bylakupee Tibetan school. Then in 1987, His Holiness the Dalai Lama presented the Five-Point Peace Plan in the United States. In 1988, His Holiness presented the Strasbourg proposal—the essence of which is how to conduct negotiations in stages with the Chinese government through the Middle-Way approach—thus making it all clear through this proposal.
While making all this clear, I was simultaneously serving as the principal of the Central Tibetan School in Mussorie and Vice-President of the Central Executive Committee of the Tibetan Youth Congress. Even then also, my stand did not undergo any changes. Since then keeping a firm stand, without undergoing any changes, in my heart I have felt that the short and long-term need, the ultimate need, of the Tibetan people is freedom and independence. As far as my knowledge is concerned, His Holiness the Dalai Lama, considering the urgent circumstances and implementing thousand strategies and hundred tactics, proposed the Middle-Way, but I think that what we needed was independence, that was in His Holiness’s mind, I felt. Therefore, from 1959 to 1979, the policy of Central Tibetan Administration was to [restore] Tibet’s freedom and independence. As such the prayers that I recite regularly, His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s composition of prayers for Tibet’s spiritual and temporal cause, these prayers I recite regularly, everyday, without any break. For us Kagyu followers, there’s a prayer-text called Chags Med De Mon (literally: prayers for welfare to be recited regularly) that we are advised to recite regularly, but we could not recite it regularly. However, the prayers composed by His Holiness the Dalai Lama during that time, for instance on 29 September 1962, His Holiness composed the prayers Dentsig Monlam (Words of Truth) that we today recite with lots of importance.
“May this heartfelt wish of total freedom for all Tibet,
Which has been awaited for a long time,
be spontaneously fulfilled;
Please grant soon the good fortune to enjoy
the happy celebration of spiritual with temporal rule.”
The above verse from the Words of Truth is the prayer that we offer to Avalokiteshvara Chenresig, the patron deity of the Land of Snows. Then on 5 February 1962, His Holiness composed, Deshek Riknga (five kinds of enlightened beings), a prayer meant to propitiate the Nechung deity. In this prayer, His Holiness propitiates the Nechung with the [following verse]:
“For the welfare of Dharma and sentient beings
Propagate the noble deeds of Tenzin Gyatso
Pacifying the harm that causes the degeneration of Tibet
Fulfill the joys of political and spiritual freedom.”
Then on 5 March 1973, His Holiness composed two very important prayers to propitiate deities. The one is the prayer to propitiate the female deity Palden Lhamo, in which he wrote:
“Defeated by the enemy hordes
The living beings of the Land of Snows
Despite having been subjected to unbearable suffering
With courage if they cling to the grand [struggle for] freedom
How could you abandon your noble blessings?”
Thus, His Holiness, with a bit of lamentation, propitiated Palden Lhamo with these words. Then on the same date, His Holiness composed the important prayer that we recite regularly, Ma med Sonam (Fortune not undermined). In this prayer, His Holiness wrote:
“Dispelling the darkness [caused by] the degeneration of times
The victory of the spiritual and political freedom of Tibet
Is sure to emerge, [so you] should not feel discouragement.”
Such propitiations were made to the deities of Tibet. Therefore, based on such awareness I stood firm with my stand, and will do so in future. Since it has significance for the parliament, I have tried to clarify and clear it up.
西藏独立会议在达兰萨拉召开
【西藏之声 2012年6月27日报导】
流亡藏人在印度北部达兰萨拉自发举办“西藏独立”会议，希望团结力量，壮大西藏独立抗争。
今年3月12日，数百名流亡藏人在美国纽约举行了一场“西藏独立”会议，并决定成立“西藏国民大会党”（Tibetan National Congress），为西藏独立抗争继续奋斗。而今天（27日），达兰萨拉地方西藏青年会会长丹增尊珠和色拉寺高僧祥萨仁波切等人，又自发在藏人行政中央图书馆大厅中举办了“西藏独立”会议。
西藏人民议会十名议员、旅居美国的藏人作家嘉杨诺布、前藏人行政中央首席部长索南多杰，西藏独立活动人士拉桑次仁，以及各非官方组织代表等40多人出席了会议。
此次会议的发起人之一，西藏青年会达兰萨拉分会会长丹增尊珠在接受本台采访时介绍说，（录音）今年三月份，由“让赞联盟”（Rangzen Alliance）在美国纽约市召开的“西藏独立”会议决定，西藏的独立抗争必须继续下去，而且在今后举办活动的形式方面，需要进行深入讨论，所以这次我们几个人自发在达兰萨拉召开“西藏独立”会议，是为了将各地的西藏独立抗争力量，凝聚在一起，并互相听取意见，壮大西藏独立运动的规模。
作为嘉宾出席这次会议的藏人作家嘉杨诺布在接受本台采访时表示，（录音）境内同胞们遭受着残酷的折磨，他们不惜献出自己的生命来表达出的诉求，我们都很清楚。为了达到这一目的，我们成立了“西藏国民大会党”，将仔细讨论，并制定出直接对抗中共的计划。同时我们也认为，藏人行政中央是为了取得西藏独立而创建的，这应该继续下去。
据介绍，“西藏独立”会议在经过一天的讨论后，将于今天傍晚制定出有关决议案。
流亡藏人在印度北部达兰萨拉自发举办“西藏独立”会议，希望团结力量，壮大西藏独立抗争。
今年3月12日，数百名流亡藏人在美国纽约举行了一场“西藏独立”会议，并决定成立“西藏国民大会党”（Tibetan National Congress），为西藏独立抗争继续奋斗。而今天（27日），达兰萨拉地方西藏青年会会长丹增尊珠和色拉寺高僧祥萨仁波切等人，又自发在藏人行政中央图书馆大厅中举办了“西藏独立”会议。
西藏人民议会十名议员、旅居美国的藏人作家嘉杨诺布、前藏人行政中央首席部长索南多杰，西藏独立活动人士拉桑次仁，以及各非官方组织代表等40多人出席了会议。
此次会议的发起人之一，西藏青年会达兰萨拉分会会长丹增尊珠在接受本台采访时介绍说，（录音）今年三月份，由“让赞联盟”（Rangzen Alliance）在美国纽约市召开的“西藏独立”会议决定，西藏的独立抗争必须继续下去，而且在今后举办活动的形式方面，需要进行深入讨论，所以这次我们几个人自发在达兰萨拉召开“西藏独立”会议，是为了将各地的西藏独立抗争力量，凝聚在一起，并互相听取意见，壮大西藏独立运动的规模。
作为嘉宾出席这次会议的藏人作家嘉杨诺布在接受本台采访时表示，（录音）境内同胞们遭受着残酷的折磨，他们不惜献出自己的生命来表达出的诉求，我们都很清楚。为了达到这一目的，我们成立了“西藏国民大会党”，将仔细讨论，并制定出直接对抗中共的计划。同时我们也认为，藏人行政中央是为了取得西藏独立而创建的，这应该继续下去。
据介绍，“西藏独立”会议在经过一天的讨论后，将于今天傍晚制定出有关决议案。
2011年流亡藏人民主大選結果
报道时间：2011-04-28
资料来源：http://www.tibet.org.tw/news_detail.php?news_id=1916
西藏流亡政府選舉事務署於今天（27日）正式宣佈2011年西藏流亡社區民主大選中獲選的西藏人民議會議員和西藏流亡政府首席部長名單。 自西藏政教領袖達賴喇嘛宣佈將所有行政權力移交于新屆領導人以來，流亡藏人對今年3月20日的正選給予更大關注，參選率相對于往年明顯增加。在總計83399名註冊參選人數中，共有49184人正式參加了選舉，占選舉比率59%，雖比初選有所下降，但超過上屆選舉比率。
西藏流亡政府選舉事務署主管江白曲桑、增設主管楊科嘉和仁增曲紮，今天在外交與新聞部會議大廳中召開新聞發佈會，正式公佈第15屆西藏人民議會議員，和有民眾直接投票選舉產生的第3屆西藏流亡政府首席部長獲選名單。
入圍2011西藏民主大選的94位西藏人民議會議員（其中包括6名自願參選者）和3位西藏流亡政府首席部長中，正式獲選的有西藏人民議會衛藏8名議員、多堆10名議員、多麥10名議員、五個教派各2名議員、歐洲與北美各2名議員和1名西藏首席部長。而衛藏議員排列第9及10名的次丹諾布和晉美炯乃得票數分別為31.85%和31.40%，未達到法定選民總數的33%，因此在這次衛藏10名議員選舉中只有8名議員獲選。
西藏流亡政府選舉事務署方面針對衛藏缺席的2名議員將進行補選。選舉事務署主管江白曲桑在新聞發佈會上對於議員與首席部長首次在同一天選舉方面作了說明，並強調這是通過研究其利弊，重點考慮生活在西方國家的藏人參與選舉，同時為了節省時間所作的決定。江白曲桑介紹說，民選第一屆首席部長的選舉率為52.22%，當時選舉的第十三屆西藏人民議會議員的總比率為59.62%； 第二屆首席部長選舉比率為44.36%，14屆議員選舉比率為52.69%，與上一屆相比出現下降趨勢；第三屆首席部長選舉比率為58.97%，第十五屆議員選舉比率為58.54%，其中首席部長選舉與上兩屆相比明顯上升，這說明2011年大選的關注力和參與人數比往年增加，而這一成果是大家共同的努力。
西藏流亡政府選舉事務署增設主管楊克嘉宣佈第十五屆西藏人民議會西藏三區獲選議員名單，其中：
衛藏地區的議員依次為，阿甲亞•益西平措、白瑪炯乃、夏爾林•丹增達珍、格西•格桑占堆、噶瑪益西、達瓦次仁、卓瑪次仁、布姆次仁；
多堆議員依次為，巴瓦•格桑堅參、色達次成、久欽•貢卻曲珍、嘉央索巴、吾嘎倉•玉珍、曲炯旺秋、央金卓嘎、次成丹增、格西•雍忠堅參、崗拉姆；
多麥地區議員依次為，邊巴次仁、圖丹龍日、傑榮•達瓦次仁、培傑•卓瑪措姆、格德•卓嘎拉姆、索南堅參、卓嘎嘉、益西卓瑪、莫日丹巴、嘉柔太。
西藏流亡政府選舉事務署增設主管仁增曲紮在新聞發佈會上宣佈，第十五屆西藏人民議會各教派、歐洲與北美地區的獲選議員和西藏流亡政府首席部長獲選名單，其中
寧瑪派議員依次為，索南丹培和甲日•布楚；
噶舉派議員依次為，噶瑪曲培和丹巴亞培；
薩迦派議員依次為，諾布次仁和曲紮嘉措；
格魯派議員依次為，絨布•羅桑念紮和阿周次丹；
苯波教派議員依次為，格西•莫朗塔青和格西•南達澤普；
歐洲地區議員依次為，圖丹旺青和瓊達果仁；
北美地區議員依次為，德吉曲央（自願參選者）和諾布次仁。
仁增曲紮最後宣佈西藏流亡政府首席部長勝選名單。他說，西藏流亡政府前任部長紮西旺堆獲3173票，得票率為6.45%；居住在美國的西藏流亡政府前任首席部長志彤•丹增南傑獲18405票，得票率為37.42%；居住在美國的法學博士洛桑桑格獲27051票、得票率為55.00% ，在三名候選人中，洛桑森格當選為第三屆民選西藏流亡政府首席部長。
據瞭解，第十五屆西藏人民議會西藏三區獲選議員將于5月30日正式進行就職宣誓，而首席部長的就職宣誓日期暫不清楚。新當選的西藏流亡政府首席部長洛桑桑格今天接受本台採訪時表示，作為在印度生長，最後到美國留學的我來說，從初選到今天，一直得到民眾的支 持和信任感到很鼓舞，特別是今天接到很多來自西藏境內藏人的祝賀，在此特別表達感謝。我將在今後不負眾望，按照先前所作的承諾繼續為西藏政教事業付出貢獻和努力。
资料来源：http://www.tibet.org.tw/news_detail.php?news_id=1916
西藏流亡政府選舉事務署於今天（27日）正式宣佈2011年西藏流亡社區民主大選中獲選的西藏人民議會議員和西藏流亡政府首席部長名單。 自西藏政教領袖達賴喇嘛宣佈將所有行政權力移交于新屆領導人以來，流亡藏人對今年3月20日的正選給予更大關注，參選率相對于往年明顯增加。在總計83399名註冊參選人數中，共有49184人正式參加了選舉，占選舉比率59%，雖比初選有所下降，但超過上屆選舉比率。
西藏流亡政府選舉事務署主管江白曲桑、增設主管楊科嘉和仁增曲紮，今天在外交與新聞部會議大廳中召開新聞發佈會，正式公佈第15屆西藏人民議會議員，和有民眾直接投票選舉產生的第3屆西藏流亡政府首席部長獲選名單。
入圍2011西藏民主大選的94位西藏人民議會議員（其中包括6名自願參選者）和3位西藏流亡政府首席部長中，正式獲選的有西藏人民議會衛藏8名議員、多堆10名議員、多麥10名議員、五個教派各2名議員、歐洲與北美各2名議員和1名西藏首席部長。而衛藏議員排列第9及10名的次丹諾布和晉美炯乃得票數分別為31.85%和31.40%，未達到法定選民總數的33%，因此在這次衛藏10名議員選舉中只有8名議員獲選。
西藏流亡政府選舉事務署方面針對衛藏缺席的2名議員將進行補選。選舉事務署主管江白曲桑在新聞發佈會上對於議員與首席部長首次在同一天選舉方面作了說明，並強調這是通過研究其利弊，重點考慮生活在西方國家的藏人參與選舉，同時為了節省時間所作的決定。江白曲桑介紹說，民選第一屆首席部長的選舉率為52.22%，當時選舉的第十三屆西藏人民議會議員的總比率為59.62%； 第二屆首席部長選舉比率為44.36%，14屆議員選舉比率為52.69%，與上一屆相比出現下降趨勢；第三屆首席部長選舉比率為58.97%，第十五屆議員選舉比率為58.54%，其中首席部長選舉與上兩屆相比明顯上升，這說明2011年大選的關注力和參與人數比往年增加，而這一成果是大家共同的努力。
西藏流亡政府選舉事務署增設主管楊克嘉宣佈第十五屆西藏人民議會西藏三區獲選議員名單，其中：
衛藏地區的議員依次為，阿甲亞•益西平措、白瑪炯乃、夏爾林•丹增達珍、格西•格桑占堆、噶瑪益西、達瓦次仁、卓瑪次仁、布姆次仁；
多堆議員依次為，巴瓦•格桑堅參、色達次成、久欽•貢卻曲珍、嘉央索巴、吾嘎倉•玉珍、曲炯旺秋、央金卓嘎、次成丹增、格西•雍忠堅參、崗拉姆；
多麥地區議員依次為，邊巴次仁、圖丹龍日、傑榮•達瓦次仁、培傑•卓瑪措姆、格德•卓嘎拉姆、索南堅參、卓嘎嘉、益西卓瑪、莫日丹巴、嘉柔太。
西藏流亡政府選舉事務署增設主管仁增曲紮在新聞發佈會上宣佈，第十五屆西藏人民議會各教派、歐洲與北美地區的獲選議員和西藏流亡政府首席部長獲選名單，其中
寧瑪派議員依次為，索南丹培和甲日•布楚；
噶舉派議員依次為，噶瑪曲培和丹巴亞培；
薩迦派議員依次為，諾布次仁和曲紮嘉措；
格魯派議員依次為，絨布•羅桑念紮和阿周次丹；
苯波教派議員依次為，格西•莫朗塔青和格西•南達澤普；
歐洲地區議員依次為，圖丹旺青和瓊達果仁；
北美地區議員依次為，德吉曲央（自願參選者）和諾布次仁。
仁增曲紮最後宣佈西藏流亡政府首席部長勝選名單。他說，西藏流亡政府前任部長紮西旺堆獲3173票，得票率為6.45%；居住在美國的西藏流亡政府前任首席部長志彤•丹增南傑獲18405票，得票率為37.42%；居住在美國的法學博士洛桑桑格獲27051票、得票率為55.00% ，在三名候選人中，洛桑森格當選為第三屆民選西藏流亡政府首席部長。
據瞭解，第十五屆西藏人民議會西藏三區獲選議員將于5月30日正式進行就職宣誓，而首席部長的就職宣誓日期暫不清楚。新當選的西藏流亡政府首席部長洛桑桑格今天接受本台採訪時表示，作為在印度生長，最後到美國留學的我來說，從初選到今天，一直得到民眾的支 持和信任感到很鼓舞，特別是今天接到很多來自西藏境內藏人的祝賀，在此特別表達感謝。我將在今後不負眾望，按照先前所作的承諾繼續為西藏政教事業付出貢獻和努力。
星期六, 7月 20, 2013
新疆又发现一处特大型金矿 资源储量达50吨
路透北京7月18日 - 新华社周四报导称，继今年5月在中国新疆伊犁河谷发现一处资源储量达53吨的特大型金矿后，新疆地矿局最近又在邻近的和静县发现一处资源储量达50吨的特大型金矿，该矿资源潜在经济价值有望超1,000亿元人民币。
截至目前，新疆天山南北已发现四处特大型金矿。报导援引新疆地矿局局长曾小刚介绍，经过近六年的勘查，新疆地矿局第三地质大队近日在对和静县敦德铁矿评价过程中发现伴生元素锌和金，目前共探获铁资源量1.87亿吨，锌150万吨，金50吨，这使得敦德矿区“身价”倍增。
“经进一步勘查后，铁、锌和金的资源量还有望攀升，资源潜在经济价值超1,000亿元。”报导称。
报导称，目前敦德矿区的找矿工作仍在继续，选矿厂也在同步建设中，项目建成投产后，将成为当地矿业经济发展的新亮点，预计年上缴利税超亿元，还可安排2,000人以上就业。
中国黄金协会统计数据显示，2012年中国黄金产量突破400吨大关，达到403.047吨，比上年增加42.090吨，增幅11.66%，再创历史新高，连续六年位居世界第一。
(发稿 李文科; 审校 张喜良)
Violence in northwest China and Beijing's growth plans
COMMENT
In China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region differing cultural values between Uighurs and Han Chinese highlight the need for Beijing to review its ethnic policy to coincide with its development plans.
Recent violence at the end of last month which killed 35 people underlines the country’s ongoing struggle with its ethnically diverse border regions and the skewed living standards between people living near the coast and those deeper inland.
On the surface, what is happening in Xinjiang may not be as media-friendly as Egypt or Turkey, but unrest is just as geopolitically significant.
An historic heavy-handed control has already scarred relationships with ethnic minorities and a softer way of dealing with people inland could be evolving. Beijing is looking at new pragmatic approach for its border regions.
Xinjiang is located far inland near the Central Asian borderlands. The recent riots in the majority-Muslim northwestern region erupted just four days before the fourth anniversary of the 2009 clashes which killed almost 200.
It is unclear which ethnic minority the rioters represented, but state media has suggested a possible connection with Uighur exiles operating outside China that Beijing calls “terrorists”.
The exiles are angry at what they call cultural dilution as Beijing implements a massive migration of ethnic Han into the region to modernise core agricultural regions.
Fighting between the two groups is increasing and exacerbated by the vast energy reserves there which Beijing wants to develop. China has huge plans for the Xinjiang region, especially as it pushes westward into Central Asian trade routes and energy pipelines.
The stuttering march of development
Beijing is under pressure by such violence to find a way to reconcile its ethnic policy with its long-term goal of developing the interior regions into a wealthy and modern society.
Beijing is under pressure by such violence to find a way to reconcile its ethnic policy with its long-term goal of developing the interior regions into a wealthy and modern society.
China has struggled with Tibet in similar ways as Xinjiang because of the enormous distances to a diverse and ethnically divided interior feeling increasingly subjugated by Beijing.
Much of the legitimacy of the Communist Party in the eyes of the Han Chinese population comes from an expectation of continued stability and territorial integrity.
Unrest in Xinjiang has arisen from a policy of encouraging the movement of the Han to marginalise minority influences and integrate them into mainstream society.
But do these minorities want to be associated with Han lifestyle?
The fact that riots are erupting more often since 2008 as Uighurs push back against Beijing’s social engineering will worry Chinese officials trained in the ideology of sinic cultural superiority.
Clearly, the unique cultural traditions of the ethnic minorities are still closely respected, and adoption of Han Chinese culture – essentially a foreign one – is unattractive for many.
Calling Beijing’s ethnic policy in the border regions a total failure at this point may be premature. But building a “harmonious society” was always going be difficult for central planners.
Forcing two or more starkly different ethnic groups together under an artificial edifice has clearly not been successful, but there are some signs Beijing is considering more conciliatory policies.
China is must deal with its historic ghosts by keeping the interior docile and developing. In the past, revolutionary unrest has regularly been triggered in the under-privileged agricultural sector.
But Beijing’s go-to panacea for unrest – resolute advancing development – might have reached a violent ceiling in the northwestern provinces.
Ethnic unrest in China is not homogenous and differs from one restive region to another. Taken together, however, such clashes and public disobedience suggest China will continue to struggle with the complicated nature of stability in these areas.
China cannot very well adopt the Soviet strategy of forcibly removing whole populations. Instead, Beijing will continue diluting the populations and tighten security while adopting a softer approach to grievances to limit the unrest.
Nathan Smith has a Bachelor of Communications in Journalism from Massey University and has studied international relations and conflict. He blogs at LikeBulb
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