作者: 桑杰嘉
来源：http://sangjey.blogspot.hk/2016/07/blog-post.html
时间: 7/23/2016
中国政府对西藏色达佛学院实施的强拆和所谓的改革项目，不仅仅是对佛学院宗教活动进行限制，而是强制摧毁僧尼宿舍，在分割佛学院基础上进一步从佛学院上师喇嘛和堪布手中剥夺管理寺院的权力，并安排中共的干部管理佛学院。然后，将要把佛学院改变成中共政治运动的基地，特别将要驱逐学习佛教的僧人、尼姑和居士等，全面限制以佛教为主的西藏独特文化的学习和继承。从以上中共的文件中清楚看到，其目的是摧毁西藏人民的特质和语言等文化。
6月，境外媒体纷纷报道有关中共计划向西藏最大的佛教学院色达五明佛学院动刀--驱逐的学员和拆除僧舍的消息，境内外藏人忧心忡忡，各人权组织也呼吁国际社会关注。今天7月20日中共正式实施拆除僧舍行动，据中共官方发布的文件今年将驱逐2200名学员。到2017年佛学院人数限制在5000人，网友称“意味着63%的学员要被迫离开学院”。这是色达佛学院成立以来第四次遭受如此大规模的清洗行动。中共拆除僧舍的目的是驱逐僧侣，按中共的计划拆除僧舍和驱逐僧侣学员同步进行，《色达县喇荣五明佛学院整顿清理工作》指出，“驱逐出佛学院的人数与摧毁的僧舍数目要相等，将对僧舍的数目和人数进行对比调查。”因此，说明驱逐僧侣学员行动也已经开始了。
色达佛学院,又称色达喇荣五明佛学院，位于西藏色大县境内，距离县城20公里，海拔3700米，由晋美彭措堪布于1980年创办，1993年被美国《世界报》称为“世界上最大的佛学院”。佛学院分僧人、尼师、居士，以及留学生等。学员来自西藏三区、中国各地以及欧美、台湾、新加坡、马来西亚等。
据色达佛学院高层透露中共清洗之前派人进行调查，以及用高科技卫星等手段统计出色达佛学院共有13000座僧舍，这次行动中要拆除5000座僧舍，虽然色达佛学院没有透露驱逐僧尼和居士的人数。如果按一座僧舍居住一位学员计，中共可能会一次性驱逐5000名学员。
来自中共最高层决定
这次清洗色达佛学院是以《色达县喇荣五明佛学院整顿清理工作》为指导方针展开，该文件称：“是根据中央第六次西藏工作座谈会和第二次全国宗教工作会议整顿色达佛学院精神”的实施，从而看出清洗色达佛学院的决定来自中共最高层。另外，色达佛学院高层透露，这次的规定不是来自县、州政府，也不是省政府，是习近平曾亲自点了色达佛学院的名字，所以，没有人敢抗拒。色达佛学院高层明确指出此次无法躲避拆除，而且说这次政府文件中明确说色达佛学院面临“关键”时刻。中共当局也警告说 “清理”也许会受到阻力，“我们有充分的准备应对”。7月初，色达佛学院高层多次强调了“拆除僧舍是既定政策”。 依据中共《色达县喇荣五明佛学院整顿清理工作》显示执行“清理”色达佛学院的是甘孜藏族自治州政府的各部门，还有色达县政府。负责实施的大多数官员是中国人。而且，该运动分七个步骤，并有实施小组和负责人进行限时执行。
中共文件显示参与执行的部门有：甘孜州宣传部、州统战部、州民族宗教工作室、州法律部门、州公安处、州民政、州国家安全局、州城镇住房建设部门、州国家资源部门、州民政、色达县政府等。
清洗七步骤
中共《色达县喇荣五明佛学院整顿清理工作》七个步骤进行。通过七个步骤完成对色达佛学院的清洗任务，其中包括宣传教育、登记佛学院学员、僧舍编号、驱逐学员、拆除僧舍、佛学院内安装监控摄影装置、限制佛学院进出、设置政府行政部门、政府干部进入寺院管理结构，并管理寺院的宗教活动等。
中共清洗色达佛学院的步骤一：
对佛学院实施开展政治宣传教育运动。向僧侣宣传第六次中央西藏工作座谈会和全国宗教工作会议的内容。按佛学院宗教管理层分三部分进行：
第一部分，佛学院常务代表委员会委员和常务委员、年长的僧尼等实施（干部）私人关系上进行宣传和说明。对佛学院各部的格给（职务）和十八部门的负责人集中宣传和说明。对324殿小（佛学院组织）组负责人进行分组宣传和说明，这一工作要在2016年6月1日前要完成。
第二部分，佛学院各林（佛学院的组织）和各聪（佛学院的组织）召开会议宣传和说明，并要写认可书。僧人和尼姑签订承认和遵守这些法规的协议，按法规学习宗教，在佛学院树立法规宣传栏。向僧人和尼姑放映中共法规宣传教育影片，要求佛学院的法规普及率达到百分之百。这一运动2016年7月3日前要完成。
第三部分，在佛学院每月进行法规宣传教育运动，这一运动要求在2016年10月31日前完成。
负责领导者：儋尼克（音译）、张潘森（音译）、香洛、香曲等。
执行部门：州宣传部、州统战部、州民族宗教工作室、州法律部门和色达县政府等。
中共清洗色达佛学院的步骤二：
对佛学院居住的居士、僧人、尼姑、老人和残疾人等的进行详细的登记注册，实施所谓的“一个标准三个实际”。对地点、人数、僧舍等分成不同的分类，为便于检查和管理对僧舍进行编号。这一运动要在2016年7月31前完成。
负责领导人：李江（音译）、张平生（音译）、舒文（音译）。
负责部门：州公安处、州民政、州国家安全局、色达县政府。
中共清洗色达佛学院的步骤三：
消减佛学院僧人、尼姑和居士的数量。2016年驱逐僧人和尼姑2200人，其中1029名居士进行另外分区。1200名僧人和尼姑将驱逐佛学院。其中包括来自其他省的僧人和尼姑600名。2017年将佛学院总人数限制在5000人，如果2017年9月30日前没有限制在5000人，2017年驱逐僧人和尼姑的人数将增加。
今年驱逐出寺院的僧人和尼姑的名单要在2016年6月15日前上交政府，10月30日前要驱逐完毕。向上级提交寺院常住的5000名僧侣的名单，其中外省僧侣不得超过1000人。调查其他居住在寺院中的人员， 2016年8月30日前提交名单给上级部门。
负责领导人：张平生（音译）、儋尼克（音译）、蔡耶芳（音译）。
负责部门：州统战部、州民族宗教事务委员会、州教育部门、州公安处、州民政、色达县政府，还有外地僧尼各自的县、州政府部门。
中共清洗色达佛学院的步骤四：
要拆除1500座僧舍，包括2013年至今被驱逐出佛学院的僧人、尼师、违犯规定建的僧舍、进入养老院的僧尼之僧舍，以及住进旅馆的尼师之宿舍等，至2016年10月30日要完成。
负责领导：张阳都（音译）、阿吉布哲（音译）。
负责部门：州统战部、州民族宗教委员会、州公安处、州城镇住房建设部门、州国家资源部门、州民政、色达县政府等。
中共清洗色达佛学院的步骤五：
佛学院内安装监控摄影装置，规定佛学院进出的法规。2016年8月31日前要完成。
负责领导人：张平生（音译）、舒文（音译）。
负责部门：州公安处、色达县政府。
中共清洗色达佛学院的步骤六：
佛学院居士林要单独分离出佛学院，改为由政府直接控制下的行政部门。佛学院和居士林之间30米内的所有的僧舍要强拆。2016年9月30日前要完成。
负责领导人：张平生（音译）、西布（音译）
负责部门：州城镇住房建设部门、州国家资源部门、州民政、色达县政府。
中共清洗色达佛学院的步骤七：
拆除僧人和尼师宿舍要把寺院和学院分开，并保留隔离区。从保留的5000名学员中区分入寺院的僧尼和入佛学院的僧尼名单和数目。寺院管理要有政府干部和僧人负责，并管理寺院的宗教活动。佛学院按中国政府学校管理方式管理，建立一个有政府干部和僧人组成的管理委员会，并将开设中国政府的教育活动，还有实施2+3办法。2016年8月31日前要完成。
负责领导人：李成明（音译）、儋尼克（音译）、张平生（音译）、香曲
负责部门：州统战部、州民族宗教事务委员会、州公安处、州城镇住房建设部门、州国家资源部门、色达县政府。
中共为什么要清洗佛学院？
为什么中共政府对色达佛学院一而再，再而三地进行清洗？
中共宣布要对色达佛学院进行所谓的“清理”之后，西藏境内外非常关注事态的发展，各人权组织纷纷谴责中共以改善佛学院之名清洗佛学院。也引起了境内外社会媒体上广泛的讨论。因此，中共色达县委统战部部长华科“辟谣”说：“色达五明佛学院要被拆除？假的！”，并说因为色达佛学院：“杂乱无序的生活区安全隐患非常大”、“ 政府要规划一个更加宜居宜修的禅院宝地”。西藏这六十多年的血泪长河中真的找不到中共如此关心西藏佛教和寺院的例子，相反，对于藏人更多经验是黄鼠狼给鸡拜年---没安好心！
从中共发布的文件中非常清楚，其目的是驱逐僧尼等学员，控制佛学院人数，限制僧尼自由入学，以及政府直接控制佛学院的各部门和宗教活动。色达佛学院是西藏乃至世界上最大的佛学院，自成立以来一直坚持学习和修行西藏佛教、传承和发扬光大西藏传统文化、积极参与社会服务、慈善活动。另外，由于数千名的中国学子在佛学院依靠雄厚的师资力量直接用中文学习西藏佛教。还有佛学院几位出色的堪布在中国哲学、佛学界，乃至世界各地受到广泛欢迎。特别是学院虽然由宁玛传承的晋美彭措大师创办，但一直坚持西藏各大传承哲学体系的综合式教学方式，所以，更是广受欢迎，学员云集。
中共为了控制西藏佛教以及为其独裁统治服务前后颁布多部“法规”，控制佛教机构、干涉宗教活动、涉足宗教传统等，如《藏传佛教寺庙管理办法》、《藏传佛教活佛转世管理办法》等等。
自从佛学院创办起，来自西藏各地的学子日益增多，现有万余学员，如此庞大的西藏佛教组织对于独裁者、消灭西藏文化和民族为目的的中共来说一直是眼中钉，早想斩草除根。但是，由于佛学院管理层和学员坚持自律，包括2008年全西藏发生抗议事件时佛学院非常谨慎，最后中共还是没有找到下手的机会。但是，对于像中共这样的独裁殖民政权来说“欲加之罪，何患无辞”？曾经多次以不同的理由进行了严厉打击色达佛学院，一直无法全面控制佛学院。因此，中共最高层“发怒”了，在中共“中央第六次西藏工作座谈会和第二次全国宗教工作会议”等会议上习近平指出：“推动宗教问题始终是中共治国理政必须处理好的重大问题，宗教工作在党和国家工作全域中具有特殊重要性，并强调宗教中国化是重要任务。”因此，色达佛学院难逃一劫，也是为什么地方政府如此下定决心的原因。
西藏人权与民主促进中心谴责：“中国政府对西藏色达佛学院实施的强拆和所谓的改革项目不仅仅是对佛学院宗教活动进行限制、是强制摧毁僧尼宿舍、分割佛学院基础上进一步从佛学院上师喇嘛和堪布手中剥夺管理寺院的权力，并安排中共的干部管理佛学院。然后，将要把佛学院改变成中共政治运动的基地，特别将要驱逐学习佛教的僧人、尼姑和居士等。全面限制以佛教为主的西藏独特文化的学习和继承。从以上中共的文件中清楚看到，其目的是摧毁西藏人民的特质和语言等文化。”
佛学院别无选择
最近网上传色达佛学院堪布慈诚罗珠7月2日向僧尼众发表的讲话录音。堪布慈诚罗珠在讲话中强调政府已经下定决心要拆除僧舍，也说明了官方文件对这次清洗的既定政策。还说明了这个决定来自中共中央最高决策者。他也回顾了前几次的打压经历，以及堪布晋美彭措大师在面临打压时的立场和应对方式等。最后，堪布慈诚罗珠呼吁僧尼众要为大局着想，要从佛学院的未来着想，要为佛法既如意宝晋美彭措的法脉着想。如果采取一些极端方式将对整个佛学院带来灾难，我们作为如意宝晋美彭措的弟子相信为佛法、为如意宝的法脉考虑。也劝说不要在社会媒体发表过激言论等。他说他们在拆除僧舍时我们继续看书学习，我知道拆除僧舍是对个人是个很大的损失，因此，佛学院也在想给予个人补助等。而且，特别强调政府在过去几年里一直向佛学院高层施压，这次是在无法摆脱拆除僧舍。
另外，在网上传发说是堪布慈诚罗珠的讲话：“我们将以‘四沙门法’方法应对这场风波；他骂不还骂，他怒不还怒，他打不还打，寻过不还报。”
中共多次打压色达佛学院
色达佛学院创办至今经历了多次中共政治打压，摧毁等，其中较大规模的打压运动如下：
在2001年6月中旬，中共军队开往喇荣高地，进行各种操练军演恐吓，之后，军队开始拆除学院部分中国学员僧舍。5月27日上午9时十五分，中共军队带着工人及监察员进入佛学院拆除尼师宿舍，工人周围是全副武装的军人守护，而且还有更多的士兵在佛学院的制高点上虎视眈眈。当时军方已经下令拆除僧舍时如有人反抗即可立即开枪。6月27日至7月12日，中共拆除2200余座僧舍，并下令佛学院只准许1000名僧人和400名尼师居留，其他一律强制驱逐。这次驱逐事件中由于无法接受中共对佛学院的清洗19岁的西藏尼师旺莫自杀，另外，还有一位中国尼师和中国僧人前后自杀。当时，佛学院僧尼约8800人。
2002年12月，中共政府官员再次来到佛学院要求拆除上次没有拆除的尼师宿舍。12月26日，中共开始拆除行动，当时遭到学员的抗议。后来又与色达县干部发生冲突，并拘捕了四名学员，佛学院按政府要求赔偿了之后，四位学员无罪释放。
2004年4月底至5月初，中共政府再次进入佛学院强制拆除房舍20多栋。
西藏著名作家采访记录“在一个清凉的早晨，有几十辆军用卡车轰鸣地冲进山谷，武警荷枪实弹，纵身跃下，强行拆毁了3000多所房屋。……整个山谷只剩下了1400名学员，法王晋美彭措在失去行动自由一年后终于得以回到了他创建的学院。但是，政府丝毫没有放松对色达佛学院的监控，常年派工作组驻守。”
2016年7月20日
星期二, 7月 26, 2016
Turkistan Islamic Party emir thought killed in 2010 reemerged to lead group in 2014
BY BILL ROGGIO | June 11, 2015
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/06/turkistan-islamic-party-emir-thought-killed-in-2010-reemerged-to-lead-group-in-2014.php
The emir of the Turkistan Islamic Party, who served on al Qaeda’s executive leadership council and who was thought to have been killed in a US drone strike in 2010, is believed to have re-emerged to lead the group after recovering from his injuries. If confirmed, Abdul Haq al Turkistani has been leading the group since the spring of 2014 without the knowledge of US intelligence services.
Abdul Haq appeared in a video that was released on June 5 by Islam Awazi, the official propaganda arm of the Turkistan Islamic Party. The video praised an attack “in Zawa township of Hotan prefecture in China’s Xinjiang region,” according to the SITE Intelligence group. The video was translated from Uighir to Turkish by the Turkistan Islamic Bulletin News Agency, which claimed that the jihadist speaking in the video is indeed Abdul Haq al Turkistani.
The Turkistan Islamic Bulletin News Agency said that Abdul Haq was “heavily injured in 2010” and was “unable to serve [as leader] until 2014,” according to SITE.
The relationship between the Turkistan Islamic Party and the Turkistan Islamic Bulletin News Agency is unclear, Adam Raisman from the SITE Intelligence Group told The Long War Journal. The Turkistan Islamic Bulletin News Agency publishes “a lot of material from TIP and reports on news as it relates to Muslims and jihad in Xinjiang and Syria and elsewhere in the Islamic world,” Raisman said.
The Long War Journal cannot independently confirm that Abdul Haq is alive and now leading the Turkistan Islamic Party. However, based on the timing of the succession, deaths of the group’s leaders, and propaganda released by the Turkistan Islamic Party, the claim from the Turkistan Islamic Bulletin News Agency that Abdul Haq was wounded in 2010 and re-emerged in 2014 does appear to be credible.
US intelligence officials said in September 2010 that they believed Abdul Haq was killed in a US drone strike in Mir Ali in Pakistan’s tribal agency of North Waziristan on Feb. 14, 2010. Pakistani officials also said that they believed that the TIP emir was killed in the drone strike. [See LWJ reports, Chinese terrorist leader Abdul Haq al Turkistani is dead: Pakistani interior minister, and ETIP leader killed in February Predator strike.]
The Turkistan Islamic Party never released an official martyrdom statement for Abdul Haq. In 2010, the jihadist group did name Abdul Shakoor al Turkistani as Abdul Haq’s replacement. Abdul Shakoor was also named by al Qaeda to command its forces in Pakistan’s tribal areas, an indication of just how much the global jihadist group trusted and relied on the TIP. He was subsequently thought to have been killed in a US drone strike in August 2012.
The reemergent Abdul Haq appears to have issued at least one public statement since the spring of 2014 without intelligence services picking up on it. In May 2014, Islam Awazi released a video that “claimed credit for the April 30, 2014, suicide bombings at a railway station in Urumqi in China’s Xinjiang region, and showed in a video the construction of a briefcase bomb used in the attack,” according to SITE. A person speaking in the May 2014 video (he is not identified) is the same person identified as Abdul Haq by the Turkistan Islamic Bulletin News Agency.
Another video, released in March 2014, identifies the leader of the Turkistan Islamic Party as “Abdul Haq Mansour” and uses an image of him, however his face is blurred.
If Abdul Haq is indeed alive and leading the Turkistan Islamic Party, he has been doing so for more than a year without the knowledge of US intelligence officials. Additionally, the fact that he is alive and not dead, as thought by US and other foreign intelligence services, demonstrates just how difficult it is to confirm the deaths of senior leaders and operatives who are targeted by air in areas under enemy control.
A member of al Qaeda’s shura
Abdul Haq, who is also known as Maimaitiming Maimaiti, became the leader of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party in late 2003 after Hassan Mahsum, the group’s previous leader, was killed during clashes with Pakistani troops at an al Qaeda training camp in South Waziristan on Oct. 2, 2003.
Al Qaeda appointed Abdul Haq to its Shura Majlis, or executive leadership council, in 2005, according to the US Treasury Department, which designated him as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in April 2009. The United Nations also designated him as a terrorist leader.
Abdul Haq was considered influential enough in al Qaeda’s leadership circles that he was dispatched to mediate between rival Taliban groups as well as to represent the Shura Majlis in important military matters. In June 2009, he was spotted in Pakistan’s tribal areas attending an important meeting with Baitullah Mehsud, then Pakistan’s overall Taliban commander. Abdul Haq and a senior delegation of Taliban and al Qaeda leaders traveled to Pakistan’s tribal areas to discuss the Pakistani military’s operation in South Waziristan. Among those in attendance were Sirajuddin Haqqani, the operational commander of the Haqqani Network; and Abu Yahya al Libi, who at the time was a senior al Qaeda ideologue and propagandist and later became al Qaeda’s general manager before he was killed by the US in a drone strike.
The Treasury Department said Abdul Haq has sent operatives abroad to raise funds for attacks against Chinese interests both at home and abroad. He also was involved with recruiting, propaganda efforts, and the planning and execution of terror attacks. In early 2008, Haq openly threatened to conduct attacks at the Olympic Games in Beijing.
In August 2009, he threatened to attack Chinese embassies worldwide as well as targets within the country.
Prior to the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, Abul Haq ran a training camp for his recruits at al Qaeda’s camp in Tora Bora in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province. [See LWJ report, “The Uighurs in their own words”.]
He later reestablished camps for the Turkistan Islamic Party in Pakistan’s lawless, Taliban-controlled tribal areas. The Chinese government has pressured Pakistan to dismantle the camps.
The Turkistan Islamic Party remains loyal to al Qaeda and has expanded its reach beyond China and Central and South Asia, and into Syria. The Turkistan Islamic Party’s branch in Syria claims to have more than 1,000 fighters, and the group played a major role in the jihadist coalition, which included al Qaeda’s official branch in Syria, that took control of Jisr al Shughur in Idlib province this spring. [seeLWJ report, Turkistan Islamic Party had significant role in recent Idlib offensive.]
Report: More Than 100 Chinese Muslims Have Joined the Islamic State
BY BETHANY ALLEN-EBRAHIMIANJULY 20, 2016
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/20/report-100-chinese-muslims-have-joined-isis-islamic-state-china-terrorism-uighur/
Chinese state-backed media has claimed that 300 Chinese Muslims are fighting with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and authorities have blamed the violence emanating from its restive northwest on radical Islamist ideology and residents’ ties to foreign terrorist networks. U.S.-based experts and human rights groups have disputed both claims, arguing that China’s repressive political and religious policies have caused the tensions and that, at any rate, the number of Uighur Islamic State fighters is negligible. But new documents, leaked by an Islamic State defector in early 2016, suggest that Beijing is likely correct about the scale of Uighur involvement with the militant movement — if not about the underlying cause.
A July 20 report from New America, a think tank in Washington, DC, examined more than 4,000 registration records of fighters who joined the Islamic State between mid-2013 and mid-2014. These rudimentary questionnaires asked basic questions of each fighter, including origin, travel history, level of education, former employment, and previous jihad experience. Analysis of the records revealed that at least 114 Chinese Uighurs, a predominantly Muslim Turkic-speaking ethnic group concentrated in the northwestern Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang, entered Islamic State territory during that time period. Nate Rosenblatt, the author of the report and an independent Middle East/North Africa researcher, obtained the data from contacts made during his previous research in Syria.
The report indicates that Uighur Islamic State fighters were poor, unskilled, and uneducated — precisely none reported having attended college. On average, the Uighurs had the skill level of construction workers. Seventy-three percent of Uighur fighters in the sample joined the Islamic State after its conquest of the key Iraqi city of Mosul in June 2014, an event which greatly strengthened the military organization and its image as a viable state. And Uighurs in the sample had the widest age range among all the groups represented, with the youngest registered fighter aged 10 and the oldest aged 80. This likely indicates that Uighurs were more likely than other groups to have brought their families along with them. “These people are extremely poor,” said Rosenblatt in a phone interview with Foreign Policy. “They don’t have jobs. They don’t have good education. They hardly travel. Because the cost of traveling — financially and psychologically — are likely very high, it appears they are moving to the Islamic State on a more permanent basis.”
The Uighurs in the sample were entirely new to jihad.The Uighurs in the sample were entirely new to jihad. When asked if they had any previous experience with jihad, 110 of the Uighurs replied that they had not; the other four left the question blank. Seventy percent of respondents indicated they had never left China before embarking for the Islamic State. Rosenblatt said this suggests the fighters are not part of “traditional Islamic separatist movements that have existed in China for some time,” such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a Uighur separatist organization that China and the United States have labeled a terrorist organization. Beijing often blames Xinjiang unrest on the ETIM, while maintaining that Uighurs enjoy “unprecedented religious freedom” in China.
The lack of previous experience with jihad and the implied lack of contact with ETIM suggests that “it may not be that these fighters are as religiously motivated” as some fighters with origins elsewhere, said Rosenblatt, but rather that the they are looking “perhaps for a sense of belonging that they don’t get in China.” The Islamic State has targeted Uighurs with slick propaganda videos showcasing orderly classrooms full of children studying the Quran. “That is exactly what a lot of these fighters are looking for,” said Rosenblatt.
Chinese control hasn’t always sat well with the Uighurs, who have resided in Xinjiang for more than 1,000 years; after the collapse of two short-lived Soviet-backed republics in the 1930s and 1940s, small uprisings against Chinese rule have occasionally broken out in the region. Since the 1990s, pockets of Uighur society have increasingly turned to Islam as way to strengthen their resolve against state administrative controlSince the 1990s, pockets of Uighur society have increasingly turned to Islam as way to strengthen their resolve against state administrative control and Chinese cultural encroachment.
The security situation swiftly deteriorated after 2009, when ethnic riots in Xinjiang’s regional capital of Urumqi broke out between Uighurs and Han, China’s majority ethnic group. Almost 200 perished. Regional authorities shut off internet access for months after the riots and have heavily restricted foreign journalists’ access to much of the region. Chinese authorities have vocally blamed religious extremism for the unrest, while outside human rights groups have decried repressive religious and political policies and preferential economic practices that have benefited Han Chinese while marginalizing Uighurs in their own homeland. Authorities have implemented policies in Xinjiang which curtail common religious practices such as fasting, praying, wearing veils, and holding informal religious study groups.
The rise of the Islamic State has roughly coincided with increased violence that has spread from Xinjiang to the rest of China. In October 2013, five died when a car crashed into a group of pedestrians near Tiananmen Square in Beijing. The al Qaeda-affiliated Turkistan Islamic Party claimed responsibility for the attack in a video, with the group’s leader proclaiming on camera, “O Chinese unbelievers, know that you have been fooling East Turkistan for the last sixty years, but now they have awakened,” using a Uighur separatist term for Xinjiang. In February 2014, a band of knife-wielding masked attackers, later identified as Uighurs, attacked civilians at a train station in the southwestern Chinese city of Kunming, killing around 30. The terrorist attack shook the nation. In October 2015, foreign-based news agencies reported that 50 people had been killed in an attack on a coal mine, apparently perpetrated by knife-wielding Uighurs against the primarily Han facility.
But despite Chinese claims of radical Islamist and ETIM involvement, it’s been difficult to verify what is truly transpiring on the ground, due mostly to strict information control and online censorship. Unconfirmed rumors of police massacres of civilians have swirled among Uighur expat groups.
It’s also been extremely difficult to verify how many Uighurs have left China to join the Islamic State.It’s also been extremely difficult to verify how many Uighurs have left China to join the Islamic State. In December 2014, citing unnamed sources, state-run Global Times reported in that 300 Chinese Uighurs were fighting alongside the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. U.S.-based experts have previously disputed that number as “implausibly high.”
Uighurs within China are subject to travel restrictions, with local authorities confiscating passports and refusing to issue new passports. Even so, Uighurs seem to have left China in large numbers over the past two years as Chinese authorities have cracked down in Xinjiang. Since 2014, thousands of Uighurs have arrived in Turkey, many through human smuggling networks in Southeast Asia. In a 2015 interview in Istanbul with FP, Seyit Tumturk, the vice president of World Uighur Congress, a foreign-based Uighur organization that opposes Chinese rule in Xinjiang, said that some Uighurs in Xinjiang are desperate to flee, and that sometimes the only help they can find comes from extremist organizations.
“They don’t allow us to live as Muslims,” one Uighur refugee in Turkey told Reuters in 2015, referring to Chinese authorities. “You can’t pray. You can’t keep more than one Koran at home. You can’t teach Islam to your children. You can’t fast and you can’t go to Hajj. When you’re deprived of your whole identity, what’s the point?”
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/20/report-100-chinese-muslims-have-joined-isis-islamic-state-china-terrorism-uighur/
Chinese state-backed media has claimed that 300 Chinese Muslims are fighting with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and authorities have blamed the violence emanating from its restive northwest on radical Islamist ideology and residents’ ties to foreign terrorist networks. U.S.-based experts and human rights groups have disputed both claims, arguing that China’s repressive political and religious policies have caused the tensions and that, at any rate, the number of Uighur Islamic State fighters is negligible. But new documents, leaked by an Islamic State defector in early 2016, suggest that Beijing is likely correct about the scale of Uighur involvement with the militant movement — if not about the underlying cause.
A July 20 report from New America, a think tank in Washington, DC, examined more than 4,000 registration records of fighters who joined the Islamic State between mid-2013 and mid-2014. These rudimentary questionnaires asked basic questions of each fighter, including origin, travel history, level of education, former employment, and previous jihad experience. Analysis of the records revealed that at least 114 Chinese Uighurs, a predominantly Muslim Turkic-speaking ethnic group concentrated in the northwestern Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang, entered Islamic State territory during that time period. Nate Rosenblatt, the author of the report and an independent Middle East/North Africa researcher, obtained the data from contacts made during his previous research in Syria.
The report indicates that Uighur Islamic State fighters were poor, unskilled, and uneducated — precisely none reported having attended college. On average, the Uighurs had the skill level of construction workers. Seventy-three percent of Uighur fighters in the sample joined the Islamic State after its conquest of the key Iraqi city of Mosul in June 2014, an event which greatly strengthened the military organization and its image as a viable state. And Uighurs in the sample had the widest age range among all the groups represented, with the youngest registered fighter aged 10 and the oldest aged 80. This likely indicates that Uighurs were more likely than other groups to have brought their families along with them. “These people are extremely poor,” said Rosenblatt in a phone interview with Foreign Policy. “They don’t have jobs. They don’t have good education. They hardly travel. Because the cost of traveling — financially and psychologically — are likely very high, it appears they are moving to the Islamic State on a more permanent basis.”
The Uighurs in the sample were entirely new to jihad.The Uighurs in the sample were entirely new to jihad. When asked if they had any previous experience with jihad, 110 of the Uighurs replied that they had not; the other four left the question blank. Seventy percent of respondents indicated they had never left China before embarking for the Islamic State. Rosenblatt said this suggests the fighters are not part of “traditional Islamic separatist movements that have existed in China for some time,” such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a Uighur separatist organization that China and the United States have labeled a terrorist organization. Beijing often blames Xinjiang unrest on the ETIM, while maintaining that Uighurs enjoy “unprecedented religious freedom” in China.
The lack of previous experience with jihad and the implied lack of contact with ETIM suggests that “it may not be that these fighters are as religiously motivated” as some fighters with origins elsewhere, said Rosenblatt, but rather that the they are looking “perhaps for a sense of belonging that they don’t get in China.” The Islamic State has targeted Uighurs with slick propaganda videos showcasing orderly classrooms full of children studying the Quran. “That is exactly what a lot of these fighters are looking for,” said Rosenblatt.
Chinese control hasn’t always sat well with the Uighurs, who have resided in Xinjiang for more than 1,000 years; after the collapse of two short-lived Soviet-backed republics in the 1930s and 1940s, small uprisings against Chinese rule have occasionally broken out in the region. Since the 1990s, pockets of Uighur society have increasingly turned to Islam as way to strengthen their resolve against state administrative controlSince the 1990s, pockets of Uighur society have increasingly turned to Islam as way to strengthen their resolve against state administrative control and Chinese cultural encroachment.
The security situation swiftly deteriorated after 2009, when ethnic riots in Xinjiang’s regional capital of Urumqi broke out between Uighurs and Han, China’s majority ethnic group. Almost 200 perished. Regional authorities shut off internet access for months after the riots and have heavily restricted foreign journalists’ access to much of the region. Chinese authorities have vocally blamed religious extremism for the unrest, while outside human rights groups have decried repressive religious and political policies and preferential economic practices that have benefited Han Chinese while marginalizing Uighurs in their own homeland. Authorities have implemented policies in Xinjiang which curtail common religious practices such as fasting, praying, wearing veils, and holding informal religious study groups.
The rise of the Islamic State has roughly coincided with increased violence that has spread from Xinjiang to the rest of China. In October 2013, five died when a car crashed into a group of pedestrians near Tiananmen Square in Beijing. The al Qaeda-affiliated Turkistan Islamic Party claimed responsibility for the attack in a video, with the group’s leader proclaiming on camera, “O Chinese unbelievers, know that you have been fooling East Turkistan for the last sixty years, but now they have awakened,” using a Uighur separatist term for Xinjiang. In February 2014, a band of knife-wielding masked attackers, later identified as Uighurs, attacked civilians at a train station in the southwestern Chinese city of Kunming, killing around 30. The terrorist attack shook the nation. In October 2015, foreign-based news agencies reported that 50 people had been killed in an attack on a coal mine, apparently perpetrated by knife-wielding Uighurs against the primarily Han facility.
But despite Chinese claims of radical Islamist and ETIM involvement, it’s been difficult to verify what is truly transpiring on the ground, due mostly to strict information control and online censorship. Unconfirmed rumors of police massacres of civilians have swirled among Uighur expat groups.
It’s also been extremely difficult to verify how many Uighurs have left China to join the Islamic State.It’s also been extremely difficult to verify how many Uighurs have left China to join the Islamic State. In December 2014, citing unnamed sources, state-run Global Times reported in that 300 Chinese Uighurs were fighting alongside the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. U.S.-based experts have previously disputed that number as “implausibly high.”
Uighurs within China are subject to travel restrictions, with local authorities confiscating passports and refusing to issue new passports. Even so, Uighurs seem to have left China in large numbers over the past two years as Chinese authorities have cracked down in Xinjiang. Since 2014, thousands of Uighurs have arrived in Turkey, many through human smuggling networks in Southeast Asia. In a 2015 interview in Istanbul with FP, Seyit Tumturk, the vice president of World Uighur Congress, a foreign-based Uighur organization that opposes Chinese rule in Xinjiang, said that some Uighurs in Xinjiang are desperate to flee, and that sometimes the only help they can find comes from extremist organizations.
“They don’t allow us to live as Muslims,” one Uighur refugee in Turkey told Reuters in 2015, referring to Chinese authorities. “You can’t pray. You can’t keep more than one Koran at home. You can’t teach Islam to your children. You can’t fast and you can’t go to Hajj. When you’re deprived of your whole identity, what’s the point?”
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